

THE
BOSTON QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1842.

ART. I. — *Charles Elwood: or the Infidel Converted.*
By O. A. BROWNSON. Boston: Charles C. Little and
James Brown. 1840. 16mo. pp. 262.

THIS small volume, written for the most part in 1834, though not published till a couple of years since, was by no means designed to offer an elaborate defence of the Christian religion, far less a complete system of theological doctrines. Its purpose was to state with tolerable clearness, and with a little more than ordinary philosophic precision, the leading questions between believers and unbelievers; to show the unsatisfactory character of the answers usually given to those questions; and to indicate with some distinctness a better method of treating them. It is properly a Discourse on the method of handling the matters in issue between believers and unbelievers, with only such applications of it as were necessary to make it intelligible, and to establish its justness and sufficiency.

It is but justice to the author, to say that he never for one moment considered, that the book of itself would be sufficient to convert an unbeliever to the Christian faith; nor that viewed either as a simple argument, or as an exposition of a system of doctrines, it left nothing to be desired. His own painful expe-

rience had taught him, that the unbeliever is never converted by mere argument, however forcible or conclusive. He is never reasoned into faith. His conversion, under the blessing of God, must be the result of the operations of his own mind. Far less can be done for him, than is commonly supposed. The most that we can do for him, is to present him the proper topics of consideration in a light, which aids him from his position to see them for what they really are. This is what and nearly all that is attempted by the author of Charles Elwood. For the desired effect, he relies on the trains of thought which he believes will be naturally suggested to the unbeliever's mind, and the feelings that will be kindled up in his heart. These trains of thought, and these feelings will carry the intelligent unbeliever further than the book itself goes, if he pursues them.

The book is written in the form of an Autobiography, and this has led some to infer that the author is the hero of his story. This, except so far as the purely spiritual experience detailed is concerned, is not true. The author has merely transferred to Charles Elwood his own experience as an unbeliever, the struggles which actually passed in his own mind, the efforts he made to get the better of his doubts, his repeated failures, and ultimate success. Beyond this he has nothing in common with him. The characters introduced are fancy sketches, though perhaps not unlike some frequently met in actual life. We mention this, because there have not been wanting individuals to demand of us, whether, in sketching the character of Mr. Smith, the fanatical preacher, we did or did not mean them!

As a literary production, the work has been objected to, that its story is meagre, and its plot without interest. The aim of the author was not to write a story, that should possess an independent interest, nor to show his skill in weaving and unravelling an intricate plot. The narrative and incidents introduced are integral parts of the work, essential elements of its discussions, and necessary to its main argument, to which

they are designedly subordinated ; but to which they contribute perhaps more than our readers in general suspect. Abstract the personal interest taken in Charles himself, the æsthetic effect of his conversations with his betrothed, and of the moral beauty of Mr. Howard's life, and generous friendship for him ; and the life and force of the argument would be greatly impaired, and nearly all the efficacy of the work would be lost. The author relied more on the subtle influence these would exert on the heart of the unbeliever, than on his metaphysics. Knowing this, we were not a little amused by the following passage from a friendly critic.

“ But we do not think him [Mr. Brownson] qualified, nor do we think that *he has attempted*, in the book before us, to present Christianity and its grounds so as to satisfy the wants and the tastes of all persons. We think that all must feel — the author and all — that the views to which his logic leads do not entirely satisfy. Logic has to do with the intellect and thought — the philosophic element in man. To this element Mr. Brownson has addressed himself satisfactorily. But the heart, and its affections, and sentiments, the fancy and the love of the beautiful, have wants which logic cannot satisfy ; they require what the logical understanding cannot prove to exist ; nay they often require a faith in what it pronounces to be impossible and *absurd*.” *

Doctors disagree. Without offering any comment on the metaphysics of this extract, we will say that it is precisely what this writer supposes the author did not attempt, that he has aimed to do ; and that it is precisely in the logical parts of his work that he is least satisfactory. This critic took up a somewhat prevalent opinion, that the author of Charles Elwood is a sort of logic grinder, without heart or soul, or at best nothing but a gizzard ; and therefore inferred, that he could dream of attempting nothing but the construction of a mere logical argument. Yet from a tolerably intimate acquaintance with the author, of almost forty years' standing, we must say, that we have formed a

* Christian Examiner, May, 1840, p. 198.

somewhat different estimate of his character. We are far from regarding him as the pure intellectual being, the mere dry logic machine supposed. Nay, we doubt whether he has one half the logical power ascribed to him. Abstract the deep, earnest feeling, the passion even, that he mingles up with his arguments, to an extent perhaps little suspected, and we apprehend his logic would be by no means remarkable. But be this as it may, we think that the tone of the book indicates, and we know that its whole design was to show, the utter insufficiency of mere logic to satisfy the wants of the soul, or to effect any real change in one's faith. In his conversations with Messrs. Smith and Wilson, where only logic is brought into play, Charles is represented as falling deeper and deeper into unbelief, and we apprehend that the reader sympathizes with him; but the moment he comes into the presence of his betrothed, whom he loves, and whose gentle tones go to his heart, all is changed; he manifests a stronger and a stronger desire to believe; all his feelings, all the force of his sentiments, the motions of soul are on the side of faith; and we feel that he is not far from the kingdom of heaven. A subtler influence than logic is at work now, that of love; and Charles himself says, that if untoward circumstances had not separated him from Elizabeth, she would have reconciled him to the Christian faith; and we are greatly mistaken, if the reader does not feel as much. Could he, who believed only in the efficacy of what this critic calls logic, and who addressed himself only to the "logical understanding," have written the following? —

"'O, there is a God,' spoken by the sweet lips of eighteen, by her we love and hope in a few days to call our own by the most intimate and sacred of ties,— it goes well nigh to melt even the atheist. It comes to us as a voice from another world, and wins the heart though it fail to convince the understanding. It is no easy thing to be an atheist when one loves, is in presence of the one he loves, and hears her, in the simple, confiding tones of the child, exclaim, 'O, there is a God.' For a moment I gazed on the beautiful being before me, as upon one inspired. Could I see her, hear her, love her with all my heart, and not believe in the Divinity? She seemed

sent to me from a fairer world, to bear witness to the reality of brighter beings than the dull inhabitants of earth."— p. 29.

Or this —

" ' There may be intellectual beings, who are moved by thought alone,— beings who never feel, but live always in mere abstractions. Such persons are dependent never on the state of the affections, and are influenced not at all by the circumstances around them. Of these beings I know not much. I am not one of them. I have believed myself to have a heart as well as a head, and that in me, what the authors of a new science I have just heard of, call the affective nature, is stronger, by several degrees, than the intellectual. The fact is, my feelings have generally controlled my belief, not my belief my feelings. This is no uncommon case. As a general rule would you gain the reason you must first win the heart. This is the secret of most conversions. There is no logic like love. And by-the-by, I believe that the heart is not only often stronger than the head, but in general a safer guide to truth. At any rate, I have never found it difficult to assign plenty of good reason for doing what my heart has prompted me to do. Mr. Howard understood all this perfectly, and uniformly practised on the principle here implied, not as a calculation, but because he was led to it by the benevolence of his own heart. He found me out of humor with myself and the world, suffering acute mental torture, and he saw at once that I must be reconciled to myself and the world, before I could look upon Christianity in the proper frame of mind to judge of its truth and beauty. Then again he was not extremely anxious to convert me. He did not regard me in my present condition as an alien from God, or as deserving to be an outcast from man. To him I was a man, a brother, a child of God. If I had been unable to come to the same belief he had, it might be my loss, but could not be my fault. He would gladly see me a believer, but he thought probably the influence of Christian example, and above all, communion with truly Christian dispositions, would go farther than any arguments addressed merely to my understanding towards making me one.' — pp. 125, 126.

It must be owned that critics do sometimes commit mistakes. If we could be persuaded that we fall into as gross errors with regard to the spirit and design of the works we criticise, as others do in regard to the spirit and design of our own productions, we would throw up the trade of critic at once in disgust.

Moreover, we are not willing to admit that the plot of this work is quite so insignificant, as some represent it. The philosophical discussions unquestionably in part overlay it, and it is by no means worked up, as far as it might be ; but it is far from being without

dramatic capabilities. It turns on the struggle between love and religion, the two strongest sentiments human beings ever experience. Ordinarily these two sentiments flow into each other, religion purifying and exalting love, and love softening, condensing, and individualizing religion; but now and then their harmony is interrupted, their alliance broken off, and they assume to each other hostile relations. The conflict which then ensues is terrible. As when Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war. Few bosoms can survive the struggle unharmed, — a struggle which almost always results in death, or in complete or partial insanity. We have ourselves witnessed, during seasons of great religious excitement, several instances of this conflict between love and religion, which we shall not speedily forget. In writing the portions of the work relating to Charles and Elizabeth, the author had in mind a real fact related to him by the young gentleman whom it concerned, and who was at the time one of his parishioners. The poor girl, a most lovely creature, full of life and soul, of captivating manners, and severe principles, was a lunatic, the last time we heard of her. We must, therefore, feel that the story of the book is naturally rich enough in materials, and materials of high dramatic interest. It would have been comparatively easy to have amplified it, and multiplied the incidents; and had it comported with the didactic design we had in view, and had it not been for our horror of writing a big book, which we hold to be a great evil, we should have so done, or at least tried our hand at so doing, whether qualified to succeed or not. But enough of this.

We have heard it alleged, that throughout the book the infidel has the better of the argument. He unquestionably does have the better of the argument in the first nine chapters; but not in the rest of the book, at least so far as we can judge. In these chapters it was unavoidable. The design of the writer was to show the real strength of the infidel argument, and the insufficiency of the replies usually given by standard

authors on the evidences of our faith. Charles, therefore, must be more than a match for Messrs. Smith and Wilson, the representatives of those authors. But we cannot admit that Messrs. Smith and Wilson are mere men of straw. They reason as well as men can from their point of view, and better than one clergyman out of a hundred does reason in his actual controversies with unbelievers. They had the wrong side of the question on the particular points at issue, and their failure was inevitable, and not the fault of the writer.

The fact is, and there is no use in pretending to the contrary, that the works in defence of religion, most in vogue among our orthodox people, excellent as they are in some respects, are utterly inadequate to meet the wants of the unbeliever. They do not reach his case; they do not touch the actual difficulties with which he labors; and they are never able to effect his conversion. Reduced to their elements they are, as arguments, logically defective; and this is what Charles but too easily demonstrates. They, who rely on these works, are themselves believers, and therefore feel no need of their aid to convince themselves. They have never reduced them to their simple elements, and consequently have never discovered their intrinsic weakness. Hence, when the author of Charles Elwood so reduces them, and shows that weakness, they think he has done them injustice. But we will thank those who complain that the infidel has the better of the argument, to tell us what argument for the truth of revelation is to be found in any popular treatise on the evidences of Christianity, that Mr. Smith does not recognise and urge; and what consideration of any value connected with the argument from nature for the existence of God, that Mr. Wilson does not suggest, or that Charles does not meet. These arguments and considerations, it is true, are stated in the briefest possible manner, but as arguments they are stated in all their strength. They are not developed, nor was it necessary. Messrs. Smith and Wilson could have talked more, they might have been made to multiply words, and to bewilder

their opponent in the mazes of sophistry, or to overwhelm him with declamation; but they could not have been made to reason better, unless they could have been made to change their point of view; because from their point of view religion is wholly indefensible,—a fact they would perceive at once, did they rely on their own arguments as the grounds of their own faith. Men are for the most part sounder in their actual faith than in the reasons they give for it. It is rarely the case, that they are able to assign the reasons which have actually induced them to believe as they do.

Throughout the rest of the book the charge cannot be sustained. We do not now insist on Mr. Morton's metaphysical arguments, for Charles is represented to be virtually a convert before he makes Mr. Morton's acquaintance. Mr. Morton is in reality instructing the neophyte, not converting the unbeliever. His arguments would have no weight with one, who was still in fact disposed to question the truth of religion. Mr. Howard is the one who converts Charles to religion, and Mr. Morton labors merely to give a rational and philosophic form to his faith. In judging of the merits of the book this fact is important, and yet it seems to have been altogether overlooked. We do not recollect having seen any notice taken of the ground assumed by Mr. Howard, the only original ground assumed in the whole work, and the only additions, if any, that it makes to the usual arguments adduced in defence of Christianity. The following extract will show what this ground is.

"One evening, while we were conversing, I remarked to Mr. Howard, that since I had been in his family, I had been almost persuaded to become a Christian.

"‘Perhaps,’ he replied, ‘you are, and always have been, much nearer being a Christian than you imagine.’

"‘But I can hardly be a Christian without knowing it’

"‘I am not so sure of that. Christianity is not a creed, but a life. He who has the spirit of Jesus is a Christian, be his speculative belief what it may.’

"‘I have not as yet advanced far enough to admit even the existence of a God. I see not then how I can have much of Christ in me.’

"Christ is not a dogma to be believed, but a spirit to be cultivated and obeyed. Whoever loves truth and goodness, and is willing to die for their honor and the redemption of man, as Jesus did, I hold to be a Christian in the only worthy sense of the term. He may not indeed have the 'letter' which 'killeth,' but that is no great loss, so long as he has the 'spirit' which 'giveth life.'"

"You seem determined to make me out a Christian, and that too without changing my faith."

"The belief in Christ lies in the bottom of every honest man's heart. Christianity is nothing foreign to our soul. It is the ideal, the realization of which would constitute the perfection of our nature. Just so far as you advance in the work of perfecting your own nature, do you grow in Christ; and could you attain to the highest perfection admitted by your nature as a man, you would attain to the stature of a perfect man in Christ Jesus. In yielding obedience to the moral laws of your own being, you are yielding obedience to the Gospel. One of these laws, the one which I term the social element of human nature, you obeyed in your efforts to reform society and augment the sum of the common weal of your kind. Consequently in obeying this element, you were conforming to the Christian law. You fancied you were obeying a law of infidelity, but that was an error of judgment, easily accounted for. You saw that element generally overlooked or discarded by the Christian world; you therefore inferred that it could not be an element of Christianity; and you rejected Christianity because you supposed it rejected this element. But had you seen that Christianity recognised this element as its great, its central law, you would not have thought of rejecting it."

"But I was an unbeliever long before I ever dreamed of turning social reformer."

"Very possibly; but still for a Christian reason. All the infidelity I have ever met with springs from one of two causes acting separately, or from both combined. The first cause of infidelity I have already spoken of. Some men feel a strong desire to redress social or political grievances, and are repulsed by the church. They therefore imagine the church opposed to political freedom, and social progress; and identifying Christianity with the church, they disown it, and very properly. The second cause of infidelity is found in the development of the philosophical element of our nature. This element is strong in some men. They must be free to inquire what and wherefore they believe. This inquiry the church has prohibited; they have therefore concluded it prohibited by Christianity itself; and therefore have rejected Christianity; and I add again, very properly. In both of these cases the supposed rejection of Christianity has been induced by Christian motives; and the infidel could not have been, with his lights, a Christian, had he done differently." — pp. 127 — 129.

Mr. Howard assumes that there is no radical difference between the inward life of an honest, intelligent unbeliever, and that of an honest, intelligent believer.

His argument, therefore, properly consists in establishing the identity of the inward life of the one with that of the other. He proceeds on the ground, that the work to be done is not so much to give the unbeliever a new and a different faith, as to enable him to find and comprehend the faith he already has; for paradoxical as it may seem, the unbeliever has a faith. Every man, who is really a *live* man, has a faith; but not always the faith he thinks he has, nor that which he writes out in articles, or to which he formally subscribes. His faith is the intimate conviction of his soul, that which constitutes his spiritual life, and controls him in his general relations with the unseen world of truth, and in his relations with the world of mankind. This faith, Mr. Howard assumes to be in the case of the unbeliever, in point of fact, as well as with the believer, essentially the true Christian faith. He therefore takes up the inward life of Charles, and shows it made up of Christian elements, that Charles had never really rejected Christianity, and that in supposing he had, he had done great injustice to himself.

In confirmation of Mr. Howard's view, we may appeal to the experience, not of every one who has been a scoffer and has subsequently become a professor of religion; but to every honest man who has at one period of his life doubted, or supposed that he doubted, the truth of Christianity, but has come finally to embrace it, and to find his happiness in living for it. Every such man feels that he is the same man after his conversion that he was before, and that in fact the elements of his faith are the same. He tells us that he was an unbeliever only because he misinterpreted his own faith, and because he misconceived the true character of the Christian religion. We know at least, that such was our experience, and it was our own experience that led us to place the argument adduced, in the mouth of Mr. Howard.

We may also come to the same conclusion, or to the conclusion that there cannot be this radical difference, commonly supposed, between the believer and the un-

believer, by the higher consideration of the fraternity of the race, and the unity of the human mind. If there is any one thing incontestable, it is that the brotherhood of the race is a doctrine of Christian revelation. This doctrine of brotherhood must mean something, and more than that all have sprung from the same original stock. It implies that all men have not only a family relation, but a family likeness, and therefore the same general manner of feeling and of thinking. The human mind too is essentially one ; modified in different ages and individuals it may indeed be, but it operates everywhere, and always, by the same general laws ; and we see by the records of the remotest past, that the human mind, then at work, was the selfsame human mind that is at work now. All thinkers, then, must be of the same family, the same brotherhood ; and instead of supposing themselves to be enemies, they should feel, and know, themselves to be friends and brothers.

Mr. Howard, therefore, we insist is right, in contending that Charles was already a Christian in fact. The only thing he should have guarded against, which he has neglected to do, is the universal application, which he does not make, but which some may suppose he makes, of his doctrine. Charles Elwood, though an unbeliever, belongs to Christian civilization, and therefore lives necessarily the life of Christ, so far as that civilization has realized it, whether fancying himself a believer or an unbeliever. Mr. Howard is right, then, in telling him that Christ is at the bottom of his heart. But would the same remark hold true of a savage, or a man born and brought up in an order of civilization less advanced than the Christian, say the Mahometan, or the Braminical ? Not to the fullest extent. Christian civilization embraces the elements of all inferior civilizations, but adds to them, what is peculiarly its own. The man brought up in these inferior civilizations could then be a Christian only in a general and feeble sense ; only so far as those civilizations constitute elements of the Christian civilization. The question

would be not of a difference of kind, but of degree. But in the bosom of Christian civilization itself, no man can be born and brought up without being, in his practical or actual faith, a Christian, so far as that civilization itself is Christian. There is, then, no room for this bitter controversy which rages between believers and unbelievers, when one comes to understand the matter. With this qualification, we are willing to be responsible for Mr. Howard's argument.

To avoid all occasion for misapprehension, we say, what we suppose is sufficiently obvious without being said, that in Mr. Howard's statement, or in our own present statement, it is not a question either of the account men render of their faith, nor of their actual conduct; but simply of what may be called their spiritual or interior life, so far as spiritual life they have. Hume was a speculative skeptic, but an actual believer. In his philosophy he doubted of everything, but in reality he was as firm a believer as Reid himself. Men differ widely in the accounts they render of their faith, when virtually their faith is the same. In their actual conduct men also differ, and differ widely; but the conduct of the professed unbeliever not unfrequently conforms more nearly to the Christian law, than that of the large mass of professed Christians. The Church is very far from embosoming all the virtue in the community. The profession of religion is a cloak which sometimes covers a multitude of sins.

Taking this view of the argument, with these explanations and qualifications, we must needs believe that the charge, that the infidel gets the better of the argument, is unfounded. The infidel is not convicted of being wrong where he was right, it is true; but he is convicted of having misconceived Christianity, and of having rejected it through ignorance of its real character; and he is brought to believe it, by being made to understand it. What more could have been required, we know not.

A writer in the *Christian Review*, Dr. Wayland, we believe, President of Brown University, objects to

Charles Elwood, that he remains the same man after conversion, that he was before ; and says that the book ought to have been entitled " Charles Elwood, or Christianity converted." This is very clever ; but the Reviewer does not seem to have even suspected, what he charges upon the author as a fault, was done with " malice aforethought." In the first place, the very design of the book was to show, not the radical difference, but the radical identity, between the true believer and the honest, intelligent unbeliever. It would have been then a great blunder on the part of the author, to have made his hero a different man after his conversion from what he was before. Moreover, Charles had, prior to his conversion, we will not say all the Christian graces and virtues of this learned and philosophic Reviewer, but at least all that fall to the lot of ordinary Christians ; and it would have been difficult to have improved his character by radically changing it.

The Reviewer also overlooks a very important fact, at least in the estimation of Christians of his persuasion, that Charles Elwood is represented to have experienced religion in his early youth, to have been regenerated even, before he became an unbeliever. To have regenerated him again would have been rank heresy, for which no one would have been more ready to censure the author, than this Reviewer, who, we presume, holds to the doctrine, " once in grace always in grace." Here is the account that Charles gives of himself.

" ' Do not fancy that I have become what I am without a struggle. I am not ignorant of what men call religion. It has been the study of my life. My first lesson was the catechism, and my earliest delight was in reading religious books, conversing with religious people, and thinking of God and heaven. I was not yet thirteen when I was affected as you have been, — had deep and pungent conviction for sin, — heard, as I fancied, the Son of God declare my sins forgiven, and felt all the ecstatic joy you now feel.' " — p. 31.

Now, the author meant to represent Charles as having been really regenerated, or he did not ; for in a subsequent part of the book he shows that he holds to the doctrine of regeneration, and therefore could not have intended to represent a religious experience to

be of no value. If he did not mean to represent Charles as having had a genuine religious experience, how could he have put this confession into his mouth? If he did mean to represent him as having been really born again in early life, he could not with any consistency have made his subsequent conversion a regeneration.

Moreover, the author designedly represented Charles as an amiable, intelligent, and worthy man, even while an unbeliever; not only because there are unbelievers who really deserve to be so represented, but because he had never been able to persuade himself, that the best way to make an unbeliever in love with our religion, is to begin by declaring him a bad man, a great rascal, deserving the utter reprobation of every friend to religion and virtue. When he was himself an unbeliever, he frequently met with good, pious clergymen, who sought to convert him by a similar method; but he never observed that their success equalled their efforts. He had also observed that in books written against unbelievers, and designed for popular reading, the infidel was always represented to be a profane wretch, a drunkard, a gambler, or a debauched villain. Such representations have a very bad effect. They mislead believers; they irritate unbelievers; and in no way advance the cause of religion and morality. They have the very opposite effect from the one intended. They create the impression with unbelievers, that believers have no solid arguments to offer for their faith; for they not unnaturally infer, that a man rarely resorts to misrepresentation and abuse, so long as he has anything better to offer. The author aimed, therefore, to avoid this error, as he regarded it, and to be just to the unbeliever, both for the unbeliever's sake, his own, and that of the cause he advocated.

But it is said, that Charles is proud, and does not repent and humble himself before God. As to repenting, we do not know, so far as his character is drawn, what Charles had to repent of. No sin or misdemeanor is laid to his charge. That he had doubted is true;

that he had dared to be faithful to the light he had, and to follow his convictions, though they exposed him to much popular prejudice, and cost many and heavy sacrifices, cannot be denied ; but this, so far from being matter to be repented of, was on all sound moral principles his merit, and his glory. To have made him repent of his honesty, his sincerity, his independence, his moral courage, his devotion to truth, and his willingness to sacrifice himself for the good of mankind, would have been to teach a morality, we should be sorry to find approved by any professed follower of Jesus. And yet, the author must have done this, had he made him repent, and talk like a sinner just converted.

Touching his pride and want of humility, we see not wherein the charge can be sustained. Charles Elwood is a man who respects himself ; who claims to be a man amongst men ; yielding them their dues, but conceding them nothing on the score of the unpopularity of his own faith, or want of faith. He does not make an apology for daring to think for himself ; nor does he beg others to grant him the privilege of thinking for himself. He thinks as he can, as he must ; and if he thinks differently from others, it may be his misfortune, but it is not his crime, *nor their virtue*. He meets them as an equal, and demands to be met as an equal. In all this we see only a proper self-respect, which whoso will not cherish merits only contempt. Towards God he manifests no pride, and no mock humility. He reverences truth, owns his obligation to seek for it, and to obey it ; and he is willing to obey it at whatever personal hazard, when once assured that he has found it. Nor has he an overweening confidence in his own judgment. When he utters his own views, he does it in strong terms, simply and directly, in the tones of an earnest mind, believing the truth and importance of what he utters. But he is willing to be taught, listens with the docility of the child to whomsoever profess to be able to teach him, — unless they begin by abusing him, or assuming to be his masters, who have

the right to command him ; and yields up his previously expressed opinions without a blush, whenever he sees a reason for so doing. Now this does not look to us like an excess of pride, or a sinful want of humility.

It is true, Charles Elwood does not adopt the usual phraseology of religious people, especially of what is called the Evangelical school. Herein we acknowledge his heresy. He is a man whom the garment of Cant can never be made to fit. He cannot go about, and with infinite pains, try to make people believe in his piety. He speaks in his own natural tones, and wears his face as God made it. He makes his confessions, if he makes them at all, to his God, and not to his brother. He never tells people what a great sinner he has been, and how hot a place in the nethermost hell he deserves, in hopes that they will flatter his pride by telling him, "the greater the sinner, the greater the saint." When he prays it is not standing in the synagogue, nor in the corners of the streets, nor in the market place ; nor does he in revenge go to religious conference meetings, and tell his brethren how often he prays in secret. In a word, he takes none of the usual methods to make men believe in his piety or virtue. He aims to be, and to do right, to *be* always what he *seems*. It would have been easy to have corrected all this, to have filled his mouth with pious phrases, to have drawn down his face, turned up his eyes, and made him speak in a sanctimonious tone ; but really we are sinner enough to doubt, whether this would have essentially improved his character in the sight of God, or in the estimation of truly Christian people. We have no disposition to deny, that there are some practices, into which many who are called pious people fall, for which we have no great respect. We cannot help thinking and feeling too, that we have a large number among us, who take unnecessary pains to make us believe them pious worshippers. They quite overshoot the mark. Less ostentation of godly conversation, and more deeds of justice and love, would serve their turn altogether better. There was something worth remembering in

the remark of one of our old divines, who when asked by one of the pious striplings of the day, if he had any religion, replied, "none to *speake* of." Religion should be like the light, the medium through which we see all that we do see, but remaining ever itself unseen. It should be an all pervading spirit, but showing itself only in greater sweetness of temper, kindness of heart, fidelity to the great trusts of life, and untiring zeal and perseverance in the cause of well-doing. It should be worn for use, to cover our nakedness and to keep us warm, not for mere show, to attract the gaze or the remark of the throng.

According to our method of judging, Charles Elwood, so far as his character appears in the book before us, is not obnoxious to the charges preferred against him, and we would rather take our chance with him, even in the days of his grossest darkness and blindest unbelief, than with the loudest of his impugnors. They who think otherwise would do well to "go and learn what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice."

We say at once, however, that we by no means pretend that Charles Elwood is a true representative of all unbelievers. He represents only the serious, honest, intelligent portion of them, the only portion it behoves us to consider in our controversy with those who reject our faith. For the others, the miserable scoffers one meets in grog-shops, on board steamboats, and in stagecoaches, all we have to say is, that we can address them only in the terrors of God's law, from the height of the Christian pulpit. We cannot honor them so much as to enter into a serious controversy with them; for the doubts they profess hang as loosely about them, as do their moral principles. Such are the infidels converted in revival seasons, and who keep up a plentiful supply of fanatics and fanaticism. We turn them over willingly to the Nettletons, the Beechers, the Finneys, the Knapps, and the Maffits.

Thus much we have judged proper to say in defence

of Charles Elwood. We recognise the justice of none of the charges which, to our knowledge, have been alleged against him; and the authors of those charges, by bringing them, seem to us to impeach their own piety and Christian understanding. There are, we must be permitted to say, many things for them to learn, and some graces for them to acquire. Perhaps they would not do amiss to follow the example of Paul after his conversion, and retire for a season into Arabia, before entering upon the discharge of their functions as Christian teachers.

Nevertheless, the book is not altogether free from faults. So far as concerns its spirit and design, its main argument, and the special moral and theological doctrines it inculcates, we do not apprehend that any serious objections can be sustained against it; and if it be interpreted throughout in special reference to the special purpose for which it was written, we are willing to expose it to the rudest criticism. But it bears traces of a system of philosophy, which we are not willing to be responsible for, without some important reservations, and which, if accepted and applied universally, cannot fail to induce some grave errors of reasoning, if not of doctrine. It is not so accepted, nor so applied in Charles Elwood as to affect at all the substance of the work, or in the least to impair confidence in the important results to which the author arrives. It merely in a few instances affects the form of the reasoning by which he obtains those results.

The faults, which we should charge upon the book, belong to it as the reader will understand it, rather than as it was understood by the author himself. The author of Charles Elwood has the habit of viewing most subjects he treats under a special aspect, and of treating them with reference to a special purpose. If the reader seizes that special purpose, and interprets all that is said solely in reference to it, he will rarely find the author in the wrong, and still more rarely find any difficulty in understanding him. But this habit necessarily involves that of using terms in

a more special and definite sense, than the one in which they are used by the generality of people. Hence a perpetual misunderstanding between him and his readers. They are always accusing him of advocating doctrines which he by no means entertains ; and whenever he succeeds by a change of phraseology, or of the point of view from which he treats his subjects, in conveying to them some glimmering of his real doctrines, they forthwith charge him with having changed his opinions, and sneeringly allege, that he has obtained "a new stock of ideas." Part of this grows out of the nature of the subjects which he discusses, and the loose notions generally prevalent on those subjects ; part out of the haste with which he is obliged, by circumstances not under his control, to throw off his compositions ; but more perhaps from the peculiarities, defects it may be, of his mental constitution. His mind operates usually with great intensity, concentrating for the time being all its forces upon the precise point under consideration. It is also deficient in that power, so essential to the artist, of properly grouping his subjects, and of duly distributing the light and shadow. The main figure is always kept distinctly in view ; it is brought out boldly in the fore-ground, as it should be ; but the other figures, essential to the picture, are thrown too far into the back ground, and some of them so far as not to be detected by ordinary eyes. They are so deeply shaded that few discover them, and hence it is inferred that they escaped the observation of the artist. This is a defect which he has tried in vain to overcome, and it is this which occasions nearly all the misunderstanding between him and his readers. Yet, whoso takes the author's position will, we apprehend, if he have a tolerable pair of eyes, and if he look long and steadily, discover that the figures are all there.

Without meaning this as an apology for the author, we suggest it for the guidance of his readers. The book must be considered from the point of view of the author, and interpreted by the precise purpose he had in writing it. This is necessary when it is taken as

a whole ; it is also necessary in considering any particular part of it. The purpose for which any special statement is made must shed the light by which to interpret it ; nothing in the book stands alone, and very little that is said has, in itself, an independent value. Its value consists in its bearing on some ulterior purpose. This is not perhaps the best way of writing, but it is our way, and we can write in no other.

The faults, which we are about to point out in the metaphysical part of this work, nearly all grow out of the fact, that the author uses terms, which may seem to have a general application, in a special sense ; and therefore appears to be affirming universal truths, when he is in reality only affirming special truths, or presenting merely such special aspects of truth as serve to enlighten the particular purpose he has in view. The error involved, then, it may easily be seen, consists rather in the application which others may make of what he says, than in the application which he himself makes of it. It may also, then, be seen how the book, as existing in the author's mind, can be sound, and yet, as it actually appears, not be free from some grave errors.

The book we hold free from the defects to which we refer, till, in the progress of the story, Mr. Morton is introduced to give what may be termed the metaphysics of religion. Till then the author speaks, from his own internal experience, the views which have been elaborated in his own mind. Thus far we would offer no criticism on the book, with the single exception, that Mr. Howard, who is the representative of the peculiar views of the author, in the chapter on Rationalism, restricts a little too much the sphere of the philosophical part of human nature, makes philosophy too exclusively retrospective, and separates it too widely from religion. He, however, expressly identifies philosophy with Christianity, which is well. Had he asserted its absolute identity with religion, he would have done better, presented a juster view both of Christianity and of philosophy. His error lies in making

Christianity more abstract than it is, and in recognising in philosophy nothing but the results of cool, unimpassioned reflection. However, Mr. Howard is in the main clear, and just in his statements.

The serious deficiencies of the work commence with Mr. Morton, who attempts to interpret religion by the light of Cousin's Philosophy, slightly reinforced by some scattered rays from Benjamin Constant. In general he borrows from these two writers only what is worthy of confidence. For the most part, he escapes their errors; but we find on a careful revision that he has not done it altogether, and that, owing to the adoption of their phraseology, he has the appearance of not having done it to so great an extent, as he really has. The points, on which he has fallen into error, or has not been sufficiently explicit in his statements, or guarded in his language, are three. 1. The origin of religion in human nature. 2. The impersonality of reason. 3. The division of reason into spontaneous reason, and reflective reason. The first shows the influence of Benjamin Constant; the other two of Victor Cousin. The first concerns the foundations of religion in the human soul; the second affects the form of the argument offered for the existence of God; and the third the explanation presented of the fact of inspiration.

I. Benjamin Constant, in his valuable work on "Religion considered in its origin, its forms, and its developments," defines religion to be a sentiment of the heart, an indestructible law of man's nature, seeking ever to embody itself in outward institutions. He attempts to bring all the phenomena of man's religious history within the range of sentiment. But this he cannot do. Unquestionably religion is a sentiment, but it is also more than sentiment. It is idea as well as sentiment. Religion, in addition to the inward sentiment, is man's theory of the universe; his solution of the problem of his own existence and destiny, prescribing to him a life-plan he must endeavor to realize, imposing a duty he must labor to perform. It is always

legislative ; it imposes the law ; hence, the Jews, with singular propriety, call their religion "the Law," and never by any other name. It always involves the idea of that which binds, which lays man under obligation. It implies, therefore, always moral considerations. Morality may not include religion, — though without it, it has no adequate foundation, — but religion always includes morality. They, who in our times attempt to separate religion and morality, whether in favor of the one or of the other, fall into serious error. The common sense of mankind pronounces the expression, an *immoral* religious man, a contradiction in terms.

Mr. Morton enlarges the definition of Benjamin Constant. He defines religion to be a craving for the infinite, and certain ideas or conceptions, which he calls "intuitions of reason." This definition, though loosely given, is substantially correct. It was intended to supply the defects of Benjamin Constant's definition, and is perhaps broad enough to embrace all that has ever been considered essential to religion. We would prefer to say religion, regarded as sentiment, is the *aspiration* to the infinite, to saying that it is a *craving* for the infinite ; nevertheless, the main point is recognised, namely, that religion is both *sentiment* and *idea*.

Thus far Mr. Morton makes an evident advance on Benjamin Constant, and is worthy of reliance. But there is another point involved in his statement, about which we are not quite so clear, or rather two points. He says, religion is a fact of man's natural history, proceeding from a law of his nature, a fundamental want of his soul ; and that the ideas or conceptions man seeks to embody in his religious institutions are intuitions of reason ; by which last, he apparently means, as may be gathered from his argument, that they are fundamental elements of human intelligence, without which man would not, and could not be an intelligent being. This language is susceptible of a meaning to which we by no means object ; but it may be interpreted so as to teach a doctrine, to which we are very far

from assenting. What was the precise meaning attached to it, we will not take it upon us to decide ; though we apprehend that the author at the time of using it, beyond a certain point, had only a vague and confused meaning. If it mean no more than that man has the natural aptitude to be religious, the natural capacity to aspire to the infinite, and to recognise intuitively the ideas or conceptions of reason concerned, that is, of knowing them when presented, which most likely was his meaning, we have no fault to find ; but if it be so interpreted as to teach that the sentiment itself is innate, a law of man's soul ; and that the ideas or conceptions are elements of the faculty of intelligence ; that is to say, innate ideas ; we hold that it is altogether objectionable.

No sentiment is or can be innate. Sentiment is the soul in exercise, exercising its power to feel. It requires a power in the soul, and an exercise of that power to feel, as much as it does to know, or to do. They are out in their psychology, who consider the soul as purely passive in its sentiments. In point of fact the soul is never more active, than in what are called the passions. Love is called a passion, but it is its highest possible activity, the fullest possible expression of its interior life and energy. Man then acts when he feels. Sentiment, then, is an act, not a law ; an exercise, not an element of the soul. Hence religion, viewed as sentiment, can exist in the soul only when the soul exercises itself, or acts in a particular manner. It is not true, then, to say, as some of us do, that the religious sentiment is a fundamental law, an indestructible element of human nature. If it were so, we must have the sentiment at every moment. No man, and at no moment of his existence, could be without it. But we can have no sentiment without being conscious of it. We are never more conscious than in our sentiments. Sentiments are inconceivable without consciousness. We lose sentiment, just in proportion as we lose consciousness. If then, the religious sentiment be an ever present phenomenon of

the soul, then must we at every moment of our lives be conscious of it, at least when we are conscious at all. But this is by no means the fact. There are men who rarely, if ever, experience the sentiment; and there are moments in the lives of the most devout, when they have no consciousness of it. The power or capacity to experience the sentiment is, no doubt, innate, a fundamental law of human nature; but the sentiment itself is born and dies with the exercise of its power.

Passing over now religion regarded as mere sentiment, to religion as idea; is it, in this last sense, a law of man's nature? Mr. Morton in this last sense makes religion consist in the idea of the true, the idea of the beautiful, and the idea of the good. This is all well enough. But these ideas, are they constitutive elements of the *faculty* of reason? Man is born, we presume it will be conceded us, with all his faculties; at least in germ. If reason be one of his faculties; if these ideas are constitutive elements of reason, then he must be born with them. The question, then, is simply, are these ideas innate, elements of the soul; and does seeing them by intuition mean detecting them in the soul itself? This was not the doctrine Mr. Morton intended to teach, but it is perhaps authorized by his language.

We have no faith in the doctrine of innate ideas, — a doctrine unjustly ascribed to Descartes. Descartes says expressly, that all he means by innate ideas is, that the power or faculty, by which we think certain thoughts, God, for instance, is innate. By intuition we have in none of our writings understood seeing by looking *in*, but as the word itself says, seeing by looking *on*. The soul sees nothing by looking into itself. Nay, it can never turn itself round so as to look at, much less into itself. It is the looker, the seer, and the seer and the seen are as distinct in fact, as they are in logic. When we speak of looking within, we use *within* merely in opposition to the world of space. By *intuition* we understand merely the power of the soul

to perceive ideas, and by ideas we mean objects or realities of that world which transcends time and space. All ideas, — and we use the term in the original Platonic sense, — are transcendental. In asserting man's power to perceive them, we coincide with the transcendentalists; but in asserting, as we also do, that it is out of the soul, out of the *me* and not in it, that they exist, and that we perceive them, we depart from what we suppose is a characteristic feature of American transcendentalism.

We deny utterly, that these ideas are constitutive elements of human reason, regarded as the faculty or power of knowing. We shall spend no time in justifying this denial; for since the time of Locke it has not been necessary to show that there are no innate ideas. The faculty or power of perceiving, or recognising these ideas we, however, do hold to be innate, a fundamental law of human nature; and the fact, that man does perceive them, is a fact of his natural history; and if he did not, his actual intelligence would not be what we know that it is. This we presume is all, under the present point of view, the author of Charles Elwood intended to assert; certainly this is all that the facts he adduces go to prove. But admitting all this, admitting that man aspires by virtue of a law of his being, or an innate power, and perceives these transcendental ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, by means of a fundamental power of his soul, it may still be asked, if no foreign or special agency be requisite to induce him to aspire, and to lead him to the actual perception or recognition of these ideas. If we understand the author of the book before us, he takes it for granted, though he does not expressly say so, that man does aspire, naturally, from his own inherent energy, and that he does perceive these ideas, without any agency but the spontaneous operations of his own reason. At least this may be inferred from his language, though evidently contradicted in his own mind by the peculiar views he adopts concerning reason and inspiration.

Now, while we are by no means prepared to main-
VOL. V. NO. II. 20

tain absolutely that man does not aspire naturally, that is, by force of his own nature, without any foreign quickening, we are still further removed from maintaining that he does. Taken as he is, to-day, in the bosom of Christian civilization, we admit that he does aspire by force of his own nature, and both as sentiment and as intelligence. But we have no evidence to satisfy us, that this is universally true of mankind. Many facts go to prove to us the contrary. Man is progressive because he aspires, and all men have undoubtedly the capacity of progress. But we are not sure that all are naturally progressive; for we do not find progress wherever we find man. Savage tribes are not progressive; ages on ages pass away and bring no improvement in their condition, no progress in their ideas. Hence, we infer, that they do not aspire. If they did aspire, they would come out of their savage state. But we have no record of any savage people emerging by spontaneous effort from the savage state, into the civilized. This is asserted by Niebuhr, and admitted by Constant, either of whom on this point is high authority. The African negro, as a race, does not aspire, or at least only to a feeble degree. He can therefore be made contented and apparently happy in a condition, from which the proud Caucasian, under the influence of Christianity, recoils with horror. Those negroes, who among us aspire, are stimulated by the example of their Christian neighbors, and have for the most part blood of another race running in their veins.

Moreover, the traditions of every civilized people, — and we own that we are disposed to consider all traditions of great historical value, — ascribe the origin of their civilization to foreign influence, never to indigenous and spontaneous effort. It is a sacerdotal or a military colony from a more advanced nation, some providential man, or some divine interposition, that quickens their faculties, commences their education, and sets them forward on the path to civilization. The facts, so far as we can come at them, seem to authorize us to say, that if man has the natural capacity to aspire,

he does not naturally aspire, that is, by the simple force of his own nature. He is not naturally progressive. In order to make him aspire some power or influence, foreign to himself, is necessary to quicken his faculties, kindle his aspirations, and compel him to struggle. Divested of what civilization has done for him, placed at the lowest round of savage life, he is naturally indolent, careless, improvident, averse to all exertion, shrinking from all effort. His greatest delight is to eat and sleep. If the sense of hunger or some outward circumstance arouse him to a sudden effort, he relapses into his torpid state at the earliest possible moment.

Nor is it any more evident that man attains at first to the *idea* of God, than it is that from the first moment of his existence he aspires. The idea of God we hold to be an intuitive perception, to-day, in the bosom of civilization; but we have no evidence that it is an intuitive perception in the minds of those, who linger yet in the lowest forms of savage life. The first thought of the first human being, no doubt, contains, if we may so speak, the germs of the idea of God; but ages on ages of growth are necessary to develop and ripen it into the sublime conception of the Divinity, entertained by Moses, Socrates, or Leibnitz. To-day, the Christian philosopher, in the language of Leibnitz, "thinks God;" but the savage does not. The idea of God belongs to advanced life, to the growth of the natural faculties, not to the primitive man. It is only by successive efforts, and by repeated revelations, that man attains to it, as is evinced by the slow and successive amelioration of his forms of religious worship.

In this view of the case, we must take the remark, that man is naturally religious, that religion is a fact in man's natural history, with some grains of allowance. Taken as we find him, to-day, in the bosom of our own civilization, he is unquestionably naturally religious. Our children naturally aspire; and our philosophers, with Leibnitz, "think God." Our faculties, by the

nurture of ages, and through the care of an ever watchful Providence, have become equal to the sublime thought. But when we speak of man universally, man of all times, all we can say is that he has the natural capacity to *become* religious, and wherever his natural faculties, by providential circumstances or influences, are stimulated into activity, he *is* religious. More than this we do not think that we are warranted in saying. To say more than this, would require us to assert that man aspires, where we have no evidence that he aspires, and entertains the sublime conception of God, where we find no traces of it, or at best only the miserable *fetiché* of the stupid African. The worship of the *fetiché*, no doubt, tells the philosopher that there the idea of God may one day be entertained, but just as surely that it is not entertained now.

Nevertheless, Mr. Morton is not obnoxious to all the criticism here implied. He is answerable mainly for the inaccuracy of his language, into which he was betrayed by his admiration of the work of Benjamin Constant. His argument drawn from intuition remains unaffected by anything we have said, because in the intuitive perceptions of the most stupid savage, *we* can see, what the savage does not, the idea of God. The error is in supposing that because we, turning back upon those intuitions, discover it there, the savage himself must necessarily have done so. Mr. Morton undoubtedly did fall into this error, in part; but he never meant to say that the savage really was conscious of entertaining the idea. He thought, however, that he was justified in saying that it was there, because he had satisfied himself that it was a necessary conception of reason. The apparent contradiction implied here, in asserting the presence of the idea in the intelligence of the savage, while the savage knew it not, he thought he escaped by means of Cousin's doctrine of the impersonal and spontaneous reason.

II. We come now to the doctrine of the Impersonal Reason, borrowed from M. Cousin, of whose philo-

sophy it is one of the most striking peculiarities. We felt, as has every man who has been at all under the influence of religious ideas, that these ideas have a character of independence and authority. They seem to be over man and to legislate for him; and he seems to be unable to withdraw himself from their presence, if indeed from their dominion. This fact led us to adopt, up to a certain point, Cousin's doctrine, and to make it the basis of our demonstration of the existence of God. As far as it really serves as the basis of this demonstration, though not so far as it enters into the form of the argument, we believe it unquestionably sound. The author of *Charles Elwood* never intended to adopt it in its fullest extent, and he thought he had escaped all that was unsound in it. But in this he was mistaken. There runs through all he says on it the same confusion, which meets us in Cousin himself. The source of this confusion we have on a former occasion pointed out; * but unhappily, without being aware at that time of the immense importance of a very obvious distinction, which we then suggested, and therefore we neglected, when preparing *Charles Elwood* for publication, to make Mr. Morton's language conform to it. We must therefore be allowed to set the matter in what we now deem its true light.

Cousin defines reason to be a faculty of human nature, that faculty by which we know all that we know, and in all the degrees of knowledge from the highest to the lowest. He also contends that reason is impersonal and objective, in us, our only light, but not *us* nor *ours*. Being impersonal and objective, it is good authority for the objective, an independent witness for what lies outside of us, indeed for whatever it reveals. It reveals the absolute, therefore, the absolute exists; God, therefore, God is. But against this there lie several very weighty objections.

1. If reason be a faculty of human nature, it is absurd

* *Boston Quarterly Review*. April, 1839. Vol. II. No. VI. pp. 177-180.

to call it impersonal and objective. A faculty is merely a power of the soul. To say that the soul has the faculty of reason, is merely saying that the power to know is inherent in it, essential to its existence, belonging in fact to its very being. It is then merely an aspect of the subject itself, and we might as well in this case call the subject, the *ME*, objective and impersonal, as the reason.

2. To assert that reason, regarded as our faculty of intelligence, is impersonal and objective, is to deny that we ourselves are persons. Cousin places personality chiefly in liberty or activity. But liberty or the power to act is not the characteristic of personality. Animals have the power to act, as well as we, and yet they are not persons. Personality is never predicated of unintelligent beings, nor indeed of all intelligent beings. The dog, the horse, the ox, are intelligent, yet we cannot call them persons. Personality is not constituted till we attain to a high degree of intelligence, to the perception of moral, universal, and necessary truths; that is, not till we come to that degree of intelligence, which goes by the special name of reason. None but reasonable beings are, in any human speech with which we are acquainted, allowed to be persons. Divest us of personality, — and we should be divested of it, if our faculty of reason were objective, — and we should cease to be moral and accountable beings. Then all foundation for morality would be destroyed.

3. If reason be our only power of knowing, as Cousin asserts, and it be also impersonal and objective, then we in ourselves must be incapable of knowing. How then come into relation with intelligence? How can an essentially non-intelligent being be even enlightened by an objective intelligence? If there be no light within, how can there be recognition of the light without?

4. If reason, in the sense that it is one of our faculties, be identical with the objective world of immaterial and necessary truth, as Cousin alleges, he merely reproduces the doctrine of Pere Malebranche of "vision

in God ;" for reason in this sense he tells us is the Word of God, the Logos, identical in the last analysis with God. Man then does not see at all, but God sees in him.

5. If reason, as we have seen, be essential to our personality, to transfer it from us to God, is to transfer our personality to God, to sink us in God, and to destroy all distinction between his acts and ours ; which in this case would be Pantheism.

6. The doctrine is psychologically false. In the fact of human knowledge it is not God nor the reason that knows, but the *me* itself. Whatever be the object or the sphere of knowledge, it is always I who know. I as invariably, and as necessarily ascribe the act of knowing to myself, as I do the act of willing. I have as direct consciousness that it is I who knows in the fact of intelligence, as I have that it is I who wills in a fact of volition. On his own principles, then, M. Cousin can no more term reason, regarded as our power to know, objective, than he can activity or our power to will.

7. The power to know, and to know even those eternal verities which M. Cousin so eloquently treats under the names of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, constitutes the chief dignity and glory of our being. To declare this power objective, not ours, is to rob us of all this glory and dignity, and to degrade us even below the animal creation, almost to a level with brute matter.

8. The element of necessity, M. Cousin detects in the intelligence, though unquestionably involving objective existence, is not sufficient to establish the fact of the objectivity of the *power* of intelligence. The same element of necessity may be detected in sensibility ; and to a certain extent in activity itself. Our liberty is not complete. We can even will only according to given laws, not of *our* enacting, and only within given bounds, — bounds which we have not prescribed, and which we cannot overleap.

These objections are conclusive ; no reasoning can

obviate their force. And yet, in the face of these very objections, we are disposed to maintain that there is a sense in which reason is impersonal and objective.

The word reason may be taken in two senses. In one sense it means, what Cousin calls the absolute, the world of absolute ideas, immaterial and necessary truth ; in the other sense, the faculty or power by which we recognise this absolute world. In the first it is impersonal and objective ; in the second personal and subjective. Cousin nowhere to our knowledge clearly distinguishes between these two senses of the word. But does he really confound them ? Does he mean to assert that reason in both senses is one and the same ? We confess that we feel unable to decide. His language and his arguments would seem to authorize the assertion, that he holds that the absolute ideas, and the power by which we recognise them, are identical. The probability we think is, that his mind has not been drawn distinctly to the point in question. And yet, if he does confound them, he only does what others have done before him. Kant confounds them by absorbing the absolute or transcendental reason, in reason as a faculty of human nature, and thus lays the foundation of his peculiar kind of Idealism, which prepares the way for the Egoism of his disciple Fichte. If Cousin confounds them, it is by absorbing the subjective reason in the objective, which would lead to Spinozism, and in some sense justify the charge of Pantheism, which has been so often brought against him at home and abroad.

However this may be, we have his own authority for saying that he means by reason, in the sense in which he contends that it is objective and impersonal, "the world of absolute ideas, the world of immaterial and necessary truth," which he treats in his Course for 1818, on the philosophy of the absolute, under the names of the idea of the True, the idea of the Beautiful, and the idea of the Good. He uses here both the term idea, and the term reason, in the genuine Platonic sense. According to Plato, the reason is the world of

ideas, and ideas are very nearly if not quite, what we mean by abstract relations, universal and necessary truths; of which sort are the truths contained in the propositions, — The same thing cannot both be, and not be; the whole is greater than a part; that, which is not, cannot act; no phenomenon can *begin* to exist without a cause; the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; reason ought to govern the passions; men should do as they would be done by, &c. True science, according to Plato, consists in a knowledge of ideas, that is, a knowledge of these abstract relations, these universal and necessary truths, these eternal principles of things. Now understanding reason in this sense, — and this is really a legitimate and even common use of the word, as is evinced by the frequency with which we hear, “he should submit to reason,” “reason dictates,” “he will not be governed by reason,” “that is a truth of reason,” “reason bids us do this,” “reason bids us not do that,” — taking reason, we say, in this sense, M. Cousin is right in pronouncing it objective and impersonal; for in this sense it is not *us* nor *ours*, *ME* nor *MINE*. But in this sense it is as distinct from reason as a faculty of human nature, as is *sight* considered as something seen, from *sight* considered as the power to see.

Strictly speaking, reason should not be termed a faculty of the soul. They, who call it a faculty, mean thereby the power of perceiving the ideas or truths of reason in the sense already defined. This has been regarded as a distinct faculty of the soul. Hence we find men distinguishing, or trying to distinguish, between reason and understanding, between the power by which we perceive the objects of time and space, and that by which we perceive the objects of the world lying beyond them. But there is no ground here for any distinction. The power, by which we perceive in one world, is precisely the power, by which we perceive in the other. The conditions, degrees, and objects of knowledge may vary, but the *power* is in all cases one and the same faculty of the soul. I perceive by one and

the same power the corporeal world and the ideas of reason. To avoid confusion, we ourselves call this power by the general name of *intelligence*, or power to know. Man with us is not a reasonable being because reason is one of his faculties, but because he has the power to perceive the truths of reason, and to follow the dictates of reason. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to quarrel about words, and we will not object to calling our faculty of intelligence by the term reason, if in this sense it be distinguished from reason, as the general term for the world which transcends time and space, the world of immaterial and necessary truth.

We may consider man as an intelligence, seeing, perceiving, or knowing in three worlds. — 1. In the world of space, which seeing or perceiving is called sensation. 2. In the world of Time, called in regard to time past, memory, in regard to time to come, presentiment or foresight — history and prophecy. 3. In the world of ideas, the world of reason, the transcendental world in modern phraseology, termed intuition, or intuitive perception. Intuition, with us, is as applicable to seeing or perceiving in the one world, as in another; for with us all knowledge is intuitive; that is, by looking *on* the object. In the longest chain of reasoning each link is intuitively perceived, and reasoning is nothing but placing a given subject, in its several parts and relations, immediately before the mind's eye.

Now, to establish the objectivity of reason, according to our view, is to establish the objectivity of this transcendental world of which we speak, of these absolute ideas, called by Cousin the idea of the True, the idea of the Beautiful, and the idea of the Good. Has Cousin, according to his own system, succeeded in doing this? This is the boast of his philosophy. To show how it may be done, was the problem he had to solve, as it is the problem of every philosopher, who wishes to go out of the sphere of the subjective, and obtain a solid basis for science. We confess, that after the maturest thoughts we have been able to be-

stow on the subject, after having wavered long in our judgment, and disposed from a strong personal feeling to find Cousin always in the right, and to award him the highest praise, we are obliged to return to the judgment we expressed in a paper on his philosophy, inserted in the *Christian Examiner*, for September, 1836, though we sustain that judgment by other and stronger reasons than those we were then able to adduce. We see him perpetually on the verge of solving the problem; nay, we admit that he does virtually solve it, but not systematically, not scientifically, not legitimately. His argument is, after all, but a paralogism. He shows, what few will deny, that these ideas are at the bottom of the human intelligence; he shows that the human intelligence cannot be developed without them, and that we are necessitated to accept them, to believe in their objective validity. All this is well. But this does not advance him a single step on the Scottish school. It merely demonstrates, what Reid himself had done equally well a long time before him, that these ideas are necessary or first principles of belief.

Cousin merely proves, according to his system, that these absolute ideas are necessary elements of human intelligence, understood not as our power to know, but as the effect of the exercise of that power. They reside, if we may so speak, in the reason. But the reason, he regards ever as *in* us. True, he *says*, the reason is not us, but he places it after all in the *ME*. Whatever is *in* the *ME*, must be the *ME*. By teaching as he does, that it is *in* the *ME*, that these ideas are seen, he necessarily contradicts his own assertion, that they are objective. He falls here into the very common error of representing the *ME*, if we may so speak, as the *locus* of ideas. Locke defined ideas very well, when he called them "objects about which the mind is immediately conversant," but destroyed their objective character by supposing it to be in the mind, that the mind converses with them. Cudworth treats them as absolute ideas, in his *Immutable Virtue*, with rare sa-

gacity, and labors hard to prove their legislative character ; but fails in consequence of considering them as furnished by the mind's own energy, and as residing in the mind. This same view is taken of them by our American transcendentalists, who regard them as laws of the soul, sometimes as the soul itself, and understand by intuition, seeing them by looking into the soul. But it is idle to pretend that what is in the soul, is objective ; that is, that what is in the soul, is not in it, but out of it. Nor will M. Cousin relieve himself by proving these ideas objective to liberty, or the power to act. He himself, notwithstanding some assertions to the contrary, expressly denies that liberty, or activity, constitutes the *ME*. According to him, the *ME* is an active, intelligent, and sentient subject. The power to know is as essential to the *ME*, as the power to act. In proving these ideas to be exterior to liberty, then, he does not prove them to be exterior to the *total ME*, that is, really objective to man himself, that is again, virtually *NOT-ME*.

We grant that M. Cousin proves that these ideas are objects of human intelligence, that is, objects of thought. But this was not the main point to be made out. The main point to be made out was, that they are not only objects of thought, which nobody questions, but that they are really and truly *NOT-ME* ; that is, that they exist out, and independent of the subject thinking them. This point, the boast of his philosophy, he has not established, and he has been prevented from doing it, by that very psychological method on which he so strenuously insists, and which we have ourselves heretofore insisted upon with equal earnestness. According to this method, the soul studies its own phenomena in itself, by an interior light called consciousness, as it studies the exterior world by the exterior senses. The soul, then, can study itself by immediate consciousness. It then stands face to face with itself, and may be both the subject studying, and the object studied. Hence the *ME*, as Jouffroy innocently asserts, may be at once both a *ME* observing, and a *ME* observed ! Grant this,

and what is the evidence that these absolute ideas, though objects of thought, are not nevertheless really subjective, belonging to the ME, taken as the object of its own observation? Cousin's philosophy, we therefore assert, does not and cannot carry him out of the subjective, into the region of the NOT-ME; for the ME observed is no less ME than the ME observing. All he attains to is an *objective ME*! — or an objective subject, none the less subjective, however, for being objective. His philosophy, then, is really, according to his own principles, if interpreted from the point of view, which recognises the subject at all, a system of pure idealism; if interpreted from the objective point of view, a system of absolute pantheism. For, with all his eclecticism, he really establishes no distinction between subject and object.

To this conclusion we must come, if we take his principles, as officially declared in his lectures, and push them to their last results. But, M. Cousin has suffered few facts in metaphysics to escape him. He has himself, and apparently without knowing it, and at some expense of systematic consistency, furnished us, in some of his *Fragments*, with the means of relieving both him and ourselves of all embarrassment.* The simple fact is, that the ME being the subject, that is, the thinker, is not and cannot be the object. But as there can be no thought without an object, for it is impossible to think, without thinking something, it follows that the objective element of every thought is really and truly NOT-ME. These absolute ideas, then, inasmuch as they are undeniably objects of thought, are not only objective to the intelligence, as Cousin proves them, but objective to the WHOLE ME, and therefore NOT-ME, existing out of the ME, and independent of it.

Cousin is, then, after all, substantially correct in asserting the objectivity of the reason, understood as

* *Fragmens Philosophiques*. Paris: 1833, p. 243.

the world of absolute and immaterial truth ; he has only failed in proving it to be so, by failing to follow out certain principles which he has himself recognised. Practically he is right, scientifically he is wrong. But, the objectivity of reason, in the only sense in which it is not absurd to assert it, was, after all, the main problem. M. Cousin, in attempting, therefore, to establish the objectivity of reason, as the means by which to arrive scientifically at an objective world, is somewhat out in his logic. His demonstration would be in this case a demonstration of the fact to be demonstrated, as the means with which to demonstrate it. We therefore think, with all becoming deference, that his long, tedious labors, on this point, leave us scientifically right where we were when he commenced them ; though we feel at the same time, that they have upon the whole tended greatly to advance metaphysical science.

Assuming now, what the author of *Charles Elwood* assumes, but does not demonstrate, that these absolute ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, are objective, out of the *ME*, and legislative for it, as we now see that they are, we must contend that his demonstration of the existence of God is worthy of being accepted. These ideas constitute the reason. They are absolute, consequently, reason itself must be absolute. This absolute reason is not God, but is, as Plato calls it, his *Logos*, Word, or Speech, and implies him as necessarily as thought implies a thinker. This the author of *Charles Elwood*, we think, has demonstrated. He has demonstrated, in our judgment, now as well as eight years ago, when the demonstration was written, the absolute necessity of a God ; and this demonstration, in fact, if not in form, rests on as firm a basis of certainty, as that on which rests our certainty of our own existence.

But, let this not be taken for more than it really is. This demonstration of the necessity of a God is not a knowledge of God. God, to speak strictly, is never a direct object of knowledge. We have heretofore used language on this subject, that needs some modification.

We have assumed, and not without justice, that the absolute ideas of which we speak are the basis of all intelligence. These ideas being absolute, constituting the absolute reason, we have supposed to be in the last analysis identical with God. Now, as these ideas are, to a feeble extent at least, intuitively perceived by all men, we have held, though we know not that we have ever so asserted, that God is known by intuition. This is stating the matter too strongly. In the first place, immense numbers of our race have almost no perception at all of these absolute ideas. They and we and all nature are immersed in them, swim as it were in the mighty ocean of the transcendental, but the transcendental is rarely disengaged by the mind, and is never seen, except so far as it is revealed in the concrete and contingent, with which for the most part it is confounded. The larger part of mankind do not look beyond the outward visible object, and, — to speak the language of religion, — live only the life of the senses. Their thoughts to the wise man, to the philosopher, involve these absolute ideas, but they themselves know it not, and therefore may be said practically not to think them at all.

Then, in the next place, **THESE IDEAS ARE NOT GOD.** Doubtless they contain a revelation of God, and therefore he enters into them, as a man enters into his thought; but they are not He, any more than my thoughts, or my words are myself. But even if they were God, we know them at best only to a feeble extent. I know truth no farther than I become acquainted with that which is true; and of the beautiful, what know I beyond the beautiful objects I have seen? Or of the good? We have the power of recognising the true, the beautiful, the good, intuitively, up to a certain extent, *when the objects to which they belong are presented to us*; but our knowledge of them does not transcend that portion of them contained in these objects, or which these objects manifest. These ideas are absolute, universal, eternal, but our knowledge of them is finite, relative, particular, and transient.

We may know that they are absolute, and imply an absolute God; but we, alas, are finite and relative beings. We may recognise the absolute necessity of an absolute and infinite God, full of power, wisdom, and love, but our knowledge must always be a relative and limited knowledge. In proportion as our knowledge of these absolute ideas, in the divine works which reveal them, extends, may our knowledge of God *in his manifestations* extend. But, beyond this, knowledge of even the manifested God is not possible.

We may unquestionably attain to the discovery of the logical necessity of God. Thus far, we think, Mr. Morton in Charles Elwood has gone. But this implies no extension of our knowledge of God. God is not learned in these logical abstractions. The God that we may know is not the God *above* the universe, but the God *in* the universe; and it is by studying him in the universe, that we learn what we may know of him, not by sinking the universe, and seeking by abstraction to attain to a pure spirit dwelling in eternal solitude, but ineffable glory beyond. Doubtless he is over all, but as over all, in his awful supremacy, we cannot approach him. We can know of God only some aspects of his Divinity, as revealed in his works. We may hear his speech, but we cannot see his face; listen to his awful word, but never behold the Speaker. This is the sublime doctrine of Christianity, which commands us to behold the Glory of the Father in the face of his Son, and teaches us that it is the Son who is in the bosom of the Father, not the Father himself, who is the object of human knowledge. We must then honor the Son as we do the Father, because the Son, the Word, is all that is revealed to us of the Father. We must, in plain terms, limit our ambition to a knowledge of God as he reveals himself; study him in his works, and in the records of his providences, love him in all nature, especially in the heart of man, but bow down with lowly reverence before the thick darkness with which he hides his face from all mortal vision.

III. With the doctrine of the impersonality of reason must go the necessity and legitimacy of the division of reason into spontaneous reason, and reflective reason. We are not sure that we have rightly seized what Cousin really means by this division; for we find upon a closer inspection of his works than we had made, when writing Charles Elwood, that he gives more than one account of it, and we are not able to make his several accounts harmonize with each other. But as near as we can come at his meaning, under a general point of view, he understands, by spontaneous reason, reason operating independently of the *ME*, by its own inherent force and energy; and by reflective reason, reason operating in subjection to our wills. In the first, the *ME* does not enter as subject, in the second, it does in some sort so enter.

Reason, taken objectively, is the world of absolute ideas, of necessary truth, the Logos, Word, or Speech of God. In spontaneous reason, then, the subject, the intelligent Force or Agency at work, is not man, but God. Whatever, then, the reason spontaneously reveals is revealed by God himself. Its spontaneous revelations are, then, supernatural, really and truly divine, and deserve all the authority usually ascribed to divine revelation. This is the view Mr. Morton takes in Charles Elwood; and it is on this view that he rests his explanation of the fact of inspiration. Mr. Morton is a firm believer in divine revelation, in the full significance of the term. If he errs, it is not in his belief, nor in the doctrine he teaches; but in the account he gives of it. His purpose was so to explain it, as to enable the unbeliever to grasp it, and to sustain it by analogous facts in his own experience. But his explanation will not abide the test of criticism.

This explanation, it may be seen at once, rests on the objectivity of the reason. But we have found reason, as the faculty of intelligence, to be not objective, but subjective and personal. It is, then, the subject itself, under one of its aspects. The subject that knows is always the *ME*. To assert, then, the spontaneity of reason, is

only to assert, in other words, the spontaneity of the ME; that is, that the ME is in itself active, capable of acting from its own inherent energy. And this again is only asserting the freedom of the ME; for the only intelligible definition of freedom is the power to act. Spontaneity is the highest possible expression of freedom. Then the ME is never more present, than in its spontaneous phenomena. There is nothing which it can be more truly said to do, than that which it does spontaneously. This is admitted by Cousin himself, when treating of the spontaneous activity of the ME in relation to morals. The highest virtue consists in the fact, that the soul is in such a state that its natural aspirations, its spontaneous emotions, are in harmony with the will of God; so that it obeys God without deliberation, without reflection, from its own natural promptings. It is then sanctified. Raising to this state the fallen soul, a prey to debased and debasing appetites and depraved tastes, is that change of heart, which religious people demand, and which goes by the name of New Birth, or Regeneration. It will not do, then, to say that the acts I perform spontaneously, whether as force or as intelligence, are performed by a subject or agent which is not ME. The more spontaneous my acts, the more strictly are they mine; the more purely subjective and personal are they. The subject in spontaneity, then, is not God, but ME, if we understand it as predicated of reason as the faculty of intelligence.

Nor shall we gain anything by understanding spontaneity as predicated of reason taken as the absolute, the world of immaterial and necessary truth. Our first perceptions of this world are unquestionably prior to reflection. We have entertained these absolute or transcendental ideas, before we have sought them. We found them to be facts of our intelligence, of our knowledge, the first moment we ascertained its contents. How came they there? Evidently, says Cousin, without any agency of ours. But in this he is wrong. For if there had been no exercise of our power of knowing, would they have been facts of our knowledge? Say, these ideas,

without any agency of ours, spontaneously present themselves before us; but we are by nature inherently unintelligent, or if intelligent, we do not exercise our intelligence, would they be recognised? Of course not. The spontaneous presentation of these ideas before our minds, which is all that spontaneity when predicated of the objective reason can mean, would not give us then the actual perception of them, for the act of perceiving them is always *our* act.

Cousin has been misled by the improper view he takes of the *ME*. He, though not without asserting to the contrary, as we have said already, makes the *ME* consist in liberty, or the power to act *as naked force*. Spontaneous activity of the *ME*, as naked force, he expressly admits to be personal; but the spontaneous activity of the *ME*, as intelligence, he contends, is not personal. But according to his own philosophy, the *ME* does not, and never can act as naked force, for this very satisfactory reason, that it is not in itself a naked force. He recognises three fundamental faculties of human nature, activity, or power to act; sensibility, or power to feel; and reason, or power to know. The *ME*, then, according to him, is inherently, essentially an active, sentient, and intelligent subject, or being. It must, then, whenever it acts at all, act as an intelligent and sentient force, and it is in this fact, in the unity and triplicity of the soul, that he finds the psychological basis of eclecticism, as he calls it, or synthesisism, as it would be more properly called.

Certainly there can be no fact of perception, without an act of the percipient subject. Cousin improperly assumes that this act, which he calls attention, is that of the subject as mere force, when it is, and must be, according to his own principles, an act of a *percipient* force; both because the particular force in question is inherently percipient, and because no perception could follow the act of a non-percipient force. The act of perceiving is then necessarily as subjective, when the object perceived spontaneously presents itself, as when it is sought by reflection. The force or agency perceiving

is not the object spontaneously presented, but the subject itself. This is so obviously true, that, had it not been for his mutilation of the *mê*, and his effort to make out the knowing faculty to be objective, Cousin could never have overlooked it, or asserted to the contrary.

There are unquestionably two classes of intellectual phenomena, which Cousin has done well to recognise. But he errs in considering one class to be less subjective than the other. The true distinction between them is that which Leibnitz has marked, of *perception* and *apperception*, or perception without consciousness, or without the recognition of ourselves as subject perceiving, and perception with this recognition. This is the real distinction which Cousin has in mind, as any one may see, who will read his Essay on the First and Last Fact of Consciousness, to be found in his *Fragments Philosophiques*.

To make this distinction intelligible, it is necessary to define the meaning of this word *consciousness*, a word used with much vagueness, and concerning which, as a philosophical term, people generally have no clear or precise notions. *Cogito, ergo sum*, said Descartes. I think, therefore I am. Descartes did not here mean to offer an argument for his existence, but simply to state the fact in which he found it. We have no direct perception of ourselves. We cannot see ourselves in ourselves. We can only recognise ourselves in the phenomenon. Our knowledge never attains to being in itself, it only attains to the necessity of being, and to so much of being as enters into the phenomenon. This is as true in regard to ourselves, as we have shown it to be in regard to God. We know being, as Cousin has himself shown, only under the relation of cause. It is only under this relation that we ever find or recognise ourselves; though not as naked cause, but a cause that knows and feels, as well as wills; in one word, that thinks. Thought expresses our highest activity, and in its pure and primitive synthesis. It is a complex phenomenon, at once action, cognition, and sentiment, responding to the threefold power of the soul, to act,

to feel, and to know. Now, in thinking, we always recognise ourselves in the phenomenon which we term thought, as subject, or the one who thinks. If we decompose the thought, we shall find it made up of three elements, subject, or thinker, object, or that which is thought, and their relation, or the form of the thought ; or, in other words, what the mind takes into its view of both subject and object, that is, notion or conception. The recognition of ourselves in the fact of thinking, as the subject thinking, is precisely the fact, designated by the word consciousness, which added to the perception of the object constitutes what Leibnitz calls *apperception*. This fact was called by Descartes *consciousness*, (*cum-scientia*), because it is something which goes along *with* knowledge, that is, perception of the object ; *apperception* (*ad-perceptio*) by Leibnitz, because it is something in addition to simple perception. I perceive a rose. This is perception. I recognise myself as the subject who perceives it, that the perceiver is I and not another ; this is apperception, or consciousness. Now all those phenomena, in which we recognise ourselves as subject, are apperceptions, or perceptions with consciousness ; all those, in which we do not recognise ourselves as subject, are simple perceptions, or perceptions without consciousness.

That there are these two classes of phenomena, is very obvious and very certain. Man is essentially an active and percipient subject. He must then, while living, always act ; and as he cannot act without perceiving, — for being intelligent in his essence, he cannot act as force without acting as intelligence, — he must perceive always and all that comes within the range of his vision ; and perceive, too, in all the three worlds with which he stands in relation. But nothing is more certain than that he does not always perceive with consciousness. The power of apperception as Leibnitz, who has treated this subject better than any one else, affirms, is only a higher degree of the power of perception. But we apperceive, that is, are conscious of perceiving, only in the few stronger and more marked instances of per-

ception. In general our perceptions are too feeble and confused for us to recognise ourselves as their subject. They may serve indeed to keep alive a dim and obscure sense of our existence, but the mass of them are too feeble to give us a distinct recognition of it.

Now, it is by virtue of these feeble and confused perceptions, which play a much more important part in the conduct of life, than is commonly supposed, that these absolute ideas, of which Cousin speaks, come to be facts of our intelligence, prior to their being found there by reflection, and prior to our having consciously sought them, or been conscious of thinking them. These are rightly termed facts of spontaneity, for they have been perceived by the spontaneous activity of the soul. But this does not in the least separate them, as to their quality, from the other class of facts. It is by the inherent power of the soul, that these are perceived, and it is by the same power, only in a higher degree of exercise, that the soul perceives, in what is called reflection, so much so that in reflection, it not only perceives, but knows that it perceives, is able to find itself as the subject perceiving. The subjective act of perceiving is by virtue of the same power, and is as spontaneous in one case as in the other.

Nor do these feeble and confused perceptions, which we have without knowing that we have them, approach any nearer the fact of inspiration, or afford any more solid ground for our faith in objective realities, than the more distinct and vivid perceptions, which we call *ap-perceptions*. No doubt, in these as in the others, reflection may discover the fact of a percipient subject, and of an object perceived. But the simple fact, that the object is perceived without the subject being conscious of perceiving it, does not constitute any additional evidence that it is veritably *NOT-ME*. We think, therefore, that M. Cousin finds in the fact of spontaneity, or in unconscious perception, no explanation of the fact of inspiration, no evidence of the objectivity of reason, and none which he does not also find in reflection, of the existence of a *NOT-ME*, the great points to be made out by its assistance.

M. Cousin, we are disposed to believe, has been, in all his discussions on the objectivity and spontaneity of reason, preoccupied by the desire to refute Kant's Idealism, and Fichte's Egoism. His great aim has evidently been, to show that the *ME* does not create those absolute ideas, as Fichte seemed to teach, and that they are not mere modes, laws, affections, or categories of a subjective reason, as was taught by Kant. The assertion of the objectivity of the reason, negatived the last, — of the spontaneous operation of the reason, the former. He, however, succeeds in neither case. For in asserting the objectivity of reason, he begs the question between him and Kant. Do the best he can, he has nothing but reason with which to prove reason's objectivity. But the validity of the assertion, by reason of its own objectivity, was the point to be made out. In regard to Fichte he shows, indeed, — what Fichte never asserted, — that the *ME* does not create those ideas by free, conscious effort. But he was still obliged to admit the intervention of the *ME*, as percipient subject, in the facts of spontaneity, or else to deny the agency of the *ME* in any of its phenomena, not resulting from its conscious and deliberate activity, or from reflection, — a denial, that would have not only made sad work of psychology, but have as completely upset all morality, as the sensation transformed of the school of Condillac.

The refutation of Kant and Fichte, and therefore of all Idealism, Egoism, and Skepticism, whether atheistic or pantheistic, is in a simple fact, which Cousin alleges, over and over again, and which he seems never to have comprehended, — the fact already stated, that the OBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF THOUGHT IS ALWAYS NOT-ME. The error of Kant, and the error which has led astray his whole school and all others, is the assumption, that the *ME* does or may develop itself as pure subject, or, in other words, be its own object, and therefore at once subject and object. Kant assumes that the *ME* develops itself, without a foreign object, in cognition ; hence he infers that all knowledge is purely subjective, and as-

serts the impotency of reason to carry us out of the sphere of the ME.* Fichte, taking Kant's Critique as his starting point, without reference to his doctrine concerning practical reason, asserted the power of the ME to be its own object, and sought the proof of it in the fact of volition. Hence he fell into the absurdity of representing all ideas as the products of the ME, and even went so far as to tell his disciples how it is that man makes God. A bold man, that Fichte; but he lived long enough to correct some of his speculative errors. Cousin seems to have fallen in part into the error of Fichte, while seeking to get rid of it. He seems never to have got quite clear of the notion, that the ME can be its own object, notwithstanding he asserts the important fact, that the object is *always* NOT-ME. The truth is, the ME is never object; it is always subject, and subject only. It finds and can find itself only as thinker; it never does, then, find itself as object thought. And as there can be no thought without an objective element, this element is necessarily NOT-ME. This is a fact of the very highest importance in science; but, a simple fact, resting on precisely the degree of evidence that we have for our own existence. This is the great fact, which Cousin has struggled through all his writings to establish, but which he, after all, has not established, and which, though asserting it, he has failed entirely to use, — misled, as we have already shown, by his psychological method.

This fact, that the object is always NOT-ME, established on the degree of certainty we have stated, science becomes possible and legitimate. The certainty of knowledge, when carried into the objective, is precisely what it is in the sphere of the subjective. *There is no*

* We know very well that this was not the real doctrine of Kant; that it was only demonstrated by him to be the result, to which all philosophy must come, that *is based on pure reason*. He himself relied on practical reason, that is to say, on plain common sense; and his purpose of writing critiques of pure reason was, to demonstrate the unsatisfactory character of all purely metaphysical speculations. A wise man, after all, was that same Emanuel Kant.

purely subjective, or purely objective knowledge. We cannot think without finding ourselves as subject, and that which is not ourselves as object. We find ourselves only in thinking. Consequently, we find both the ME and the NOT-ME in the same phenomenon, by the same light, and with equal certainty. They are both fundamental and indispensable elements of thought. Without the ME, no thought, because no thinker; without the NOT-ME, no thought, because no object to be thought. Here is the whole mystery solved, and philosophy and the universal faith of mankind placed on the same basis. Mankind believe in an objective world, because they think it, and cannot think without thinking it. Philosophy can add nothing to this, obtain no other basis for faith, and needs no other.

The question as to the validity of our knowledge, that is, as to the grounds of science, disposed of,—which, we venture to maintain in opposition to M. Cousin, is the first question in philosophy, not the last,—then come up the questions concerning what we actually know, and what are the sources and conditions of knowledge. We must answer the question, what do we actually know? by drawing up an inventory of the wealth of experience; for all actual knowledge is by experience,—nothing being *a priori*, but the capacity to know. Under the head of sources and conditions of knowledge, must be considered the several ways in which knowledge is obtained, and the means we possess of extending our own knowledge and that of the race. In this department of philosophy must be considered the great and striking fact of inspiration, natural and supernatural, human and divine,—a fact which plays a more conspicuous part in the origin and progress of human knowledge, than even religious people themselves contend. We did intend to treat this subject of inspiration in this present article, but we have left ourselves no space to treat it at sufficient length, to satisfy either ourselves or our readers. We, therefore, leave it to be a distinct topic of consideration on some future occasion. We will only say at this time, that the views,

we have heretofore offered on inspiration, are not broad enough to embrace the whole subject, and by leaving out some important considerations, but imperfectly explain it so far as they do embrace it.

But we have given enough of metaphysics for one quarter, and must bring this unexpectedly protracted article to a close, and that, too, while we leave much unsaid, which we had proposed to say. In the course of the article we have spared neither ourselves, nor our master in philosophy, M. Cousin. The criticisms on ourselves will be taken, we presume, in good part ; but those on Cousin, considering the relation we have been supposed to hold to his philosophy, will most likely excite some surprise, and call forth a new edition of the old stereotyped charge, that we have changed our opinions again. This charge has been rung in our ears from early boyhood, and we confess that it has ceased to be musical, and become somewhat monotonous, and wearisome. Would that our good-natured critics could find some other fault in us, so as to be able to introduce a little novelty and somewhat of variety into their accusations. Both for our readers' sake and our own, we would that we never had occasion to modify our opinions once expressed. But we are too poor in virtue to be able to part with enough to purchase that consistency, which is maintained only at the price of wilfully shutting the eyes to the light, or by obstinately adhering, in spite of conviction, to one's first utterances. If we were never conscious of having erred, we should never have occasion to modify the opinions we had once expressed. It is doubtless best never to err ; but if we belong to a fallible race, and cannot well avoid falling into error, the next best is probably to adhere to one's errors no longer, than till one discovers that they are errors. For ourselves, we are still disciples, and we have not the least doubt, notwithstanding our proficiency, that there are many things for us to learn. And that we may be free to learn them, we resolve never to be the slave of our own past,

—the slave of our own shadow. Others may do differently, but perhaps not more wisely ; and after all he perhaps is not least deserving of confidence, who is the first to detect and expose his own errors.

Nevertheless, we are far from admitting that we more frequently change our opinions, than most men, who are accustomed to think for themselves, do theirs. The principal difference between them and us is, that they are prudent enough to keep the greater part of their changes to themselves, or to their few intimate friends, while we are so imprudent as to send ours all out to the public as they come. Still we could, were it worth our while, very easily convince this same public, that we have by no means undergone the frequent changes of opinion that they imagine. The great current of our faith has always flowed on in the same direction, and the doctrines, we are putting forth to-day, are the doctrines, enlarged, and systematized, which we have always been seeming to ourselves to be putting forth, ever since we have been known to this community. The only changes we are conscious of, and the only changes we have acknowledged, have occurred in relation to our views of the value, or soundness, of the views of others, — views which we partially adopted for a time, without making all the qualifications and limitations they demanded. Our faith has been and is the same. Where we have investigated a subject for ourselves, and relied on the free action of our own mind, we have rarely had occasion to change our views.

Even in the criticisms we have offered on Cousin's philosophy, we have said nothing not substantially anticipated in former remarks upon it. We have, it is true, placed our objections to that philosophy in a more prominent light now, than we had done before, because we are confident that they are of more importance than we formerly considered them. Every man in criticising favorably, or unfavorably, any system, must view it from the position where he stands. When we approached Cousin's philosophy at first, we felt deeply the need of a profounder, a more religious philosophy, both for our-

selves and our countrymen, than that taught in our schools. We did not feel able to construct such a philosophy as we felt was needed ; we knew no one amongst us that was able. There was too great indifference on the subject. It was necessary to kindle up an interest in philosophical studies. It was at that time more important that our countrymen should think, than it was what they should think. Philosophy had no audience. We thought, and so thought some of our friends, that of all philosophical writings, within our reach, Cousin's were best adapted to the wants of our countrymen. Our first aim was to get them read and studied, confident that by so doing we should prepare the way for a sound philosophy, even in case Cousin's should be found to be not altogether satisfactory. It was the best, the most satisfactory, that we were acquainted with. It had great and positive merits, and we felt that it was admirably adapted to the state of philosophic thought in our community. We therefore, did what we could to commend it. We had no disposition to dwell upon its defects, for our purpose was, not to criticise it, but to induce others to study it. We commended it not for these defects, but for its merits. But, we own, that these defects were greater than we at the time thought them, and now that an interest is awakened among us in philosophical studies, we have felt that it was time to point them out, as they had not been pointed out before.

But we still maintain our respect for Cousin, as a philosopher, and as a man. We abate nothing of what we have heretofore said in his praise. If his philosophy, taken as a whole, is not all that we at first thought it, we still contend, that he deserves a high rank among the eminent men, who have at different epochs contributed to the progress of metaphysical science. His writings contain nearly all the materials requisite for constructing a sound system of philosophy. There is scarcely a point involved in the whole subject, on which he has not shed more or less light. We have borrowed from him the very light, by which we have

been enabled to criticise him ; and if we are able on some points to offer a more satisfactory explanation of our mental phenomena, than he has done, it is to him that we are indebted for our ability. We know very little that we would say, which he has not already said or implied ; and if we were asked what books were best to be studied by one wishing to form just philosophical views, we know of none, that we could more conscientiously or unreservedly recommend than his. They are the best, all things considered, that we are acquainted with. Whoever would become familiar with metaphysical subjects, must study them. They have a permanent value, which no progress in science, or changes of doctrine can altogether destroy. We are pleased, therefore, to find them introduced as text books into our venerable University at Cambridge ; and equally pleased are we, too, that their introduction has not caused the expulsion of Locke from the same University ; for we are not ashamed to own, that our respect for Locke is every day increasing, and we would not repeat the severe things which the indiscreet zeal of his admirers have, on some former occasions, induced us to say of him. The more we study him, the more are we struck with his merits. The philosophy, that commends itself by detracting from the imperishable glory of such a man as John Locke, can be in vogue only for a day, and must soon take its place with the things that are as if they had not been.

M. Cousin is a true philosopher, and would have given us a sound philosophy in all its parts, if he could have undertaken to do it at once, in a regular systematic treatise. His errors and defects grow, we apprehend, from his having studied philosophy somewhat after the fragmentary manner in which he has treated it in his writings, and from having confounded, too much, philosophy with the history of philosophy. He has nowhere given us a complete system of philosophy ; and we confess, that we do not find ourselves able to mould all that he has at different times advanced into one and the same system. We find, or we seem to ourselves to

find, in his writings the elements of incongruous systems, which are not, and cannot be made parts of the same whole. We have been forced to this conclusion, by undertaking to mould his scattered fragments into a complete and systematic body of philosophy, an undertaking we have been compelled to abandon. We could not succeed. We have, however, attempted the construction of a system on our own account, with what success it is not for us to say, though with a success more satisfactory to ourselves than we anticipated. We have the satisfaction of feeling that, for the first time in our life, we have a system, which, though not constructed without assistance, is yet as a system our own. Some of its elements appear in this article ; and those familiar with metaphysical matters will not judge them unimportant. The whole system will be laid before the public, at the earliest day possible ; and we are confident, when seen as a whole, it will be found able to reconcile many jarring creeds, and in no small degree to meet the wants of both the Old School and the New. This much we may say in advance of its publication, that, viewed in relation to the systems of philosophy already extant, it assumes English philosophy as its starting point ; that is, it takes up philosophy where it exists in our literature, and in our national character, and continues it ; but attains to all those moral, spiritual, and religious results, for which we and others have valued the metaphysical speculations of modern France and Germany. Without claiming for man more than finite powers, or pretending to solve all problems, it will, we think, show a solid basis for science and religion. We pretend not, however, to have made any discovery that will supersede the necessity of Divine Revelation, or a childlike trust in the wisdom and goodness of Providence, whose ways are often dark and mysterious, and whose purposes are not seldom past finding out. Man does well to aspire ; it is the glory of his nature, and the condition of his advancement ; but, he does well, also, to remember that he is a limited being, and his intelligence but a feeble

taper burning in the bosom of infinite night. For a feeble distance it may furrow the darkness, and as it grows by burning, it may furrow it farther and still farther ; but can never overcome it, and enlighten infinity.

EDITOR.

ART. II. — ASSOCIATION AND A SOCIAL REFORM. No. I.

BY ALBERT BRISBANE.

I WISH in a short series of articles to lay before the readers of the *Boston Quarterly Review* a general idea of the system of Association, discovered by CHARLES FOURIER. The social principles, given to the world by that great genius, are beginning to excite a deep and widely extended interest. Since his death in 1837, his doctrine has spread rapidly, and his disciples, who may now be counted by thousands, are to be found in every civilized country on the earth. Besides Europe and the United States, where it is natural to suppose new social principles would first penetrate, circles of converts to the theory of Association and Attractive Industry are to be found in South America, and even in the distant India.

Men of wealth and talent have been gained to the cause in Europe ; papers have been established in Paris and London, and the political parties of France have been compelled, by the persevering efforts of the disciples of FOURIER, to devote their attention to social principles, and the grand question of a reorganization of Society. The day is not, I believe, far distant, when in some of the most advanced countries, the present superficial and controversial systems of politics will give way to a true Social Science.

The illusive doctrines and schemes of politicians are, to a true science of society, what the wild speculations

of astrology were to astronomy, or the wilder researches of alchemy to chemistry, and they must lead to and be replaced by a positive Social Science.

They, who wish to keep up with the social movement of the age, should become acquainted with the discoveries of **FOURIER**. He has treated almost every subject, which belongs to the domain of Social Science, such as the system of Property, Education, the organization of Industry, the division of Profits ; the question of Liberty, Equality, human Happiness, the Harmony of the Passions, the Destiny of Man, the Theory of Immortality, &c., with that profound research and clear analysis, which carry irresistible conviction to the impartial mind.

It is impossible to furnish in a few short articles, like those which I propose to write, anything more than a general idea of some one or two branches of so vast a system. I will, in the present one, direct my observations to the defects of the system of *Isolated Families and Free Competition*, and point out some of the evils which result from them, in order to predispose the minds of readers favorably towards Association, against which the instinct of selfishness and individualism, so universal in society, arouses objections of every kind.

Association, combined Action, Unity of Interests, are the principles upon which a true Organization of society should be based. Our present societies, founded on individual action, conflict of interests, free competition or universal strife, and the system of isolated families, are false, and are not the Social Destiny of the Human Race. Man is a social Being, a being made for varied and extended social relations, for unity and harmony ; not for isolation, antagonism, duplicity, and discord. The feeling, which exists in the minds of people against association and union with their fellow men, arises from discordant interests, antipathies, poverty, vulgarity of manners, brutality, and the desire of the shrewd and scheming to take advantage of the mass. It will be impossible to associate men, so long as these causes of disunion exist, and so long as they

remain, as they now are, with their prejudices, ignorance, incompatible tastes and habits, their want of refinement, and their vices.

Our present societies, with their repugnant and degrading Industry, with their Poverty and miserable methods of Education, can do nothing towards elevating and refining the mass, and correcting the above evils and defects. It is reserved to Association, with its system of *unitary* Education, *Attractive Industry*, and general welfare, to effect these ends. Association will be an order of things in which the condition of the mass can be effectually and practically improved, — in which Man, — *Universal Man*, can be made what he should be, — a nobly developed Being, possessing the education and refinement to which the most favored of the race have attained. Make educated, intelligent, and refined beings of men, and they will then feel no repugnance to associate with each other.

It is the rude and undeveloped condition of the mass, and the selfishness engendered by conflicts of interest, which excite in men's minds an instinctive dislike for Association.

The System of isolated households, or system which assigns to each family a separate dwelling with a separate interest, is the fundamental defect of our societies; it is the source of repugnant industry, of poverty, of disunion, of an anti-social spirit, of absence of unity in manners, habits, opinions, and language, and in fact of most of the evils referred to above.

Where had this defective system, which Association is destined to replace, its origin? In the rudest and lowest order of societies, in the Savage State. In this society, uncultivated Nature assembles individuals by couples in the hut or wigwam. This system of couples in separate dwellings is the most defective of domestic organizations, the smallest and most imperfect of associations, and is the result of ignorance, poverty, and accidental circumstances. It had its origin in a *rude and primitive* state of society, when men's feelings and social sympathies were undeveloped, and they had very

few relations with the beings around them, when their wants were extremely limited, when they were without Industry, Art, Science, or any of the elements of society, and when they were too poor and ignorant to construct anything more than a rude hut or wigwam.

Although, in our civilized societies, an immense progress has taken place, still their mechanism is, in its most important features, *based upon that of the savage and barbarous periods*, so that they are but extensions of the rudest and most imperfect of societies.

The cottage, the mansion, and the palace have replaced the wigwam or hut of the savage state, but the isolated household, with its single couple or family, and its separate interests,—which is the primitive or savage system,—still continues the domestic organization of our present societies, and is the main cause of the conflict of interests, discord, waste, poverty, antagonism, and selfishness, which exist so generally in the world around us. Society is divided into an infinite number of isolated families, between whom no Association, no Combination or Unity of action, and very few Social Relations exist.

Each family seeks to forward its own interests, separate from, or at the expense of all the other families around it; and from the conflict and opposition, which such a state of things necessarily engenders, arise that envious competition, the overreaching fraud, injustice, and duplicity of action, which prevail so extensively in all the commercial, industrial, and other relations of society, and which make every man the opponent and antagonist of his neighbor.

So long as the system of isolated families, with opposing interests, continues, we shall have, what we may properly term *a commercial and industrial War*,—a War of all the Elements, and interests of society. This conflict and opposition in the business operations of men, rendered so intense by the desire of fortune or the fear of want, engender discord, cheatery, and animosity, without end, and impel man to prey, like a tiger or hyena, upon his fellow man.

Society offers us, says *FOURIER*, the spectacle of an incongruous and ridiculous mechanism, in which parts of the whole are in conflict with, and acting against the whole. We see each class desire from interest the misfortune of other classes, and place individual interest everywhere in opposition to public good. The Lawyer wishes litigations and lawsuits; the Physician sickness. — The latter would be ruined if every body died without disease, as would the former, if all quarrels were settled by arbitration. — The Soldier wants a War, which will carry off half his comrades to secure him promotion; the Monopolizer of bread stuffs wants a famine, that will double or treble the price of grain; the Merchant, the Grocer, the Market-Man resort to adulterations, forestalling, and other means to increase their profits, which must be done of course at the expense of their customers; the Manufacturer and Mechanic manufacture bad wares, which do no service; the Employer strives to cut down the wages of his workmen, and to prolong their day's labor, while the Workmen, on the other hand, slight their work, and do the least possible in their paid day's labor. The most envious competition, opposition, and antagonism are excited between all classes in society, and every individual is forced to wage war upon all others around him, to escape want, or to secure a competency.

In this conflict of interests, this collusion of fraud and injustice, this incoherent turmoil and wrangle, this greedy and unprincipled strife, which is decorated with the name of Free Competition, and which superficial minds believe the impelling principle and life of society, one half of the time, talent, and labor of men, is wasted or misapplied. In the confused efforts, which are made by each and all to attain separately the grand desideratum, — Fortune, they only trample each other down, and the vast majority are overtaken in the end by poverty and disappointment. No Social Providence exists in Society; no encouragement and protective aid are lent by it to its members; each must fight his way alone, and the world cares and heeds not the means

which he chooses, so long as he does not resort to open and direct robbery. If he fails and poverty is his lot, he is left to suffer unpitied and alone.

The first step to be taken, towards improving society and elevating the social condition of Man, is to discover a system of Association, which will conciliate and harmonize all interest and feelings, and establish unity of action between the separate and discordant families of which society is composed, so as to induce them to direct their talents, and to labor in the best and wisest manner for the mutual welfare of all.

Nothing can be done so long as men are not associated, — so long as all branches of Industry and Commerce are prosecuted by isolated individuals with conflicting and opposing interests. Society is wrong in *its very foundation*, and political reforms and changes, which exercise an influence merely on the surface of social affairs, can effect no real and permanent good. Is it not perfectly evident that so long as disunion, strife, conflict, and opposition exist in the daily business and social relations of men, they will exist in all the other departments of society, and particularly in politics and legislation? Men's views and opinions are governed in a vast majority of cases by their interests, and where there is conflict of interests, there will be conflict of opinions, and that without any hope of reconciliation or impartial conviction.

Association, with its concert of action, and unity of interests, is the only remedy for social and political evils. It would give a powerful onward movement to society, and while it stilled party violence and individual dissensions, it would, with its vast economies and its immensely increased product, banish poverty from the earth.

The abuses and defects, which grow out of the system of isolated families, with their endless conflicts of interests, are so numerous, that it is singular the attention of political writers has not been directed to them. It is evident that they must seek, with apathy and very blindly, for the means of ameliorating the condition of

the mass, when they neglect such important problems, as unity of interests, increased production, and collective economies. I will quote from FOURIER a few of these defects, which will show how much a Reform in our present household or domestic Organization is required.

DEFECTS OF THE SYSTEM OF SEPARATE OR ISOLATED HOUSEHOLDS.

1st. Smallest possible Association; a single Family without Capital, Credit, or extended Relations; and often even without the necessary Implements of Industry.

2d. Labor without emulation, prosecuted alone the entire day and year through, without variety or change.

3d. No Variety of occupations, no Elegance in the Organization of Industry, in manufactories and workshops, calculated to please and stimulate the working classes.

4th. No system for developing fully the talents and faculties of children, and for giving them an industrial education.

5th. Misapplication of the labor of Sexes and Ages; bad adaptation of cultivation to the soil; excessive power given to capital, and its control over industry.

6th. Complication in labor, obliging a single individual to execute every part and detail of a work.

7th. Waste of Talent and Capacities, and want of a just Remuneration, guarantying to all, to the child and woman, as well as to the man, a share of the general product, according to their Labor, Capital, and Skill.

8th. Separation of the three primordial branches of Industry — Agriculture, Manufactures, and domestic Labor.

9th. False and anarchial Competition in Industry; opposition of like branches of business and labor, instead of Association and emulative Rivalry.

10th. Stoppage of work for want of implements, machines, workshops, capital, and credit, — wants which are constantly paralyzing Industry in our societies.

11th. Absence of system and economy, which cannot be attained in the isolated household. Large Associations are necessary to systematize all branches of work and to effect great Economies.

12th. Production and consumption subservient to Commerce, dependent upon it for all sales and purchases, which

dependency opens an unrestricted field to the adulterations, frauds, and monopolies of a mass of intermediate dealers.

Lastly. Ruin of the children by the death of the parent.

Our whole system of Industry is, with these defects operating in it, a perfect chaos, an industrial war, an arena of conflicts, fraud, and confusion. This state of things causes not only the poverty and degradation of the Laboring Classes, but it exposes the Rich in innumerable ways to unforeseen reverses and ruin.

If we look at society, if we examine its business and industrial operations, what do we see? We see commercial excesses and fluctuations, financial schemes and frauds, an unregulated banking system exposed to the cupidity and ignorance of individuals, an unstable currency without counterpoises, and subject to sudden expansions and contractions, a mania of speculation, and a feverish strife after wealth ; — the whole accompanied by waste and extravagance of every kind.

These abuses are fatal to all classes of society ; they draw in the rich, — even the most cautious among them, — and engulf them in ruin. If we look at the few past years, we find that our first bankers and financiers, that our richest merchants, have been ruined, and their fortunes, and often their reputations, swept away in the flood of our ever fluctuating and incoherent system of commerce and industry.

For the welfare of the rich as well as the poor, of the producing classes as well as the capitalists, a good and stable organization of industry, commerce, and banking is most deeply to be desired.

It is, however, upon the Laboring Classes that the evils of our false social organization, and our falsely organized system of commerce and industry, fall with a suffocating weight.

To improve and elevate the condition of the Laboring Classes, *we must first improve industry*, we must *ennoble it, and render it honorable and attractive*. Man will always be obliged to exercise Industry ; it is one of the means by which he fulfils his earthly Destiny, and by

which he improves and embellishes the globe he inhabits. It is also the source from which he draws the means of satisfying his wants and comforts, and of securing his physical happiness. — Ennoble Industry, render it ATTRACTIVE, and it will become a delight and a blessing, instead of the mournful burthen, which it now is.

No complete Liberty, no real happiness can be enjoyed by man, so long as Industry is suffered to remain in its present rude, repulsive, and degraded state ; it must be radically reformed, which it cannot be so long as the present system of isolated families is continued.

The miserable condition of the Laboring Classes in France and England, where Political Liberty exists, proves practically that Politics can do nothing to improve their condition, so long as the fundamental Organization of society is false. The working classes are somewhat better off in this country, because there is a thin population, and a vast extent of soil, — not because they possess more political liberty, or enjoy the right to vote. Their condition, however, is growing gradually worse with the increase of population, and a century or two more will sink them into the same poverty and dependence in which they are now plunged throughout Europe.

I will take from FOURIER a list of the most palpable evils which oppress the Laboring Classes, in order to show that the wrongs, which they suffer, have their origin in social, not political causes, and that political measures and reforms are impotent and valueless as a remedy, — a tantalizing mockery, as the experience of all countries, where political controversy has existed, proves.

EVILS WHICH OPPRESS THE LABORING CLASSES.

1st. Necessity of sacrificing frequently their health to obtain work in unwholesome occupations, in prolonged labor, on which their support and that of their families is dependent.

2d. Unjust suspicion attached to the poor man ; the more

he is in want, the more certain he is of being refused aid and credit to enable him to turn his labor or skill to account.

3d. Fear of want for the present, or danger of being thrown out of work, the right of which is not guaranteed him by Society.

4th. Dreaded suffering for the future; fear of an increase of evils in his old age, heightened by the recollection of those already endured, and by seeing no means of escaping from them.

5th. Communicated suffering, or power of feeling the evils of his family, whose privations add to his own.

6th. Poor and destitute, he has, in case of sickness, no other asylum than the poor-house, to which he is often refused admittance.

7th. Increase of the privations of the destitute multitude with the increase of Luxury, which, inventing daily new means of enjoyment for the rich, tantalizes the poor with the display of these increased means of enjoyment, from which they are shut out.

8th. Indirect privation of the protection of the law; no justice for the poor man, who cannot undergo the expenses of law-suits against a rich rival, who appeals from Court to Court.

9th. Selfishness or ignorance of the great portion of political Leaders, who, strong in their protestations of devotedness to the cause of the People, use them as tools to get into power, distribute all offices among themselves, propose no useful and positive ameliorations, but leave them to support alone the repugnant labor and hardships of our false societies.

10th. Lastly, the profits of the labor of the producer are often not for himself, but for an employer, or a capitalist, who, taking no part in his toil, receives the larger share of its product.

These Evils are general in their nature. I will point out a few which I gather from the statistics of Nations. In the city of London, there are, it is computed, about two hundred and thirty-two thousand thieves, beggars, and vagrants. What a sink of misery, corruption, degradation, and crime is such a capital !

In Paris there is in proportion to the population nearly an equal degree of vice and wretchedness.

In France, out of a population of thirty-three millions, twenty-two millions have but six cents a day to defray expenses, — food, clothing, lodging, and education.

In some of the Provinces the peasants are so poor that they have no beds. They make couches of dry leaves, which, during the winter, become decayed, and grow full of worms, so that parents and children, on rising in the morning, pick the worms from off their bodies.

In Ireland, out of a population of eight millions, every third person experiences, during thirty weeks of the year, a deficiency of third rate potatoes.

According to the *Journal of the Statistical Society of January, 1840*, there are, in Liverpool, seven thousand eight hundred sixty-two inhabited cellars, damp, dark, dirty, and ill ventilated ; and in these lodge thirty-nine thousand three hundred of the working classes. In Manchester, of one hundred thirty-two thousand two hundred working people, fourteen thousand nine hundred sixty live in cellars. At Bury, one third of the laboring classes are so badly off, that in seven hundred seventy-three houses, one bed serves for four persons, in two hundred seven, one for five, and in seventy-eight, one for six human beings. In Bristol, forty-six out of every hundred of the working classes have but one room for a family. In Glasgow, thirty thousand Irish and Highlanders are said, according to the description of Doctor Cowan, "to wallow in filth, crime, and wretchedness, in the cellars and wynds of this great commercial city." From ten to twenty persons, of both sexes, lie huddled together in their rags and filth on the floor each night. The cellars are beer and spirit shops. Multitudes of young girls, says Mr. Lymonds, applied to Captain Miller, the head of the Glasgow Police, to rescue them from these scenes, to which they are driven by sheer want. A year or two served to harden and hurry them from drunkenness, vice, and disease to an early grave.

The Register General states that he has seen in one

small garret, "the husband sick of a typhus, a sick child laid across the sick man's bed; two others sleeping under the bed, the two window recesses let to two Irish Lodgers at sixpence a week, as resting places for the night, the wife, a young healthy woman lying in the same bed with her sick husband at night, and supporting the family by taking in washing, which was hung across the room to dry, — the Parish Authorities having forbidden the exposition of Linen out of the windows."

In our own country, three millions of negro producers, whose labor pays for a large portion of our imported luxuries, are barely supplied with their commonest physical wants, and work from fear of the lash.

If we examine the history of the past, we find that the changes which have taken place, since the commencement of societies, in the condition of the Laboring Classes, who compose the vast majority of the human race, have been only so many varieties of one general misery, and tyranny.

In India, we find these Classes, Parias and degraded castes, and spurned and despised by the higher classes. In Greece and Rome they were slaves, — reduced to a level with beasts of burden. In the middle ages they became serfs, and by being attached to the soil, instead of being personal property, the means of their enfranchisement were opened to them. In modern civilized societies, the Paria, the Slave, the Serf, have, with a few exceptions, disappeared, and the hired Laborer stands in their stead. Slavery, as it existed in antiquity, has given way in our age to a system of Hired Labor, or Labor for Wages, which, in a thick population and with competition among the Laboring Classes for work, reduces them to a condition nearly as miserable as that of slaves, and places them, bound by want and poverty, at the mercy of those who have the credit and capital of society in their hands.

Politicians, Legislators, and Philosophers have discovered but two systems of Labor, — *Slave Labor*, and *Hired Labor*, or Labor for Wages. The first makes

use of the *lash and punishment* to force the Mass to work, and the second, of *want* and the *fear of starvation*.

To impel Man to undergo the repulsive and toilsome drudgery of our false societies, the slave system applies the lash to the back, and tortures the flesh : while the system of Labor for wages, to attain the same end, starves the stomach, and harasses the mind with anxiety. Both systems are a disgrace to the genius of the political leaders of the world, and a deep reproach to human Reason for having so long neglected the great practical question of a good Organization of Labor. It is reserved for Association to do away with these two vile systems, and replace them by a system of *Attractive Industry*.

Why is it that the Laboring Classes are forced from want and starvation to labor in our societies? What organization of things is it, which produces such a result? I will explain the causes.

To the Savage, the forests and fields are free : he takes as a right their products wherever he finds them, and applies them to his wants. But in our societies, every field is fenced in, every fruit tree has its owner. If the poor laborer takes the grain of a field, or the fruit of a tree, which his wants require, he is warned that they have an owner, and that he incurs a penalty by the act. Everything is walled around, barricaded, and guarded : the soil, workshops, and whatever yields the means of livelihood, are owned and monopolized, so that nowhere can he find a meal or a shelter free, and no alternative is left him but to labor or to starve.

It requires the stimulus of poverty to force Man to undergo the monstrous and repugnant drudgery of our present false system of Industry, which, with its prolonged and monotonous occupations, its ill-constructed workshops and manufactories, its frauds and deceptions, the rapacity and injustice of employers, the coarseness and vulgarity of workmen, and the scantiness of remuneration, is a loathsome and brutalizing burthen, which all strive to escape, — by any and every means which can be devised.

To crown the Injustice which is done in our societies to the Laboring Classes, *the right even to the repugnant Labor, upon which their existence depends, is not guarantied them.* The right of Man to Labor is the primary right which God has given him, for without it, his right to existence even is not acknowledged, and he may starve upon the earth, where he was placed to live, and upon which he has an important function to perform.

If we look at our large cities and manufacturing towns, we see the Laboring Classes wandering from manufactory to manufactory, or from workshop to workshop, inquiring for work, and refused it. Without any means of subsistence while out of employment, pressed by want, harassed by anxieties, they reduce the price of their day's labor to tempt the employer, and sell twelve, fourteen, or more hours of monotonous drudgery out of each twenty-four for a miserable pittance. If they manage to avoid positive want, they are beset by cares and perplexities of all kinds, which drive numbers of them into vice and dissipation, and often into crime.

To Beings thus situated, what a mockery to offer them the right to vote, the guaranty of not being thrown into prison without a writ of habeas-corpus, or equality of rights before the Law, when they have no money to defend those rights! Are they free because they possess these illusory guaranties, when they are at the same time the Slaves of Labor and the Serfs of Capitalists? It is true that the whip does not force them to their task, like the real slave; but does not the alternative of want or starvation do it as effectually? If their bodies cannot be sold, they have to bargain their Liberty and their time, without the power of disposing scarcely of an hour.

No; the political Liberty and the illusive Rights, which politicians have secured to the Mass, are the mere shadow of that high and true Liberty, and those equal and comprehensive Rights, which in Association will be secured to all.

Association and combination of Action, are the two

great principles upon which society should be based. It is only in Association that Industry can be ennobled and rendered attractive, integral equality and liberty practically realized, and harmony of interests and feelings established. The system of isolated families, or households, is the fundamental defect of our societies, and is the source of repugnant Industry, poverty, conflict of interests, and universal discord.

Why has this system of isolated Households, which had its origin in the savage Period, been continued in the later societies, which Man has established, and why have not politicians and legislators endeavored to reform it? It is because those leaders of mankind have been absorbed by personal ambition, and have seen in social affairs only the government or administration; they have preferred to operate on the superstructure of society; that is, the administration, as it led more directly to personal success and aggrandizement. *They neglected the domestic or household System, and with it Agriculture and the whole Organization of Industry.* This fatal neglect has not, up to the present time, been repaired, and we see the politicians of our day, as were those of Greece and Rome, still engrossed with superficial political reforms, administrative controversies, and party strife, to the entire neglect of the mighty question of a Social and Industrial Reform.

Another reason, why the system of isolated Households has been continued, is because the Rich, so long as a true system of Association is not discovered, avoid any intimate connexion with the poor. They are attached from interest to the system, and prefer to live by themselves in separate dwellings.

The Middle Classes are induced from self-interest to follow their example, for every one in our societies shuns connexion with the more needy and less prosperous, and the Poor find themselves forced from necessity to adopt the mode of living, which the higher classes have established.

Thus the neglect of politicians, and the strife of individuals to secure their happiness and welfare, separate

from the rest of their fellow creatures, have combined to maintain the present system of isolated Households, and the false social order which is based upon it.

It will appear to most persons a Herculean task to discover the means of associating separate and discordant families, of conciliating different interests and feelings, of introducing unity of action into society, and of harmonizing differences of character; but as difficult as it may appear, the problem is solved. FOURIER'S discoveries offer us the practical means of overcoming these difficulties.

A practical trial of Association could be made with four hundred persons, or a hundred families, and if Association for about four hundred thousand dollars, when put in operation, proved of great advantage to all classes, — to the Rich as well as to the Poor, it would spread rapidly, like any discovery of great importance, — like the Mariner's compass, the art of Printing, or the Steamboat, — and soon become universal.

ART. III. — *Mr. Parker and the Unitarians. — Reply to a question concerning the Doctrine of Immortality, Repentance, Remission of Sins, &c.*

[WE willingly insert the following letter to the Editor of this Journal, and the accompanying Essay, though we cannot do so without taking the liberty of making a few prefatory remarks, "defining our position," as say the politicians. For Mr. Parker, personally, we have the highest respect; but we say to the public, as we say to him, that while we can interpret his South Boston Sermon so as to make it harmonize with our views of Christian truth, we by no means accept it as a full statement of that truth. In our review of it, our purpose was to show that it did not necessarily run athwart the more generally approved views of Christianity; but we presumed then, as we do now, that Mr. Parker's own faith was what it is represented to be in the following Letter. We hoped, however, by our statement to show him and the admirers of his sermon, that they might accept all that was attractive in the

views he set forth, without rejecting what we consider to be the spirit of the teachings of the Church generally. If we succeeded in doing this, we trusted we should do something to check the growth of what we could not but regard as an incipient but fatal heresy.

We wholly coincide with the views which our correspondent takes of Unitarianism, so far as regards its original phasis. We took substantially the same view, in the *Christian Examiner*, the Unitarian organ, for September, 1834, in an article reviewing Benjamin Constant's work on Religion. But we did not then, nor do we now, nor have we at any period since, thought it necessary to cut ourselves loose from the Unitarian PARTY. With that party we have considered ourselves associated ever since we recovered our faith in Christianity, in 1831, and we have seen no reason for wishing to seek other religious connexions. We are by no means satisfied with the amount of Christian truth which they set forth in their struggles with Orthodoxy, but in those struggles, theirs was the cause of Christ. They represent the true Christian movement of this country, of the Christian Church in America, and as such they have a right to command the active coöperation of every man, who loves God, and believes in the Lord Jesus Christ. They brought out that phasis of Christian truth most needed at the time, and in their contest with exclusive and intolerant Orthodoxy, they did noble battle for humanity. They have been the champions of freedom; they have interposed a shield between the rights of conscience and the encroachments of ecclesiastical tyranny, common to all other sects in the country; and we have no hesitation in saying that the freedom of the Church of Christ, under God, has been and is in their keeping. In our closets we may read the works of Calvin, of Flavel, of Owen, and Gill even, with much approbation; but the moment we go forth into the midst of the Orthodox people of the day, and listen to their sayings, and observe their doings, we almost pray for infidelity as a blessing to the race. It is to the labors of Unitarians, that we, who sometimes complain of them, owe it, that there is one spot in this New World where men can think and speak freely; and let the Orthodox churches swallow up our Unitarian churches, and it would not be long before a padlock would be placed on every man's lips, who could not subscribe to the Westminster Confession, the Thirty-Nine Articles, or bow to the ignorant but iron rule of Methodist Episcopacy.

We, therefore, while we freely acknowledge the deficiency of the Unitarian creed, in its old phasis, regarded as a definitive statement of Christian truth, hold to the Unitarian *movement*, and contend that the Unitarian community is the truest *Christian* church now on earth. In our efforts to advance the cause of Christ, they must be taken, to use a military phrase, as our *point d'appui*. Without them we have no basis for our operations, and can operate to no advantage.

In the next place, we hold that the form of Christian truth, which ought to prevail, and which must prevail, if the church is to live, must come out from the Unitarian views of the Gospel, and not from the Orthodox views. Orthodoxy cannot be moulded into the form of

Christian faith, that will express the mind of Christ to this age. It belongs essentially to the past, and it has no longer any true life. The life of our Orthodox churches is spasmodic. They are recruited by means of artificial machinery, and if left to themselves would decay, dissolve, as the body when the soul has fled. By means of Revivals, which are a sort of voltaic pile, or galvanic battery, they are made to exhibit certain motions, and certain appearances of life; but no man need mistake the counterfeit. The vital spark has become extinct. From them, we hope nothing. But in the Unitarian community there is true life. There is freedom. There is active and intense thought. This being so, the Unitarian community cannot remain in the first stages of its development. There is no longer any vitality in the first forms it assumed. But it is rapidly assuming a new form, and must inevitably assume a form that will combine the freedom it has asserted, with the rich spiritual truths heretofore expressed by Orthodox symbols.

Mr. Parker and his immediate adherents are deeply impressed with the insufficiency of Unitarianism, as they find it, and seek to remedy the evil by carrying its original protest still further. This is their error; but one which they will soon correct; for to carry the protest farther than Unitarianism originally carried it, would be to go out of the pale of Christianity entirely, and to enter into the regions of mere NATURALISM. But in mere naturalism they cannot remain. They are evidently wrong; and in seeking to modify Unitarianism in that direction, they are seeking to make it retrograde instead of making it advance. They are really the party of the past, and not of the future, as they honestly believe themselves. Unitarianism must cease to be protestant, and become affirmative and catholic. It must advance in the direction of supernaturalism, and not in the direction of naturalism, but a supernaturalism, freed from the superstition and metaphysical absurdities of the Orthodox School. The problem it has to work out is the reconciliation of naturalism and supernaturalism. The solution of this problem we sought to indicate in our review of Mr. Parker's Sermon. If that review is understood by our readers as by ourselves, it points out the synthesis of the two. There is not a word in it that a single Unitarian need object to, and there is nothing in the creed of the Orthodox, which the Orthodox man really holds to be essential, that is not there recognised. But, whether we have worked out the problem or not, the Unitarian Community will soon do it; and then they will be in the condition to become the dominant church of the country. Believing, as we firmly do, that it is only in the bosom of the Unitarian Church, that the problem can be worked out, we cannot but regret, that so many of our young men leave it to go and wander, they know not whither. This church is our mother, and God forbid, that we should disown her. She may disown us if she will, but that is her affair and not ours.

We state our position to be with the Unitarian Church, and our belief to be, that in the evolution of a new form of faith from its old creed, now going on, we shall find all that we can ask. We stay where we are, and do what we can to assist this evolution; and

we presume that the writer of the following letter has no disposition to do otherwise. There is no home for her, more than for us, anywhere else. The Orthodox would disown their own faith as we hold it, nay, would be unable to recognise it in our statements, so ignorant are they of the deep significance of their own doctrines. — ED.]

MY DEAR SIR,

IT seems a late day to publish anything more about Mr. Parker's Sermon at South Boston, and perhaps you will think it unreasonable to be asked for a place for anything more in your Review, after you have yourself given so long and able a defence and explanation of it. But I will tell you the history of these few remarks which I enclose.

Just after the publication of the Sermon, there appeared, in three Unitarian Periodicals, this inquiry ; — Is the doctrine of Immortality, are the doctrines of Repentance, Remission of Sins, &c., no part of the Permanent Christianity according to Mr. Parker, but only the Love of God, and the Love of Man ?

The very statement of such a question seemed to me to argue a want of apprehension as to the relations of things, which was Mr. Parker's best justification for repudiating, on the one hand, these technicalities, into which Unitarians, even more than other sects, have divided the great Truth of Religion, thereby destroying its life and power, and, on the other hand, for asserting Christianity to be the two great principles of Spiritual Life, whose inevitable consequences, in the Intellect, are an impossibility of questioning the immortality of the soul, the nature and efficacy of repentance, and the other doctrines into which Christianity is analyzed by the speculative and scientific. Nevertheless, as the inquiry seemed to be put in good faith, and from not apprehending the scope of Mr. Parker's views, and as two of the Inquirers were popular Unitarian ministers, I thought the answer ought to be given. But this answer was refused a place in all the publications, where the questions had appeared, and my only reason for wishing it printed, at this late day, is on account of

some of the reasons given for the refusal. I want to show what views are rejected by the present Unitarian leaders, as fatal to their own. — It affords me an occasion, also, of saying something more, which I will do, if you please, in the form of a letter; and you can extract what you think best, as an introduction to the article.

You have said, in your Review, that Unitarianism is dead, to which they have opposed the facts, that new Unitarian Churches are formed continually here and there, about the country; and that there is a good deal of religious movement within the old Unitarian Churches in this vicinity. They do not seem to comprehend, that the formation of Unitarian Churches at a distance is merely a proof, that there is always a protest against the Exclusiveness and Dogmatism of Conservative Orthodoxy and Ecclesiastical Tyranny; and that the characteristic of the movement in the old Unitarian Churches, which is the true sign of the times as to Unitarianism, is destructive of the Unitarian formula, and tends to quite a different statement of the doctrine of Life. If the Unitarian sect had known what it was about, or rather, if it had not forgotten entirely the Ideas in which it originated, it would have embraced Mr. Parker as its last hope, and supported him in his statements. For I do not interpret his sermon exactly as you do, though perhaps it may bring minds to your conclusions. I do not think it was any part of his plan to *assert* that Jesus of Nazareth was the Saviour, in the sense of the Orthodox Church. His assertions may lead his hearers and readers to this point, but Mr. Parker, as I understand him, meant to say this, and this only: that Jesus of Nazareth was inspired, as Socrates, or any other great moral and spiritual philosopher is inspired, except that his degree of religious genius is not measurable by any individual man's, who has yet appeared in the world; that his inspiration consisted in the clearest vision of the Law of Holiness; a vision, which, in point of fact, may possibly be unsurpassable by all the men that ever will be created,

but which no man can say is *absolutely* unsurpassable. Now, whether this view be true or false, I maintain that it is the legitimate consequence of taking the Unitarian point of view and method. If Jesus Christ was not in a peculiar sense God, he was a creature of God, and could have no other inspiration, no other authority, than that which his perception of Truth gave him, and his authority was measurable by the degree of Truth he had ; for no perceiver of Truth can have Truth absolutely without measure, though what he perceives may be above any measure, men at present can apply.

It is therefore suicidal in Unitarianism to attack this ground of the authority of Jesus. By so doing it has commenced its own burial. I will not say that individuals of this sect, or other sects, were wrong in asking if this was the ground taken by Jesus and his Apostles, for this would be a fair question ; but they give the death-blow to Unitarianism, by denying Mr. Parker's positions to be the necessary consequences, to which a clear and honest mind must come, that starts with the premiss, that Jesus Christ was created on the same platform as Adam, or even as the highest archangel.

For, if Jesus Christ was not himself the substance of Christianity, that is, was not the absolute manifestation of the Essential God, then he must have been a limited creature, and Seer of Christianity ; and if a Seer, then abstract Christianity is the absolute, in opposition to Jesus the relative. Consequently the importance of his individuality is *transient*, and must diminish to his disciples, according to their advancement in spiritual life ; and to the world, in proportion as it becomes obedient to the Law of Holiness.

This, I apprehend, is Mr. Parker's view ; for he cannot, like some other Unitarians, give up that there is an Absolute Christianity, old as God. Consistently with this view, his statement throws Jesus back into Nature, from the position in which the Orthodox Church has placed him ; — a position against which Unitarianism did at first oppose the moral Imperative in the hu-

man soul, and by doing this in good faith, though by an exaggeration, has had all its life. — As a Hebrew youth, faithful to the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world, living out the moral law, as no other man is recorded to have done, and by this means having all the advantage of his religious genius, whereby to see and to express the moral beauty and obligation of holiness; and teaching holiness, free from all the limitations with which impure character and defective intellect curtail it in other men; and finally as a martyr to it; — Jesus Christ is represented with the most subduing power which Unitarianism admits of. And it cannot be denied, that this is a view which must stimulate the conscience of a *fellow* being, strictly speaking, to the most painful degree; and if Jesus were really a created being, acted upon by moral considerations, and obeying a power out of himself, his success, in moral character, must, on the one hand, be an infinite reproach to his brethren, and on the other, in proportion as they believe it to be real and potentially theirs, an encouragement.

Mr. Parker meant to make this representation, and to this effect. It is his own view, and it is evident from his whole tone of preaching, and from the tone of the lectures, into which he amplified his South Boston Discourse, that it has upon his own spiritual being these effects. Looking upon the world lying in sin and wretchedness around him, with these sins organized into institutions, that oppress and degrade and even obliterate the image of God, originally stamped upon man's nature, he is filled with a mighty indignation which cries aloud and spares not. The Law of Holiness, as Jesus exhibited it in action, this is the Law for every mortal man, from which he cannot, and ought not to wish to escape. To wish to escape its utmost requisitions, is, in his view, the Sin against the Holy Ghost.

It is no wonder that the assertion of this tremendous doctrine, deduced from the common premises with iron-linked logic, and uttered with all the fervor of conviction, should strike into the preachers of Unitarianism

terror or rage, according to their several characters ; and awaken their congregations to ask, whether this young man is a Babbler and false Prophet, or whether their ministers have been recreant to their duty in letting them sleep in a false sense of peace. Unitarians, as long as they remain such, can see no other alternative. The more they examine their own principles, the more they must see that they cannot escape from the duty of unfolding, each in his own person, the character of Jesus of Nazareth, in all its purity and all its height and breadth of righteousness, on the penalty of not having the Christian's Heaven and God. Nor is it any wonder, that Mr. Parker himself, being full of human sensibilities on all sides, and imposing on himself the same moral responsibilities, he imposes on all men, should tremble and quiver with a terrible eloquence, as the tides of his heart pour themselves out in every form of indignation at wrong, and of exhortation to "be up and doing." He could only sustain the mighty burden of suffering humanity, which he so courageously invokes upon his own heart, by the safety valve opened to the burning energies of love in the other pole of his statement, — Jesus, the brother, a nature not discriminated from his own, except in cultivation, did succeed in keeping the Law. One finite creature apprehended Infinite wisdom and acted it out, so that no jot or tittle of the Law passed away until all was fulfilled. More than this, without mediator, *by moral exercise*, one mortal creature triumphed over evil. Without mediator, *by moral exercise*, every mortal man *may* come into precisely the same reconciliation with God, since He is no respecter of persons. All this is inevitable from the combined premises, that God is just, and that Jesus Christ is the Saviour, purely by virtue of the righteousness of his humanity. In vain it may be said that he declared God would pardon sin. His own certainty of it could be transferred to no other soul, except so far as that soul came into the state of his own, which would be putting the desired consequent for the antecedent. No one could be sure this certainty was not the transport of

benevolent affections. There are but two ways in which the sinner can believe his sin forgiven. One is the Orthodox way, that God remits it to fulfil something else in himself, than abstract Justice ; and the other is, that the sinner himself actually does something, so good and beautiful, both inwardly and outwardly, as to balance and out-balance the Evil he has done, by presumption or infirmity. The last way, if they do not desert their premises, is the Unitarian way ; and by denying Mr. Parker's statement of it, and denouncing him for setting it forth, they have acknowledged that their first principles involved a vital error. The Christ of the conservative Unitarians is an impossible being even with God, for the uncreated cannot create another uncreated, nor could a created Christ, though the very Heaven of Heavens, be clean in the sight of Absolute Goodness, Wisdom, and Power.

Mr. Parker's statement is, therefore, the last word of Unitarianism. Honest and courageous, he has followed out its principles to their legitimate issues, with the manliness all men must respect, for he is true in relation to the principles, whether he be true to Absolute Truth, or not.

I will now tell you the historical relation, all these remarks bear to the Essay which I enclose, on the generation of the doctrines of Christianity in the intellect of the man who loves God and his neighbor.

The outcry some of the Unitarians made upon Mr. Parker, and the shabby desertion of him by some who believed his conclusions, merely because he had uttered them without their leave, excited me to examine anew the basis of Unitarianism, and to ascertain the significance of its principles with respect to spiritual well-being. Going back to their origin in the soul, I found Unitarianism was a reaction of the moral nature, against the corruption by the recreant Orthodox of their original statement of the doctrine of Life, which I had never before understood ; and that it was not, as I had always believed, or rather never doubted, a legitimate unfolding of the moral nature in its *fair* proportion. As, by virtue

of our moral nature, we can receive power from God to manifest our gratitude to Him, for His manifestation to us of His Goodness in Jesus Christ, when we are spiritually *alive*, we shall exhibit a progress in the Love, Wisdom, and Power, which show us to be the sons of God. But all, who have received the doctrine of life into their Intellect, have not been faithful to it, perseveringly exercising their moral powers, according to their individual ability. And some have never understood or received it at all, who have yet professed it formally. Thus the Goodness of God has been disgraced, and made of no effect. Seen through the medium of those unfaithful stewards, the radiance of its glory has been lost, and the formula of it viewed as a mere bargain, and a bargain also between dead abstractions; and thus the souls of men have been thrown back from the Living God, revealed in the face of Jesus Christ, upon such a God as might be inferred necessarily to exist; and this God must be an Inexorable necessity, whether called Law, or *called* Love, for he is clothed upon with absolute Justice, by that moral Imperative in the human constitution, which affirms his existence. It was in this sally of the moral nature, outraged by the corruptions of the Orthodox Church, that the Unitarian sect took all the life it has ever had. Never was a heresy more respectable; but inasmuch as it was a human reaction, it involved an element of Death. And the reassertion of it now, more clearly, to be rejected by Unitarians, is a proof that Unitarianism has lived out its life, and is dead. Mr. Parker may presently see, if he does not already see, that there is no step farther but into quite another world, in which the Moral Law, which he worships, will appear, as it is, *relative*, and not the Absolute; and that the freedom of our nature, by which we choose whether or not to do right, — is a faint and perverted image of that in God, by virtue of which He forgives the inevitable sins of partially intelligent creatures, and gives holiness, or life in the spirit, as he gives individual existence, or life in objective nature, of free grace.

So you see I take the side of Mr. Parker, inasmuch as he is attacked or opposed by the conservatives, especially the Unitarian conservatives, without asserting whether or not he has stated, or even discerned the deepest secret of Life, which lies in seeing and partaking the Freedom of God. He has certainly discerned the true method of seeking it. For moral exercise is a prevailing prayer, as long as we do not grow superstitious upon even this means, which enthusiasts are always liable to do ; for all enthusiasts are partial, even moral enthusiasts.

It is not without emotion, that I so decidedly pronounce dead the foster mother of my religious life, to whom, perhaps, I owe more than I know. But I must say the Unitarian Church has proved herself, in my inward experience, for years, no real mother to me, and I have languished even unto death for the author of my Life. The search for the nearest duty, however, and its fulfilment as best we may, though under the consciousness that this is infinitely below the whole Law of Rectitude, is not without its blessing. Moral exercise, when not esteemed for more than the exercises of a created being can be worth, is a prevailing prayer for light. In looking round among Unitarians, I see, on the faces of all the best, a sadness, and, in their tones, I hear a note of sorrow. But whenever I see that they make this prayer of moral exercise, in true humility, my heart applies to them, at least prophetically, the following beautiful lines ;

Abon Ben-Adhem (may his tribe increase),
Awoke one night from a deep dream of peace,
And saw within the moonlight in his room,
Making it rich and like a lily in bloom,
An angel writing in a book of gold.
Exceeding peace had made Ben-Adhem bold,
And to the presence in the room he said,
"What writest thou?" the angel raised his head,
And with a look made all of sweet accord,
Answered, "the names of those who love the Lord."
"And is mine one?" said Adhem, "nay, not so,"
Replied the angel. Adhem spoke more low,

But cheerly still, and said, "I pray thee then,
Write me as one that loves his fellow men."
The angel wrote and vanished; — the next night
He came again with a great wakening light,
And showed the names the love of God had blest,
And lo! Ben-Adhem's name led all the rest.

It is but fair for me also to say, that the Orthodox Church militant in all its forms, seems to me sufficiently corrupt to justify the Unitarian protest; and that it owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Parker, for bringing the question of principle between the two churches, to a fair issue.

Of the questions, which Mr. Parker has brought before the public mind, one of the most fruitful in answers is this; What is the relation of the doctrines of Christianity with the two great principles of spiritual life; — the love of God and the love of man? It has been asked under which category is to be reckoned the doctrines of the immortality of the soul, the efficacy of repentance, the remission of sins, &c.

We begin our remarks with the doctrine of Immortality. By nature we have no sense of Mortality. Mortality is a conception abhorrent to our whole soul. When we think of ourselves as dead, we think only of our body, and in imagination survive, to pity this dead body, so intimately associated with our consciousness of life. The notion of annihilation of soul would not distress us, but that we survive, by the same necessity of imagination, to pity this dead soul. We may puzzle and distress ourselves about death and annihilation, but we cannot, by thought, disinherit ourselves of a consciousness of Life, which appears in our Intellect as the Idea of Immortality. We may cease to enjoy it, but it will cling to us, tormenting us; for Life is the Law; that is, inasmuch as existence is the imperative gift of God, every mind that has become conscious to itself, has the conception of something permanent therein, as well as of much that is transient; and the permanent awakens love. This conception and

love of permanence constitute what we call an Idea or Sense of immortality, according as we are intellectual or sentimental in our general character. Faith in Immortality is but the fact of Life, appearing to our own Reason, or our Sensibility. Life embodies itself in form successively, annihilating each successive form by quitting it, but it cannot deny its own essence. What is called the voluntary sacrifice of Life itself, proves that nothing can be sacrificed, but the phenomena and circumstances of life. It is common enough for men to give away what they call their lives, for an object, such as glory, love, integrity of soul. But what is this which stands over my phenomenal life and gives it away? Is it not Life itself? The giver is not the thing given.

The question then arises, How should there ever have been a doubt of Immortality? * It can only

* We venture to affirm in this place, that this doubt really never occurs. No man does, or can doubt his immortality. To doubt he must think. But he cannot think a single thought, without including himself as the subjective element of the thought, as the subject thinking it. This consciousness of himself, as the thinker, is always an inseparable element of thought, not merely logically considered, but considered as a simple fact of intellectual life. When, therefore, we speculate on our annihilation, we always and necessarily survive in thought; we always and necessarily include ourselves in the thought as the subject of the phenomenon we term annihilation. We cannot think of our own annihilation, without thinking at the same instant of ourselves as undergoing it, enduring it, and therefore as surviving it, which negatives the assertion that it is annihilation. In all our thoughts, whether of the future or of the past, we have direct consciousness of ourselves as living subjects of the thought. The soul is always present to itself, in all its phenomena. It cannot therefore conceive itself either as past or future, or as absent. The *ME* we speculate about, whether in the past or the future, is not the *ME*, not *ourself*, but a fact of memory, the product of our past living, or a fact of foresight, a presentiment of a fact of future living. The confounding of this *ME*, which is veritably *NOT-ME*, and with which I hold numerous dialogues in what is termed self-examination, with the *ME*, properly so called, the *ME* of consciousness, is the cause of the illusion, which leads us to fancy that we doubt our immortality. Men, who profess to doubt, who really believe that they doubt their own immortality, are deceived, by supposing that the object of which they are thinking, and which they affirm will cease to be, is them-

have been, when Thought was superficial, because by false living the phenomenon was put in opposition to the principle of Life. To live under the guidance of the passions, more especially of the sensual passions, or in too close connexion with finite circumstances, scatters the power of thinking and wastes or deadens consciousness. Attention becomes unduly fixed on manifestation, and forgets the principle. Experimenting in morals under the leadings of sense, instead of simply obeying principle, according to the heart, has obscured, or weakened, or checked in its development, the Idea of Immortality from the days of Adam and Eve to this day. Because they ate the forbidden fruit, they missed of the tree of Life. To recover the lost heritage, they must become as little children, love God and their neighbors. Then the Idea, which gives man his true dignity, will again dawn on his benighted soul. He shall see and eat of the Tree of Life.

It is this practical truth which Mr. Parker sets forth. Because he has not yet lost his birthright of spiritual discernment, he has seen it, and stated it with a breadth which has made him unintelligible to the mass of *educated* people, who, by *intellectual wire-drawing*, lose "the Primal Light of all our seeing." Faith in Immortality is no discovery to be made by intellectual

selves. A little sound philosophy would set them right, and teach them that they can never be the object of their own thoughts. It is never then of themselves that they can affirm the non-existence.

Furthermore, so far as experience goes, there is not a single fact to warrant the induction of man's mortality. All the soul's experience is of life. It has always survived all its phenomena, and what evidence has it that death is a phenomenon it will not be able to survive? It survives deep sleep, it survives stupor, fainting, unconsciousness, all that most resembles death. Where, then, is the evidence that it will one day cease to survive? Surely, some strong evidence is needed to warrant an induction contrary to all experience. For our part we regard the question of the immortality of the soul, involved in the question of its identity, and we are so far from believing the question, Am I immortal? unanswerable, that we do not believe it even askable. Whoso examines the words, will find, that in them he asks no question at all. — ED.

process, first hand, or second hand. It is an inheritance forfeited by falling from the first principles of spiritual life, and recoverable only by returning to them. Faith in Immortality is indeed only another name for spiritual discernment, or power of rising over creation, towards the Creator, that is, of abstracting the mind from circumstances. Loving God regulates the passions, denies the supremacy of the senses, so that the faculty by which he is discerned acts. Its action is at once Life, and the consciousness of Life. Hence the Idea of Immortality is inevitably unfolded in the growth of the Human Constitution.

Socrates's conversation on the Immortality of the Soul is a magnificent fact in the history of the human mind, and the greatest record of the mere Intellect's attempt at self-recovery. But it fails of the End, of maturing this Idea into a Faith.

No one ever closely followed it, who did not sympathize with Simmias when he said, It is proved, but I feel a lurking doubt. This remark, which is an internal evidence of the reality of the conversation, shows that Faith in Immortality is not an act of the understanding. It was because Simmias, like most of us, was diseased in the moral life, that his spiritual discernment was not perfect. Socrates, as Plato says, smiled. He knew the difficulty. He had presented the fact of Immortality only to the dialectic and æsthetic faculties. He suggested that Simmias should employ his Imagination to create the symbols of a divine life, and to enter into the significance of the Fables of the Popular Religion, and, in connexion with this, often to go over the argument in his thought. This was wise as far as it went. But Socrates was only the Apostle of the Intellect. His teachings were addressed not to man, but to a class of men, the intellectual *par excellence*. It has often been remarked that himself was the proof of Immortality, rather than his arguments. When we rise from the perusal of the Apology before the Areopagus, or in Plato's life-like picture, see him drink the cup of hemlock and smile, we see evidence of the immortality of the soul.

But Jesus of Nazareth, from the depths of a life in which no Death is, taught a method of realizing Faith in Immortality more simple for the individual, and more universally possible. He saw that the faith in Immortality could not be a tradition, or an intellectual apprehension, to be held in a symbol, but must always be an original Idea springing from the life of each man. Love God, he said, and Love man ; — in short, live immortal, and you will believe in immortality. The belief is a birth from and of the spirit. It is as much an individual act, and even more, than the birth of the body. No man can be born for another spiritually, any more than bodily.

Some persons would have it that spiritual discernment is a consequence of intellectual acuteness and cultivation, and so is not possible to all men. If this were true, then some men could not worship God. But all the pure in heart see God. The intellectually acute, by scientific analysis, may make the Idea of God part of our theology, but cannot make us feel its truth, if, by our giving the senses dominion over the soul, our purity of sentiment is injured. Nothing, therefore, could be more philosophical, than Jesus Christ's remanding all those, who come to him for the kingdom of heaven, to the first commandment. Yet Mr. Parker's reiteration of this condition of receiving faith in Eternal Life is taken in our *Christian* community, as the proof that he is not a Christian! But it is not the nine letters of that word which make the man a Christian; but having the same mind that was in Christ Jesus. When he was born into Judea, the commandment to love God stood at the head of the law, yet who had the Idea? It may be that now those who sit in Moses' seat, have farthest departed from the spirit of the prophet. No mind, ordinary or extraordinary, can discern spiritually, except so far as it is free from all reliance on forms and formulas. When a sensual mind, or a technical mind, represents to itself God, it forms some Idol. It may be the embodiment of some desire, or it may be a form of words. The more describable is a man's God the

more probably has he fallen below the Idea of Spirit. But God seeks to worship him those to whom all circumstance, whether Mount Gerizim or Jerusalem, is indifferent; for He is Spirit, and must be worshipped in Spirit and in Truth. The moral obligation to worship God, therefore, involves a moral obligation to spiritual discernment, which of course God puts within the reach of all. Nothing, therefore, can be more impious than to say, there are minds incapable of spiritual discernment. It is the only germ of immortal life, and consequently, the necessary foundation of faith in that life. But this discernment is enfolded in the sentiments of Love of God and Love of Man. Mr. Parker calls all men to this Love. This is the one thing needful, because it involves all other things desirable. The mind, which loves, and therefore apprehends God in Spirit, can apprehend everything ever uttered by the wit of man, only let him carefully discipline the mortality in which his light is planted while on earth.

Love of God AND Love of Man. Moses was a pure Theist. He made God the Supreme object of human aspiration. But he did not propose a practical life, which fully tested this great principle. Love God, and the Children of Abraham after the flesh, was his word. Jesus went beyond him. He gave a test by which we may measure infinite depths of our love of God; for he showed that our neighbor is the Samaritan, the lost, the dead, the farthest removed from the Visible Church. Mr. Parker has endeavored to state this practice, as always essential to the preservation of the principle of worship. The philosophy of the day, which gives form to the theology of the most enlightened sects, the ecclesiastical arrangements, which grow up out of this theology, all this, he says, is transient. It may have temporary merit, but it is not to be named in the same day with the Eternal principles of moral life. Be loving towards all that lives, towards the Absolute Source of Life, and all the streams therefrom, yourself not quite forgotten, and the Law of Life will retain or recover its natural supremacy, and preclude all question,

that is, all doubt of Immortality ; for Love is our Immortality, the Everlasting gift of the Absolute God to his creatures.

Jesus Christ's life and death, — his death was but a greater life — express and explain the Immortality of the souls of men. But they must be looked at in the largest way. Some Unitarians have the narrowest way of understanding all his words. They see nothing universal in anything he says. Whenever he speaks of the relations of matter and spirit, they would have it, that he is thinking of Judea and Judaism, and their overthrow by the Romans ; whenever he speaks of the secret of Life, they would have it that he speaks of a reconstruction of the earthly kingdom in which he was born. This sublime being, who uses all things as symbols of Thoughts which pervade Eternity, is interpreted with a narrowness, which would degrade him below minds with which we are constantly familiar. For no great mind dwells on circumstances as such ; and Jesus perpetually uses kingdoms, persons, above all his own person, as symbols of spiritual facts. Should not we all do so ? Does not every mind of spiritual discernment see in Jesus' life on earth the evidence, that phenomena need not obscure the law ? As soon as he began to reflect, he saw his Father's business to be his own. It is possible that he had not discerned the ignorance and darkness around him, till the time of his enrollment at the temple, as a Jewish man, when twelve years old. For to him nature was transparent, the manifested word of God, whose very existence was by and through himself, and man he only knew as he was in the bosom of the Father in Heaven, — "the Son of Man which is in heaven." Measuring by this standard, the wisdom of the wisest of his time was folly. He judged the doctors by his understanding and his answers. Even if, as some say, this story of Luke's is of doubtful authority, as a fact of circumstance, it is the happiest apologue of what must have been true of his experience on earth. At some time, by means of the spirit within, he saw the want of spirit-

uality about him. He therefore separated the Transient from the Permanent in all his conversations and discourses, by way of awakening the sleeping spirits of men to attend to God's great manifestation of Himself. Through the phenomenal men around him, he discerned that Divine Idea, we call the man's soul — a chained Life — a Life in Death. Sometimes he spoke to the phenomenal men, the dead, as when he says, "Ye are of your father, the Devil. He was a liar from the beginning." But, also he addressed the spiritual men, alive in their humble faith; as when he said, "thy sins are forgiven thee." His whole Sermon on the Mount was a statement of principles. His parables, all he said, had the one object of leading all, who heard him, to go beneath dogma and institution to the spiritual facts of Law and Love. There were, as he knew, those who did not understand him, but he did not forego his spiritual communications on that account. "He that hath ears to hear, let *him* hear," was his word. He never stooped to those, who should come to him, in the power of humility. As Lawgiver he says, "Be perfect, as your Father in heaven, is perfect;" but as supreme Lover, "I am the Resurrection and the Life." — "He that believeth on me shall never die. I will be in him a well of water, springing up into everlasting life." — "Have I been so long with you, and you have not known me, Philip?" "Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? Henceforth ye know him and have seen him; my Father and I are one." (Translate *I* into the word Wisdom, and my Father into the word *Love*.)

We have no accounts of Jesus arguing, as Socrates did, upon the Immortality of the soul. He did not recognise that disorder of mind, or rather that disease of soul, which wants the sense of Immortality. He assumes the fact of Eternal Life, as the basis of all he says. God is eternal and man is his son. Consequently, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living. Only as ever-living souls, and not in their narrow individuality, did they become the nucleus of a national Religion.

Alas ! did he anticipate that the time might come when his own name would be used to crush the faith he would inspire ; by being sequestered to his phenomenal life ? He seemed to do so, when he said, “ but when the son of man cometh, shall he find Faith on the earth ? ”

He never connected the thought of Immortality with time, “ leaving an infinite present for a limited future.” He occasionally asserted it in connexion with the Past, but this was to make the Past less of a dead weight,— to show, in short, that *the Past* was a figment of our brain. “ Before, Abraham was — I am.”

Because the Love of God and the Love of man are the organs, by which the soul apprehends and preserves its Immortality, and Jesus of Nazareth has made the clearest manifestation of this, he is said to have brought Life and Immortality to light. He made it a part of Religious science by showing its generation in the Soul.

There was life, and consequently a faith in Immortality, before the full manifestation of its generation ; but the manifestation of this generation, in life and word, is of an immense importance. Being in the world of sense, constant regeneration is necessary, and Love is the only means of spiritual discernment. It enlarges and strengthens the mind, and makes it capable of every spiritual exercise. It constantly stimulates thought, which is higher than sense, and assimilates the soul to the object of its love. The love of man is but another phasis of the love of God, preventing the mind from becoming the victim of its own power of abstraction. This alone saves the soul from *Religionism*, a great vice ; for Religionism forgets that God is Creator, and loves his own image, as the temple of his Spirit, while *Religion* loves God the Creator, and especially as the Father. How can we love the Father, and not love the children of the Father ? Fatherhood implies a certain communion of nature. Would you know whether you love God ? You may ask yourself if you love goodness, wherever you see it. He, who does not love it in the beggar at

his gate, does not love God, who is the absolute goodness. Goodness is one and the same thing, whether in God or man. Man is interesting, therefore, just in proportion as we love God, who may dwell in him. "We have as much piety as we have charity, and *no more*."

By process of reasoning similar to the above, we should proceed to prove that, in all living minds, all the other doctrines, mentioned in the inquiries to which we are replying, are generated by living out Love of God, and Love of man, which two principles are in fact one, since we love the same spirit in God and in man, looking to God as object, man as subject. This common abstraction of the Christian doctrines from the Christian life, the separation and substitution of the effect in the Intellect, for the cause in the Soul, is Mr. Parker's best justification for his practical statement. It is doubtless a legitimate action of the human intellect, to look at the fact of Religion in the soul, in daylight, and to class its phenomena scientifically, and, therefore, to speak of the *doctrine* of Immortality, the *doctrine* of Repentance, the *doctrine* of Remission of sins, &c. But, alas, for the mind reduced to depend on scientific formulas for any of its impulse, or for what it calls its life! That mind is dying the death. Religion is not an assent to deductions of the understanding from the phenomena of human development, but it is living totally according to spiritual facts which it loves. A man may fancy he thinks God is love, but *to love*, is the only expression of that thought which avails. Let no man fancy he believes in Repentance, Remission of sins, Immortality, except just so far as he feels penitent, pardoned, immortal; for all such beliefs are mere speculations, and if not known as such, deceptive.

The above remarks imply how much deeper are the foundations of Christian faith, than in the authority of any created being. Flesh and blood may not reveal Eternal Life, but only the Father who is in Heaven. No man can convey to another the Idea of Immortality. Words cannot hold it. The speech of even Jesus of Nazareth did not make ears. He taught whom the Father gave him only. The most others can do, for any soul,

is to indicate what it is to avoid and do, in order to realize and accept its own limitations, or feel its own wants, when it will find itself crowned with Immortality by God.

He who feels a doubt of his Immortality should dismiss all speculations on the subject, and make the most of any germ of the love of man he has in him, and act this out as impartially as possible, in consistency with man's relation to God. As he dwells on himself and neighbor, as Sons, who had not existed but for Love, the fire will burn within him, and before he knows it, the Idea of Immortality will have returned, or rather the clouds of doubt, superinduced by the prevalence of lower laws than the Law of Life, will have passed away from his heaven. The real doctrines of Christianity, that is, the consequences of the Christian life in the understanding, though they change their form with the understanding itself, are as permanent as their generating cause is real; and without sharing this causing Love, all the authority of ages on ages cannot make them part of an individual mind, however large a figure they may make in its creed. "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father."

We have not a word to say in answer to some other misunderstandings and misrepresentations of Mr. Parker and his Sermon. "These things must be." They are the proof, though it may seem paradoxical to say so, of his being *in some degree understood* where he is nearest the truth. The word of God, as in the time of Jesus of Nazareth, has become of none effect by reason of "traditions." To approximate the utterance of it, frightens a Judaizing Christendom, not less than Jesus frightened the Sanhedrim.

We love to call ourselves liberal Christians. Some of us have dared to organize as such. Our organization has betrayed us, as organization ever must, as soon as it is trusted in as permanent and authoritative. But the soul is immortal. The Son of Man comes, as the

truth of our nature, and if he does not find faith on the Earth, he brings it. However delayed, the word of LIFE is sterling; and the Lord of the Sabbath day, having set doing good to man against every institution made for man, shall come again in glory; and as the lightning cometh out of the East, and shineth even unto the West, so shall that coming of the Son of Man be!

E. P. P.

ART. IV. — *An Elementary Treatise on Algebra, for the use of Students in High Schools and Colleges.* By THOMAS SHERWIN, A. M., Principal of the English High School, Boston. Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey. 1842.

“To the making of books there is no end.” We are glad of it. Why should there be an end? If a book tend to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge, either by presenting new information, or by serving up old in a more attractive form, it ought to be welcomed; and it will be by those, whose pecuniary or other exclusively selfish interests are not liable to be injured by its introduction.

We have no objection to a book, because there are already a score of a similar kind in the market. We have no objection to a book of instruction, even if it is made with a pair of scissors, provided the instruments are judiciously employed, to cut out such well treated portions of the subject matter, as best announce and illustrate it.

We seldom find a single author treating all the branches of a subject equally well; and it therefore becomes important, especially to the young, that some discriminating person occasionally collect, into one compact treatise, the isolated improvements, which

have been made by successive authors, and which have stood the test of experimental instruction, during a course of years. The more these portions are fashioned into symmetry, and receive new life and spirit from the compiler, the better will his book fulfil its design.

We do not mean to insinuate, that the book before us is a mere compilation; for, although in it, as an elementary treatise, we find only long established principles, yet the exhibition and demonstration of them, as well as their arrangement and the mode of instruction, (considerations of the utmost importance to the learner,) are original.

The object of this notice is, to state what we consider the requisites of a good elementary instruction book of Algebra, a science, dignified in itself, and so important in its various applications, that it surely makes legitimate claims to well digested treatises and excellent manuals for instruction.

Mathematical knowledge seems to be gaining a more extended diffusion in our country; and we hope, at the same time, that the standard of mathematical acquirements is steadily and rapidly rising. Our common schools, which were formerly considered in good condition, when a few of the most advanced pupils, (by dint of sundry mystical operations prescribed, not explained,) had succeeded in "getting through," Daboll's arithmetic, now send forth their annual crowd of boys and girls, at an age much younger than of yore, not only better acquainted with arithmetic, but often with a very useful, though doubtless a limited knowledge of algebra and geometry. It seems fair to infer, that, the common schools being thus indisputably better than formerly, the higher schools and colleges have risen also; but the fact, in regard to those high schools in which boys are prepared for college, is, that Latin and Greek are the principal objects of attention, while barely enough of arithmetic and algebra is acquired, to pass an examination at college; consequently, the boys, not being thoroughly prepared in elementary knowledge, find themselves unable to accomplish the course of mathe-

mathematical studies prescribed by the college faculty. These facts show, that at least one description of high schools has not been very successful in raising the standard of mathematical knowledge; and, what is worse, has consequently impeded its advancement in the colleges. The blame, we suppose, must be shared between teachers and parents; the teachers for not insisting on keeping back the unprepared pupil; and the parents for excessive eagerness to get their sons into college. Hurry, however, is our national characteristic.

The text books of our colleges have, within a few years, been changed for the better; and doubtless individual students are occasionally found, who have made progress far beyond those of the same rank and pretensions in former times; but, the "*rari nantes in gurgite vasto*" are few indeed, compared to those, who sink down through utter weariness and disgust; for we believe it to be an indisputable fact, that there prevails in our colleges a very general and lamentable disrelish for mathematics. There are other causes of this disrelish, besides the insufficiency of preparation; such are, the great amount of time and labor requisite for proficiency, the supposed improbability of making an every-day use of them in the professions, the small chance they offer to one's vanity as a means of display. As to a want of natural capacity, we cannot believe this to be quite so general as the dislike, and, therefore, cannot set it down as peculiarly influencing this branch of knowledge. The most common complaints, which the students make openly, are, "the books are too difficult;" "we are driven on too fast;" &c.

Now many utter these complaints, who are glad to find any plausible pretence to cover their real indolence and negligence; and yet, we believe, the rogues have sagacity enough, in the present instance, to use a just discrimination in their choice of pretences. We do truly believe, that many of the mathematical text books, in our colleges, are too difficult for a great majority of the persons called upon to use them. The treatises of Professor Peirce, for instance, elegant and

symmetrical as they are, are too condensed and general for boys ; they presume a greater preparation in mathematics, than boys usually get before going to college, and greater than the examinations for admission seem to demand ; in fact, they appear to have been made, with a prospective view to a much higher standard of mathematical acquirements, than the present state of things in our schools and colleges immediately promises ; and, we believe, they are thoroughly perused and understood but by a very few collegians, and these remarkably well endowed with faculties for mathematical studies.

It may be said, that the subject demands this great generality ; that it is its chief virtue ; is all, perhaps, that renders it valuable in the higher departments of science dependent on analysis ; and if boys do not readily show talents for such reasonings, they must leave the subject to heads better constituted by nature for mathematical investigations. In reply to this, we declare, that children must be fed "with food convenient for them," with children's food, so diluted as not to clog by repletion, and yet so strong as sufficiently to stimulate their faculties to healthy activity. Boys must be trained in a long course of exercises in the elements of the exact sciences, must be made perfectly familiar with their instruments, before they can be justly expected to grapple with general views and discussions. Many people, and especially persons of great natural powers for acquiring mathematical knowledge, forget how slowly young persons attain an acquaintance even with arithmetic ; that not one in twenty, of the boys admitted into our colleges at the age of fifteen, nay, of the whole that enter, inclusive of those whose age approximates thirty, has a thorough and firmly settled knowledge of this first branch of mathematics, although they have, on an average, attended to the subject ten years.

It would appear at first glance, that, if the very elements of science can scarcely find a lodgment in their crania, after so long, so Troy-like a siege, it were ad-

visible to desist ; but many a dull boy, by patient perseverance and accurate instruction, has finally arrived at an enviable acquaintance with the deepest science,

quæ, sera, tamen respexit inertem,
Candidior postquam tondenti barba cadebat.

We do not wholly approve of setting up a procrustean system, and declaring that books should be made only in accordance with it ; but, in an instruction book of an exact science, we can tell, *a priori*, what are indispensable requisites ; and we claim a right to examine such books, with reference to our preconceived notions of what they ought to be. We proceed to mention some.

The first requisite, in the formation of an instruction book, is, that the author, being thoroughly acquainted with his subject, invariably tell the truth. One of the most popular elementary instruction books of algebra, and that made by a teacher of great celebrity and success, contains in its key, as explanatory of the process by which the fraction $\frac{ax + by - xy}{ay + cy + ax}$ may be reduced to its lowest terms, the following morceau ; “since ax occurs in the numerator and denominator, this term may be cancelled in both. Ans. $\frac{b - x}{a + c}$.” The enunciation is too formal and express to allow of the charitable construction of a *lapsus*, and the subsequent reduction of similar quantities, by the same rule, settles the blame of ignorance of a first principle on the author. How he could ever have made progress in analysis, with such notions of reduction, is a puzzling question.

From this single instance of false teaching, all will readily see the absolute necessity of stating truth alone, in elementary books ; as an error, imbibed early and habitually assumed, will constantly recur and annoy the student, even after a better acquaintance with the subject has exposed its falsity. The truth should also be so strictly observed, that no statements, made in general terms, for the sake of producing a strong impression on

the Student's mind, will in any part of his progress be necessarily withdrawn.

In the second place, clearness is essential ; and such clearness, withal, as a young person can appreciate. Too concise and condensed a statement is as much to be avoided as verbosity. Each rule and direction ought to require no second look to correct a false view taken at first. The subject has intrinsic difficulties enough to exercise the mind, without the foreign aid of mistiness : and so far are we from believing, that simple and easily acquired views of the subject debilitate the mind, that we believe the very thing, which would strengthen it, is kept from it by the hardness of the exposition ; for, the simplest truths, most clearly expressed, will task the majority of young persons to the extreme of their ability, and this same majority are soon disheartened by a strain even slightly severe.

In the next place, we like to have statements made with precision and formality. This can be much assisted by the typographical execution of the book. A distinct and formal announcement of each topic attracts the attention, and fixes it more securely to the subject under consideration.

Minuteness in explanation is quite necessary, leaving no breach in the process too broad for the unpractised step of the young.

There should also be a frequent reference to fundamental principles, and a constant repetition of them, to refresh the learner's memory, however much these may mar the symmetry and conciseness of the treatise ; for, the object of the book being instruction, iteration and re-iteration can hardly be too much insisted on. A great portion of the trials of a teacher arise from his not making sufficient allowances for his pupil's feeble recollection ; he is often surprised to find, that a topic, dwelt upon with great patience and care, and left only when it was believed to be perfectly fixed in the learner's mind, has, after some little time, quite vanished from his memory.

Then all the parts of the book should be so arrang-

ed, that each may presuppose no information in the learner, which has not already been actually imparted.

And, lastly, it should strictly adhere to its design, not touching on topics too high for the learner, and yet being adequate to the wants of the class of persons, for whom it is prepared.

The question now arises, how the book before us complies with the requisitions we have premised. Does it possess nothing but truth? Does it possess clearness, precision, minute explanations, frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, happy arrangement, and a successful accomplishment of its design?

The first six sections of the book consist of problems in equations of the first degree, with one unknown quantity, commencing with extreme simplicity in the inductive method, each section developing but one new principle, and exemplifying it, till the learner acquires a knowledge and facility in the use of the signs. We incline to the belief, that many pupils will find some of these problems a little more difficult than the author intended they should be; the difficulty lying not in the operations, which the author renders very clear, but in reducing the conditions of the questions to the form of equations, a process very often more difficult than solving the equations themselves.

The Sections from 7th to 15th inclusive contain the various operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.

The Sections from 16th to 22d inclusive treat of the subjects of factors, divisors, and multiples, and very happily apply them to operations on fractional quantities. These sections are particularly good. The subject of resolving algebraic quantities into their prime factors is quite too much neglected in every other book, with which we are acquainted. We are glad to find so much attention paid to it here, and equally so to observe the frequent use made of factors, in the subsequent sections of the book. The habit and power of discovering and adroitly managing the prime factors of quantities are of

great service to the analyst, in every stage of his progress

Section 23d contains a few problems in literal equations; and thus the learner is prepared for Sections 24th and 25th, on Equations of the first degree, with several unknown quantities.

Section 26th contains numerical substitutions in algebraic quantities; and like the section on factors, shows the author's intimate acquaintance with the real wants of his pupils.

Section 27th is the most appropriate article on generalization, we have met in any book. The examples are practical and useful. We also discover a judicious location of the examples. Most authors refer the pupil to various parts of their books, to seek out examples for generalization, which the pupil invariably neglects to do, unless strongly urged; whereas this author has arranged a sufficient number of suitable examples in the section itself.

Section 28th investigates negative quantities and negative results.

Section 29th discusses the courier problems and examines the symbols $\frac{m}{o}$ and $\frac{o}{o}$.

Sections 30th to 46th inclusive treat of the various relations of roots and powers, and the operations connected with them, including pure and affected equations of the second degree, and pure equations of the third degree. We notice, with peculiar satisfaction, the articles on approximate roots, irrational quantities, and the binomial theorem. It is too often found necessary to suffer boys of moderate capacity to omit the demonstration of the binomial theorem, and content ourselves with teaching a practical application of its results; but, by the previous gradual training derived from this book, and the cautious advance of the demonstration itself, leaving no gaps requiring more mental agility, than even heavy boys possess, we believe most pupils will be able to get through it profitably. Still it is strict and concise, contrasting well with Colburn's, which occu-

pies some twenty pages, and over which we have seen many a pains-taking boy toiling in hopeless disgust.

Section 47th contains the consideration of inequalities, a subject not unimportant, and yet wholly neglected in most treatises on algebra. Sections 48th to 53d inclusive exhibit the doctrine and application of ratios, proportions, and progressions. Sections 54th and 55th contain some elegant exercises in equations of the second degree, with one and two unknown quantities. These are introduced in this place, to test the learner's proficiency in all the principles and operations treated of in the foregoing sections. They are such exercises as will not only effect this object, but will render the learner familiar with many expressions and quantities, a knowledge of which tends greatly to assist him in the higher branches of mathematics. They are likewise as difficult as the nature of the book demands.

Sections 56th, 57th, and 58th treat of the construction, the tables, the uses, and applications of logarithms, with characteristic minuteness and perspicuity.

Sections 59th and 60th are on Compound Interest and Annuities.

The book ends with a selection of miscellaneous examples.

It will be perceived, that attention has been paid to all the branches of the subject, which can be necessary for a book of its class; and scarcely can a passage be found, which does not admirably conform to the requisites, which we have presumed to set forth. We have noticed but one, that does not strictly agree with the first. On the 140th page, it is said, "imaginary quantities," (such as $\sqrt{-16}$,) "indicate absolute absurdity in the questions from which they arise." The author has here inadvertently dropped his usual caution, in making the assertion too general. When he was discussing the symbols $\frac{o}{o}$ and $\frac{m}{m}$, he was guarded and discriminating, and remarked, that in problems of geometry, such symbols indicated no absurdity, but true results. Now imaginary quantities also indicate no absurdity in

problems of geometry ; for instance, the equation, $y + 3n\sqrt{-1} - a = 0$, considered geometrically, is far from absurd, it being in fact an equation, which has for its locus a point, whose coördinates are $n=0$, and $y=a$. Even in pure algebra imaginary quantities are employed advantageously, and without involving any absurdity.

In regard to the other requisites, we must say, that, had we not been told, in the title page, the author's name, we could have been sure, that the book was made by a person, who knew exactly where young people fail and need assistance ; who had been accustomed to *teach* the subject, and not merely to hear recitations or receive a stated number of answers to a daily dole of questions ; and who knew how to supply the pupil's wants, and to correct the deficiencies of existing books. Men, who are not accustomed to teach, and who know not what mighty stumbling blocks very little things are to beginners, may be surprised at meeting so many precise directions on the minutiae of the operations ; but we feel assured, that many a learner, and many a teacher, will acquire habits of accuracy, and be freed from a vast deal of perplexity by them.

The distinct announcement of the subjects of the sections, so that the learner cannot fail to know exactly what he is going about, and the referring of the pupil back to principles, are much facilitated by the excellent typographical execution of the work. The beauty of the type and paper, and especially the very small number of errors, render it, in a mechanical point of view, superior to most American works of the kind, it being not unusual in mathematical books to find whole pages of errata.

The great excellence of the book, we remark, in conclusion, consists in its being adapted to the capacities of the majority of young persons. The clearness and minuteness of its rules and demonstrations render the subject accessible to pupils of very moderate talents, while the more gifted will find ample exercise for their powers, as well as a sufficient amount of algebraic

knowledge, to introduce them to the professedly more profound treatises, to analytic geometry, and the calculus. F.

ART. V. — SPIRIDION. PAR GEORGE SAND, (MADAME DU-
DEVANT.)

WE have for some time been seeking an opportunity of offering a few thoughts on modern French Literature. With the modern political and philosophical writings of France we have for several years been familiar ; but we had paid no attention to its lighter literature, till we saw it denounced in no measured terms, in an article, published, three or four years since, in the *London Quarterly Review*. That article led us to believe that modern French Literature must possess some admirable qualities, and be deserving of no little respect ; for we have generally been in the habit of construing the *Quarterly's* denunciations into high praise. Its denunciations were so loud, and so bitter, that we lost as little time as possible in making ourselves acquainted, to some extent, with the class of writers condemned ; and we have been not altogether unrewarded for our pains.

However, taking modern French Literature, as represented by Victor Hugo, H. de Balzac, Alexandre Dumas, and George Sand, otherwise Madame Dudevant, we cannot say that we have found as much to approve, as we were led by the outcries of the *Quarterly* to expect. We have found not much to justify the charges of indecency, of licentious and antisocial tendency ; but we have found more than we looked for, offensive to our taste and feelings. In a word, we have not been able, taking it as a whole, to sympathize with it ; or to find either the pleasure or the profit, in becoming acquainted with it, that we have a right to expect from

the Literature of a refined and highly civilized people.

France has few, if any writers, that can compare advantageously with Scott, Bulwer, Washington Irving, or even Charles Dickens. Victor Hugo by no means wants genius, talent, or learning; but he is misled by his theory of Art, and fails to give us a work that can be read with unmingled pleasure. He is the best of his class. His natural disposition, we should judge to be tender, affectionate, and even sunshiny; but having adopted the notion, that the grotesque is an essential element of the beautiful, and the horrible of the pathetic, he gives us works, which chill rather than please, and harrow up the nerves, instead of melting the heart. We have never yet been able to submit to the torture of finishing the perusal of his *Notre Dame*; and the "Last days of a Convict," we have left with the leaves uncut. His *Han d'Islande* has, however, some passages of great beauty and tenderness. His Dramas are better; and we have read with much pleasure *Marion de Lorme*, *Angelo*, and *Hernani*, horrible as they certainly are. The *Roi s'amuse*, and *Lucrèce Borgia*, have proved too much for our nerves. We abandon them to the tender mercies of the London Quarterly Review.

Balzac is certainly a writer of great power and fertility, but there is something dry and hard in his spirit. He lays open the vices and corruptions of society, it must be admitted, with the hand of a master; nothing can surpass his pictures of its hollowness, its hypocrisy, its vanity, its licentiousness; but we nowhere meet in him the warm and genial aspiration to something better. We do not feel, while reading him, as we do while reading Bulwer, and Boz, or our own Irving, that there is at bottom a genuine love of humanity, a hearty sympathy with mankind, and a strong desire to make society better, more favorable to the growth of religion, virtue, and happiness. We rise from his pages, soured, indignant, and misanthropic. We feel contempt for our race, not love; and find ourselves disposed to bid them hasten on to the devil, not to sacrifice ourselves for their redemption.

Of Alexandre Dumas we know less, than of Hugo, and of the others. He is not, however, so cold and freezing, as de Balzac. He has warmer sympathies, a more genial spirit, and is more able to look on the brighter side of things; and yet he has his faults, and faults of the same class with those we have pointed out in Victor Hugo, to whom he is inferior in talent and genius. Of George Sand we will speak more particularly hereafter.

Excluding de Balzac, who seems to write for the Parisian Saloons, we may say of modern French Literature, that it is strongly impregnated with what we have sometimes, without much precision, called social democracy. It has a tendency to recognise the rights, the claims, and to some extent the worth, of the masses. It does not bow to the aristocracy, nor court in any respect the high-born and the rich. It is plebeian in its spirit, and recognises, and sometimes without a sneer, the existence of the proletariat. Its heroes can be born without titles, and it can expose vice in high places. It furthermore is indignant at tyranny, impatient of restraint, loud in its demand for freedom, and the elevation of the masses. It moreover has a certain humanity. It opposes itself to cruel and sanguinary punishments, and would excite sympathy for even the wicked, by showing that they are never utterly abandoned. This is its good side.

But this is the good side of all modern literature. It is a remarkable fact, that since the French Revolution literature has ceased to be aristocratic. Everywhere, or nearly everywhere, throughout Christendom, and especially in Western Europe and America, there has been a decided disposition among all writers of much note, either to expose the vices of the great, — to hold up the more favored classes to ridicule or indignation, or to laud the virtues of the low, — to paint the less favored classes in the most lively colors, and under the most attractive forms. We everywhere meet the plebeian classes rising into notice or into power. They are no longer introduced upon the stage as sub-

jects of ridicule, for the amusement of the well-born and the refined. They furnish the author his heroes. Their patience under wrong, their quiet and unostentatious lives, their simple habits and gentle virtues, or their rights, and the wrongs and outrages to which they are doomed, constitute the materials of his romance. He only can fetch an echo from the heart of this age, who speaks out for universal man, and in tones of sympathy with the wronged and down-trodden.

It is well worth one's while to trace this tendency. We may see it even in the dominant taste with regard to the use of language itself. In our own language, what scholar would now write in the latinized English of old Dr. Johnson? Good taste is now to avoid as much as possible the Latin element of the language, and to use those words which are of Teutonic origin. We have discovered an unsuspected richness in the old Anglo-Saxon, and the nearer we approach to the language of Alfred and Edward, the Confessor, the more correct is said to be our taste. In France we see something similar. The writers show an increasing affection for words of Celtic origin, or at least for that portion of their language most in use with the great body of the people. All this is easily accounted for. Formerly the reading public was composed almost entirely of the aristocracy and their retainers; and of course all works, written with the intention of being published and read, must breathe the tone, and speak the language of the aristocracy. In France and England, the aristocracy were of an anti-national origin; they could therefore have but few sympathies with the great mass of the people, and hence little fondness for the purely national language. But now, the plebeian classes, the body of the nation, demand a literature, and must be addressed in their own tongue. To speak to the hearts of the great mass of the people, we must use the terms with which they are familiar, the language in which they think, and in which for generations they have been accustomed to express their feelings. Now, as the great body of the English and American people are of Anglo-Saxon origin,

the Anglo-Saxon is their principal mother tongue ; and in addressing them it is necessary to draw upon the Anglo-Saxon funds of the language, because then we speak to them in their mother tongue. The Clergy, once the literati of Europe, educated in the Latin language, made always in all their writings as much use of it as possible. So long as they gave the tone to literature, the national languages, the mother tongues of the people, would be discountenanced. But the clergy are no longer in relation to literature what they once were. The laity have been to school, and now control our literary tastes. The laity have less fondness for Latin, and more sympathy with the people who speak their national tongue. This tendency to the Anglo-Saxon elements of the English, and to the old Gallic elements in modern French, and to strict nationality in modern German, indicates the rising importance of the plebeians and the laity, and shows that the clergy and the aristocracy count for comparatively little in modern literature.

If we pass from language into the historical works of the day, we shall find the same tendency. We republish old Chronicles and Ballads, study the Bards, Scalds, Troubadours, Trouvères, and Minnesängers. We write the history of the Gauls, the Anglo-Saxons, and Slavonians. We seek everywhere for the remains of the old conquered races. We sit in judgment on the conqueror, and sympathize with the sufferings of the conquered, endured in silence for so many ages. This tendency is remarked in the brothers Thierry, especially in Augustin, author of the History of the Norman Conquest. The tendency this way is first decidedly marked in England by the publication of the old English Ballads, by Bishop Percy ; but the man, who has perhaps contributed more to it than any other writer, dead or living, is Sir Walter Scott. Whether Scott knew what he was about or not, may be a question ; but his writings mark a revolution in literature, and contain even a social revolution. We plead guilty to having misconceived the tendency of Scott's literary

labors, and of having judged him, on a former occasion, too superficially. We have just finished a critical perusal of all his novels, and we are happy to be able to say that our estimate of his character, and our judgment of the tendency of his writings, are altogether more favorable to him than what we have heretofore expressed. His sympathies are not always with power, but almost always, and apparently unknown to himself, with the conquered or oppressed classes. In regard to his own country, he has labored to exhibit the merits, the virtues, the noble qualities of the defeated party. In passing into England he is true to the same tendency. In his *Ivanhoe*, he has resuscitated the old Saxon race, and showed the struggle between them and their Norman masters, which continued long after the Conquest; and by so doing he has furnished the scholars of Europe with a key to the real history of modern society. When treating of the English Revolution in the seventeenth century, he may not in all cases have been just to the Puritans and Republicans; but still he is far less unjust to them than is commonly supposed. Then, in selecting his characters, his noblest are always from the lowest or plebeian classes. In *Ivanhoe* we have Gurth, the swineherd, a noble specimen of the true man; and the man, who could have drawn such a character, and so described his exultation, when the collar of bondage was struck from his neck, could not have been without the soul of the freeman. In this same novel, we find his best female character, — a character in which he rises far above his ordinary conception of female worth, and in which he has altogether surpassed himself, — Rebecca, the Jewess, taken from the despised tribe, the persecuted of all lands. Edie Ochiltre, the beggar, may put to shame the whole race of his noble Dukes, Counts, and Barons, and Little Barons. Something of this same tendency is to be found in the prosy Wordsworth. He, all tory as he is, has a fellow-feeling with simple humanity. The tendency is still more decided in Bulwer, and altogether more yet in Boz. Amongst ourselves we see it in Ir-

ving, in Cooper's *Bravo*, and *Headsmen*, and in some of Hawthorne's *Twice-Told Tales*.

Now this marks not merely a literary, but a social revolution. These lower classes, these plebeians and proletaries, among whom Scott, Wordsworth, and others find their heroes, are, at least, so far as concerns England and France, the descendants and representatives of the conquered races; and this tendency which we have marked indicates that a revolution in their favor has in some degree commenced, and is now in progress. The old Anglo-Saxon rises against his Norman master, the simpleman against the gentleman, and seeks to reëstablish his language and his rights; the Gallo-Roman seeks to throw off the yoke imposed by the Teutonic Frank, and to be the freeman of his natal soil.

All modern literature bears the marks, if we may so speak, of the revolt of the conquered tribes. It is insurrectionary, rebellious. Consequently it is held in great horror by the representatives of the conquerors, whenever they perceive its real character and tendency. We, whose sympathies are always with the rebels, of course approve this tendency. We discovered it in Bulwer, and hence our high regard for his writings; we discovered it in many of the modern French writers, and hence the reason of our respect for them; we did not originally discover it in Scott, Wordsworth, Irving, and Boz, and hence the reason why we have never spoken in their praise. In Irving it is slight, but he belongs after all to modern literature; in Boz it is strong, but not so strong as a superficial reading would indicate. It will, if we are not much mistaken, show itself stronger, and at the same time gentler still, in the author of *The Gentle Boy*.

In Scott it is stronger than in any of the rest, though he was probably unaware of the fact. Few, comparatively speaking, have suspected the real tendency of his writings, and hence the praise he has received from those who dread the revolution, which none more than he has contributed to bring about. We, for our part,

belong to the conquered race, if not by blood, at least by position, and we feel impatience under the yoke of the conqueror. We cherish the old national feeling, and call all our brothers who labor to retrieve the losses of the defeated party, to restore in England dominion to the Anglo-Saxon, and in France to the Gaul.

Now, as modern French literature is decidedly ruled by the old Gallic spirit, and in this respect purely national; and as it marks an effort of the mass, who have been held in bondage, to recover the rights originally wrested from them by invading tribes; and not only marks that effort, but strengthens it, and promises to render it successful; we approve it, we prize it, and bid its authors God speed. Viewed in this light, it is eminently moral and social, tends eminently to the emancipation of the masses, and to the introduction of a better and a nobler social order.

But, viewed under the relation of art, and its bearing on mere private morals, we cannot commend it without important reservations. But in this respect even, we are far from thinking it at all inferior to the great mass of contemporary English literature, while it is decidedly superior to the old French literature. Its general conception is undoubtedly just, but it abuses its freedom from old classic restraints, and runs into innumerable extravagances. Having come down from the stilts on which it stalked over the stage, in the age of Louis Quatorze, and finding itself on its natural feet, it is so delighted that it frisks about sometimes in a manner quite unseemly, and exhibits a variety of antic motions and tricks, with which we could very easily dispense.

We do not infer the degeneracy of France from this literature, nor that French society is necessarily exceedingly corrupt. Nor do we believe this literature will be found generally corrupting. But we should relish it better, if it would veil its horrors, if it would smile less grotesquely, and exhibit less of the satyr. We believe that the writer, who puts us in good humor with ourselves and with the world, who draws us off from the dwarfed and the deformed, to dwell with the grand and beauti-

ful, will do the most for private morals and for social progress. We believe he, who unveils the glories of Paradise, and permits the sinner to see the beauty and bliss of the saints, will more effectually convert him to God, than he who only exposes to his view the tortures, and fills his ears with the howlings, of the damned. We are sure that when we stand looking upon a smiling landscape, beneath a serene sky, and inhaling the sweet fragrance of flowers, at peace with ourselves and with the world, we are in our happiest mood to labor for our fellow men, or to give ourselves up to live or to die for a great or noble cause. No doubt virtue leads to happiness; but it is a truth equally deserving our consideration, that happiness leads to virtue. The more happy you render your fellow men, the more virtuous will you render them. The man, who finds a paradise in the bosom of his family, who is surrounded by all the charms of home, and whose heart is best formed to enjoy the sweets of domestic affections, the love of wife and children, is *not* the last to hear the voice of his country or of his race, and to rush to the frontier, to make a rampart of his body against the enemy.

The fault, then, of French literature, a fault which we find also with English literature, is that it presents us too many images of vice, crime, and horror, and does not call forth the warmer, gentler, and holier aspirations of our nature. It affects us painfully; it raises a storm of passion in our bosoms, and leaves us mad and miserable. We have been affected by the nightmare, and it is long after reading it, before our blood circulates freely again, and we recover our wonted strength and equanimity. There may have been a period in our life when we should have delighted in the stormy passions described, but we are not ashamed to own, that, as we have had occasion from the vicissitudes of life to enlarge our own experience, and to suffer from the wounds that few in the warfare of life can escape, we grow weary of the battle, and come to envy those who cultivate in peace their native vales, and dance to the rustic pipe. We hear not the war-trumpet

with delight, and we shrink from the conflict. Thus it is this stormy literature, which only rouses passion and stirs up all within, like the ocean when lashed into fury by the tempest, ceases to charm, and we wish it more peaceful, more serene, more sunshiny.

So much for modern French Literature in general. We come now to George Sand, otherwise Madame Dudevant, though we disclaim in the outset all intention of offering anything like a regular review of her writings. We have found her loudly and very generally censured, and have therefore, been led to sympathize with her. We have heard her called many hard names, and have therefore presumed, without other evidence, that she must have great and positive merits. Moreover, she is a writer of great ability; we may even say, of powerful genius; the most so of any female writer, we are acquainted with, ancient or modern. She is in many respects the first and best of the authors of modern French Literature. We cannot indeed place her above Victor Hugo, but we confess, that we prefer her writings to his, and believe them possessed of greater æsthetic and moral merits.

In assuming, as we are told she sometimes does, the male attire, Madame Dudevant seems also to assume no little of true masculine thought and spirit. In originality, depth, and vigor of thought and expression, her writings betray very little of the woman. Her style is rich, flowing, graceful, delicate, and at the same time, terse, vigorous, and free from that diffuseness, the besetting sin of most French writers, and of French female writers in particular. In a word, she writes so well, that for some time she was able to impose upon the acutest critics of France and England, and to make it believed, that George Sand was really, as *his* name and dress purported, a man. This, which we think is high praise, we presume will be thought by some, in these days of "Woman's Rights," to be but a sorry compliment. Somewhat of a revolution in the relative position of the sexes would seem to be going on.

Man's long-admitted superiority, which has stamped itself upon all the institutions of society, and is inwoven with the very texture of language itself, is now questioned, and we are told that he must cease to regard himself as lord of this lower world, surrender the sacred *symbol* of authority to woman, don the petticoat, and henceforth handle the distaff. Alas! we have fallen on evil days. With your Mary Wolstonecrafts, Fanny Wrights, Harriet Martineaus, your Chapmans and your Folsoms, we can no longer escape by conceding woman's equality to man, but we must own her superiority; and instead of thinking that we praise a woman, by saying that she writes almost as well as a man, we must rather praise the man by saying that he writes almost as well as a woman.

Nevertheless, at the risk of being "brained by my lady's fan," we must still hold on to the old doctrine of man's superiority, save in what may be called woman's more appropriate sphere of life. In her own sphere, as a wife, and a mother, in the quiet affections and duties of home, which after all is the more important and the more elevated sphere, we readily own woman's equality, and even her superiority; but we question her power to compete successfully with man in any of the other departments of life. Science is indebted to her for no important discovery, and Art for no master-piece or *mistress-piece*. She devotes more time and study to poetry than man does, and yet she has produced no Iliad, no Paradise Lost; in music she produces nothing, and cannot even equal man in the bare execution of the melodies composed by the great masters. She has succeeded in copying with tolerable accuracy, but has never been able to give us an original picture or an original statue of much merit. Indeed, she generally does not contend for her power to equal man. They, who assert her ability, as a general rule, to compete successfully with man in Art and Science, in the several departments of outdoor as well as indoor life, only expose themselves to her scorn. She does not wish to be, nor does she wish to be considered, superior to man.

Her great want is, — not to love; — but to reverence ; and she would soon cease to love man, if she could not look up to him, and reverence him. She is so made, — not so educated, but so made, — that she finds the highest and sweetest gratification of her ambition in the success of her husband, or her son. She rarely is ambitious for her own sake. Her desire is unto her husband, in whom she would live and reign, in whose existence she would completely merge her own. It is for him only, or as a mother for her children, that she would acquire wealth, fame, or distinction. It is the order of nature that it should be so, and it is in this way that woman becomes really a “help meet” for man, and the peace and loveliness of domestic life are secured. We think, therefore, our “Woman’s Rights” people would do well to let it remain undisturbed. We think also, that there is more gallantry than wisdom in the growing fashion of altering the marriage covenant, so that the wife no longer promises to *obey* her husband.

This last reminds us of another ultraism coming into vogue. There is already a class of radicals among us who think it a gross outrage upon natural rights, that children should be required to obey their parents, and we have even heard it seriously contended that we should have a Rights of Children’s Society, to protect the pretty dears from the despotism of their fathers and mothers,— fathers more especially ; and to secure them the free and unimpeded enjoyment of the natural liberty of going and coming when and where they please. When this society shall have gone into operation, we propose the formation of another to save the needle from its slavery to the pole, and the body from its subjection to the law of gravitation. It is intolerable tyranny, that of compelling the needle at all seasons, in all weathers, by day and by night, without the least time for rest or relaxation, to “point trembling to the pole,” and calls aloud upon all the friends of freedom for redress. Moreover, what slavery more gross or complete than that of our bodies, nay, of all nature to

the law of gravitation? Now, we may as well complain of those laws to which the natural world is subjected, as of those by which God governs the moral world. This slavery of women and children to the tyrant man, which does so sorely vex the modern friends of freedom, perhaps, correctly rendered, would be merely the protection of the weak and helpless by the strong. The power, man claims over his wife and children, is only that which he needs in order to be the protector of those he loves.

Against this power, so far as concerns the wife, the writings of Madame Dudevant are a loud, indignant, and yet an eloquent and touching protest. Her writings to a very considerable extent seem to have been called forth by a deep sense of the real or imaginary sufferings of woman. Women are represented to us as the victims of a false and hollow-hearted civilization, of unjust and tyrannical laws, of barbarous husbands, doomed to be tied to men they cannot love, to suffer from the want of some object for their affections, in a word, to go through life sighing and pining for what they have not, and cannot have, and to die poor, miserable, broken-hearted things. Poor Madame Dudevant, we doubt not that thou hast suffered much, and that thou hast faithfully unfolded to us much of thy own painful experience, for which we are duly grateful. We can easily believe all the sentimental tortures, thou so eloquently and pathetically settest forth as endured by thy sex, are really endured by them. But after all, my dear Madame, a few hours each day of employment in the labors performed by thy cook or chamber-maid, with a simpler diet, would improve thy digestion, and save thee from the greater part of them. *Ma chère amie*, have you ever reflected how much the digestion has to do with these sentimental tortures? The lady, who should be compelled to live on six pence a day, and to earn it by bodily labor, would keep clear of them all. It is idleness, luxury, refinement, that produce them; and the best way to cure them would not be to sue out a divorce from thy husband, but to dismiss thy servants,

and do thyself the labor of thy own house-keeping. Nay, do not frown, and turn away in disgust. Thou hast no conception how it will improve the temper and manners of this brute of a husband, to sit down to a dinner of thy own cooking. Penelope kept off the suitors, and herself faithful to her lord, by keeping herself constantly at the loom.

Seriously, we think it is time that some one venture to contradict this nonsense becoming so fashionable, about the hard fate of woman, representing her as the slave of man's passions, and the victim of his tyranny, — a poor, frail, sensitive being, that finds earth to her nothing but a vale of tears, and domestic life, for which she is so well fitted, but a sort of hell in miniature. We do not believe a word of all this. Here and there a husband may be found, no doubt, who is disposed to tyrannize, and who does abuse his wife ; but as a general rule, man has no such disposition. Wives, no doubt, suffer in many instances from the temper of their husbands, but husbands sometimes suffer from their wives ; but they have the self-respect, for the most part, to suffer in silence. We see no reason for thinking that the lot of woman is one of peculiar hardship. The principal evil, to which she seems to us exposed, is idleness, brought about in consequence of the changes which have been effected in the forms of our industry.

Moreover, we believe, that much of this which is said about woman's exquisite sensibility is sheer nonsense. The great relief from the ills of life is employment, in a word, work. Man was made to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and when he does not, he suffers. The changes which have been introduced into society, imposing less active duties than formerly on the women of the easy classes, have given to these women ample time and opportunity to experience the sentimental sufferings, which necessarily spring from comparative idleness and luxury. There is, no doubt, then, much real suffering in these classes. But we have yet to be convinced, that woman is so organized as to be susceptible of acuter sufferings than man. For our

part, we believe the reverse, if there be any difference, is the fact. Man is more angular, has more elbows to be struck, and a more irritable temperament. Women submit to pain more readily than men, not, we apprehend, because they have more power of endurance, but because they actually suffer less than men in similar circumstances. If we pass from physical to mental sufferings, we believe it is the same. Man can love as deeply, as truly, and as tenderly as woman, and he feels, we apprehend, not less acutely than woman the pang of unrequited or disappointed affection. He, however, bears up against it, because it is not manly to give way to it. We fancy the husband, who has been disappointed in his wife, who finds that between him and her there is nothing of that compatibility of temper, oneness of feeling, and ready sympathy, he had anticipated, suffers no less than the wife, on making the same discovery. And then for remedy, — the wife has as many resources as the husband ; for she may employ herself as well as he ; and when she becomes a mother, she finds, in the pleasures of maternal affection, ample amends for the want of the conjugal. In the love of her children, she has even a resource which the husband has not, or at least only to a feeble extent. He, it may be said, can take an active part in politics, in the Church, in the world, in chasing ambition or wealth, and thus find wherewithal to fill up the vacuum in his heart. So may the wife take an active part in house-keeping, in superintending her domestic arrangements, in educating her children, and solacing the afflicted. There is as ample room for her activity, as for his.

Nor can we go along with our sentimental reformers, in looking to divorce as a remedy for the evils they find in married life. Married life unquestionably is not that perfect paradise, which the brilliant fancies of the young couple, who for the first time tell to each other their mutual love, have painted it ; and most wisely ordered is it, that it should not be. The life of man in this world is destined to be one of toil and struggle. Man is born to work. If marriage, then, realized that

Claude Lorrain dream of youth, if it brought us, without interruption, that exquisite delight and perfect satisfaction, which the inexperienced expect from it, we should find it impossible to make the necessary efforts to sustain life, to perform our part in the world ; and marriage would be only a sort of euthanasia. A little uneasiness, some little want, is necessary, to compel each to work ; for love, when perfect, though very desirable and very pleasant, is after all a little too absorbing. We do not think it, then, an evil, that married life is not a life of perfect bliss.

But even were it so, divorce would be the worst possible remedy, save in very rare cases. The truth is, we have more power to control and regulate our feelings, than modern philosophy admits. Idleness and indulgence are the principal causes of our inability to control our sentiments. Constant employment, and constant effort at self-mastery will work miracles for us. The parties, who find themselves not so well matched as they expected to be, then, may get over the difficulty, if they will make the effort. They can conform one to the other, and come to harmonize tolerably well. It is a bad doctrine in morals, this, that our feelings are altogether beyond our control. We can, if we will do our best, bring our feelings to go hand in hand with what we believe to be our duty.

Then again, we protest against the lawfulness of divorce. Marriage by its own nature is absolutely indissoluble. When a couple enter into the marriage relation, they do it for life ; they understand it, and they mean it for life. If they entered it with any reservation, with an understanding that it was to continue only for a period, only so long as it should be mutually agreeable to themselves, they would not look upon it as marriage ; it would want, in their eyes, the character of sanctity, and would be not at all distinguishable from a mere transient commerce of passion and caprice. Divorce, then, can never be claimed by the parties themselves, as a matter of justice, can never be granted, merely on the ground of the mutual consent of the parties con-

cerned ; and can be tolerated only in those rare cases, which justify the exercise of mercy on the part of the lawgiver ; when the lawgiver may arrest the ordinary course of the law, through compassion to one of the parties, grossly wronged or offended by the other, or to prevent a greater moral and social evil. It can be properly granted only by the special act of the lawmaking power. Consequently, it will be wholly impossible to grant that freedom of divorce, contended for by reformers on this subject, without abandoning the marriage institution altogether. But even if divorce were lawful, and marriage were dissoluble at the will of one party, or of both parties, it would bring woman very little relief. The passions or the sentiments, which would crave a divorce, would rarely be able to find the satisfaction demanded. The cause of the suffering complained of is not, after all, so much the result of the incompatibility of the parties, as we sometimes suppose. It is inherent in one or both of the parties, and would be not less active, as a general rule, in any new relations one or the other might form.

So far as it concerns certain property relations, we think our laws might, and should be modified in favor of woman. In a commonwealth like ours, where so much attention is paid to female cultivation, where there is a constantly increasing excess of females, and consequently where a large number must inevitably remain single through life, women's facilities for acquiring, holding, transferring, or disposing of property, should approach as near as possible to those of the other sex. But beyond these, we see no special occasion to clamor for woman's rights, or any more ground to complain of man's wrongs to woman, than of woman's wrongs to man. Man is by no means generally disposed to tyrannize over woman ; and we do not believe that the instances, in which husbands love their wives, are so rare as is sometimes imagined. Man is more frequently woman's slave, than she is his. The cords with which she binds him may be finer, and apparently weaker than those with which he binds her ; but they are not

the less effectual. Through his susceptibility, through those very qualities in him, which it is contended by some that she alone possesses, she is able to do with him very much as she pleases ; and we have yet to learn, that she never exercises her power, save with moderation. Man, to say the least, is as weak before her, as she is before him ; and if she does not enjoy her rights as fully as he does his, the fault is no more his than hers.

As for this political equality, which some are claiming for woman, we have less and less sympathy with it every day. We formerly contended for it, and have preached and written in its defence. But we do not think woman would gain anything by its admission, at least, so long as we retain our present political organization. The peculiar temperament and genius of woman does not fit her to excel as a legislator, or as a judge. The only branch of government, in which she would acquit herself tolerably, would be the executive. She is a good administrator, and a keen judge of character, which would enable her to select faithful and competent agents. Nevertheless, were she to enter freely with us the political arena, she would soon compel us to forget her sex, and to treat her as a second or third rate man. We hope the time will never come when, in our intercourse with her, the difference of sex can be forgotten on either side. We have never yet known any good to come from attempts to obliterate the great landmarks of nature. We must therefore conclude with saying, that, upon the whole, we have no sympathy with the clamor about woman's rights ; no belief in the alleged fact, that she is universally the victim of that horrid brute, man ; or that she has any peculiar wrongs to be redressed. Life, no doubt, has its evils ; men and women both suffer, — the married and the unmarried, the divorced, and the undivorced, and suffer often, and long, and deeply ; but the remedy is not in pitting one sex against the other, but in laboring together with such mutual love and confidence as there may be, to remove those evils which are removable, and in aiding and encouraging each other to bear

with firmness, and without a murmur, what must be borne. The cure for these vague, sentimental sorrows, these pangs of disappointed or unrequited affections, and the horror of being wedded, a frail, delicate thing, all life, all love, all sensibility, to a coarse, unsympathizing husband, will not be found in reading sentimental novels, nor in indignant, though eloquent protests against all institutions, domestic or social; but in a firm resolve to do one's duty, in active employment in some useful calling, and in unremitted efforts to lighten the burdens, and solace the afflictions of our brethren. No small portion of our misery springs from our love of it, and fear of losing it. We hug it to our bosoms, we cherish it, lavish on it the fondest caresses, and cannot be persuaded to let it go. If at any moment it seems to be escaping us, we are alarmed, and like the Countess in one of Dumas' Plays, not a little grieved to find ourselves on the point of being — happy!

As society advances in wealth and artificial refinement, as the numbers of those who find themselves in easy circumstances increase, the more decided must be the tendency to these sentimental sufferings, and the more general this ill-at-ease of which we hear and experience so much. Naturally, then, will it find more and more expression in our literature. This is unquestionably an evil, and an evil which has been greatly exaggerated of late, by the large accessions which have been made to the number of female writers. Women are at this moment gaining almost a monopoly of our literature; they have suddenly stepped forth from the retired apartments of domestic life, to lay open before us their feelings, fancies, and caprices. The result is the inundation of the land with a flood of sentimentality.

But after all, this evil is of short duration, and one which will cure itself. Woman wants what may be termed productive genius; but she excels as a critic. She has a finer, and in most matters a more correct taste than man. Her powers of execution are not equal to her judgment. Her own productions will

never satisfy herself. Nor will she be satisfied with productions by the other sex possessing characteristics similar to those of her own. Woman is herself always more or less sentimental, and sentimentalism will always characterize her productions ; but she detests mere sentimentalism in man. He, who would commend himself to woman, must indeed possess deep and genuine feeling, real tenderness and delicacy of sentiment, but he must not sigh and shed tears ; he must not whimper ; he must be robust, bold, vigorous, energetic, in one word, *MANLY*. Those dapper little gentlemen, who talk sentiment, or write verses in albums, and who are really fit only to stand behind the counter and sell tape by the half or quarter yard, are never the men, who can gain the approbation or the affections of a genuine woman. She demands always the genuine man. No matter if his arm is brawney, his frame somewhat huge, and his manners unrefined, if there be at bottom a true man with a bold spirit, a brave heart, and an heroic soul.

Now these qualities, which woman demands in man, she requires him always to express in his literature ; and it will ere long be discovered, that as soon as the novelty of being herself an author passes off, she will tolerate no literature that is not strong and manly, giving expression to bold and energetic feelings, to brave thoughts, and high aspirings. The sickliness of her own productions she will not tolerate for a moment, in those of the other sex. The growing literary influence of woman, which now swells the flood of sentimentality, will ultimately tend to make our literature more robust and healthy. And as men must study to be as unlike women as possible, in their characters, in order to please them, their natural desire to please them will make them, as authors, study to be strong, healthy, and unsentimental. In this way literature will recover its tone, and in turn contribute to the health of society.

But we have rambled so far from our subject, that it is now too late to return to it. George Sand, upon the

whole, though a woman, is to us the most pleasing and the most inspiring of the modern authors of popular French literature. She has great purity of feeling, great depth and delicacy of sentiment, and rare beauty and strength of expression. If she exposes vice, or the defects of existing domestic or social arrangements, it is never in mere wantonness. You feel always that you are reading the utterances of an earnest spirit, always and everywhere aspiring to something better. You feel the unrest in which she is, and from which she tries to escape, and you honor her as a brave and struggling spirit, who would be better, do better, and make the world better, all men and women happier and lovelier, if she could. But you feel all the while, that she is out of health, that the tone of her feelings is diseased; and you are unable to rise from the perusal of one of her works, cheered and invigorated for the combat of life. O sing us, my dear lady, a livelier strain; do not oppress us ever with that monotonous wail of the soul, seeking in vain to solve the problem of its own destiny. Enough of those melancholy notes. Sing us a song of gladness; if you cannot, sing us a bold war song, and send us forth ready to do valiant battle against the enemies of our peace and virtue.

Spiridion, the work named at the head of this article, is properly a religious work, written with the same purpose that we had in writing Charles Elwood, or the Infidel Converted. It details the experience of an ingenuous mind, in its progress through the several stages of doubt, unbelief, to absolute infidelity, and from that depth of horror and desolation, up to something like faith in God and immortality. The conclusion to which she arrives, the solution she offers of the enigma of existence, is worthy of study, as marking the tendency of religious speculation among the popular writers in France, and more especially as showing the growing influence of the doctrines of *l'Ecole de Saint-Simonienne*. We intended to notice this solution at length; but we have left ourselves no room. We, however, recommend the book to all who are capa-

ble of appreciating fine writing, of sympathizing with free thought, and liberal feeling. We consider it a very remarkable book, a book not without a deep significance. It is worthy of a place in Mr. Ripley's series of *Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature*. We have never read a book on religious subjects, that contained so many passages, which seemed to be perfect transcripts from our own experience.

EDITOR.

ART. VI. LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

Twice-Told Tales. By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston: James Munroe and Co. 1842. 2 vols. 16mo. — These volumes are not introduced for the purpose of being criticised, for their author, in his own department, is one of those very few men, born to give law to criticism, not to receive the law from it; nor are they introduced for the sake of being commended to the public, for they are already well known; and no lover of American literature can be presumed to be ignorant of them. We notice them simply, to tell the author that these *Tales*, excellent as they are, are not precisely what he owes to his country. In them he has done much, and shown us that he can do more. He is a genuine artist. His mind is creative; more so than that of any other American writer that has yet appeared, with the exception, perhaps, of Washington Irving. He has wit, humor, pathos, in abundance; an eye for all that is wild, beautiful, or picturesque in nature; a generous sympathy with all forms of life, thought, and feeling, and warm, deep, unfailing love of his race. He has withal a vigorous intellect, and a serene and healthy spirit. He is gentle, but robust and manly; full of tenderness, but never maudlin. Through all his writings there runs a pure and living stream of manly thought and feeling, which characterizes always the true man, the Christian, the republican, and the patriot. He may be, if he tries, with several improvements, to the literature of his country, all that Boz is to that of England. He possesses a higher order of intellect and genius than Boz, stronger, and purer. He has more earnestness. The creator of "The gentle Boy" compares advantageously with the creator of "Little Nell." The Gentle Boy is indeed but a sketch; yet a sketch that betrays in every stroke the hand of the master; and we think, it required a much higher order of genius to conceive it, so gentle, so sweet, so calm, so full of life, of love,

than it did to conceive the character of Little Nell, confessedly the most beautiful of Dickens's creations.

But we have no room for remarks. We have wished merely to enrol ourselves among those, who regard Mr. Hawthorne as fitted to stand at the head of American Literature. We see the pledge of this in his modesty, in his simplicity, and in his sympathy with all that is young, fresh, childlike; and above all in his originality, and pure, deep feeling of nationality. We pray him to remember that, while we approve his love of children, and admire much the books he has sent out for them, we do not forget that he is capable of writing for men, for all ages; and we ask him to attempt a higher and a bolder strain than he has thus far done. To those, if such there are, who have not read these Twice-Told Tales, we recommend them as being two as pleasant volumes to read, as pure and as healthy in their influence, as any two that can be found in the compass of our literature.

The Ideal Man. A conversation between Two Friends, upon the Beautiful, the Good, and the True, as manifested in actual Life. By a Philokalist. Boston: E. P. Peabody. 1842. 12mo. pp. 160. — The title of this book is long and unpromising; the pages also are broad, and have a heavy and forbidding look; there is nothing in the style or matter that suddenly arrests the attention of him who is listlessly turning over its leaves; and almost every one will be disposed, after a hasty glance, to throw it down, with the feeling that, though it may be a very good book, it must be also a very dull one. And yet this judgment would be altogether wrong. We have found the book quite readable, and have been favorably impressed with the author's goodness of heart, seriousness of purpose, and general literary ability. We will not claim for the book uncommon brilliancy, or great originality, but we have noted several of its passages which are very felicitous, striking as to thought, and beautiful in manner. When we consider that the author is a foreigner, and writing in a foreign tongue, we are struck with the general purity, freedom, and flexibility of his language. The author is an exile in this country, from his home, his native land, the unhappy Poland. We hope our countrymen will make him regret his exile as little as possible. He has decidedly a literary turn of mind, a free spirit, and a warm heart; and they will find themselves well repaid for encouraging his literary enterprises.

Psychology, or Elements of a New System of Mental Philosophy, on the basis of Consciousness and Common Sense. Designed for Colleges and Academies. By S. S. SCHMUCKER, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology, in the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg, (Pa). New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1842. 12mo. pp. 227. — We have only this moment received this volume, and have had time barely to glance at some few of its pages. We have, however, read enough in it to satisfy ourselves that, notwithstanding it issues from the

press of the Messrs. Harper, it has very considerable merits. The author has evidently bestowed much time and pains in the investigation of metaphysical subjects, and not altogether without success. What important discoveries he has made, which entitle him to call his system "new," we have not yet ascertained; but we like his general classification of the mental phenomena. He rejects the usual classification of English philosophy, modifies that of the German, and virtually accepts, without acknowledgment, that of Cousin. He divides the mental phenomena into 1. Cognitive Ideas; 2. Sentient Ideas; 3. Active Operations. Cousin's classification is, 1. Sensations; 2. Cognitions; 3. Actions, voluntary and spontaneous. The two classifications are, then, virtually the same.

Mr. Schmucker bases his classification on the operations of the mind, not on the faculties or powers of the mind, because, as he says, we know nothing of mind in itself. But we know mind, so far as it enters into its phenomena. If among these phenomena we find cognitions, we have a right to affirm that the mind has the power or faculty of knowing; if we find sensations, or "sentient ideas," we have a right to infer that the soul has the power or faculty to feel; and so on. In strictness, we believe it more scientific to found the classification on the powers or faculties of the soul, than on the observable differences of the phenomena themselves. However, this is a slight matter. In the next place, Mr. Schmucker deserves praise for enlarging the third division, so as to embrace the whole activity of the soul. The Germans include in this division only volitions; but volitions are merely those of our actions which are performed with consciousness; but I act just as much when I raise my arm unconsciously, as when I raise it consciously.

But we must object to the author, that he calls our mental phenomena *ideas*, in the sense in which Locke uses the term, thus laying again the foundation for the theory which Reid spent so much time in overthrowing. The mind is immediately conversant, not with certain ideas or mental representations of objects, but with the objects themselves. What Mr. Schmucker means by ideas is best expressed by the word notion; and is termed by Cousin very properly the *form* of the thought. In consequence of his view of ideas, the author is unable to get from the subjective world to the objective. He really can make out scientifically the existence of no world besides my own internal world. He himself virtually admits this. We converse not, he says, with objective entities themselves, but with certain ideas or mental representations of them. These mental representations are, then, all that we can know. How will he show that there must needs be an objective reality, or entity, to answer to this mental representation? He nowhere shows, so far as we have seen, what we conceive to be the great discovery of modern metaphysics, that this mental representation, as he calls it, is merely the relation of the thinker and the object thought in the fact of consciousness, and is the notion which the mind forms, in the act of thinking, of the subject and object, and can never be formed, save when both subject and object are taken into view by the subject thinking.

Moreover, Mr. Schmucker, in making this classification which he does of the mental phenomena, appears to us to forget, that there are in real life no pure cognitions, no pure sentient ideas, no pure active operations. The mind is a unity, and manifests itself always as a unity; but as a unity existing in triplicity. Every phenomenon of the soul is cognition, and sentiment, and action at once. This analysis which we make is fatal to all true philosophy. We must take thought, not as analysed, but in its primitive synthesis, as the basis of our systems. We remark also, that the author is very far from perceiving the precise nature of what is termed consciousness, and is somewhat misled by the Scottish School, which has treated consciousness, of which it makes great use, *not* with rare sagacity. We refer, the reader for our view of it, to the first article in the present number.

Several more criticisms we could offer on even the few pages we have read, but we forbear. While we are far from believing that the work merits to be regarded as a standard work for schools and colleges, we think it still worthy of being studied. The author is a man of ability, of a free mind, and of an earnest purpose; and he writes with great ease and perspicuity. This style, bating his terminology, is very suitable to a work of this kind. Upon the whole, we are gratified to meet with the work, if for no other reason, at least as indicating a growing interest in metaphysical subjects.

Psychology, or a View of the Human Soul: including Anthropology. Adapted for the use of colleges. By the Rev. FREDERICK A. RAUCH, D.D., late President of Marshall College, Penn. Second edition, revised and improved. New-York: M. W. Dodd; Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1841. — The first edition of this work did not meet our eye, and we knew not of the existence of such a work, till the appearance of this second edition. It is by a very worthy German, now no more, who was obliged to leave his own country, in consequence of entertaining liberal political opinions. It is a work of more than ordinary pretension, and of even more than ordinary merit. It is much superior in learning, ability, and the justness of its views, to the work of Mr. Schmucker. As we intend to return to it soon, and to give it an elaborate examination, we content ourselves now with merely commending it to our readers, as one of the very best philosophical works ever published in the country, and one which, if it does not always teach the truth, rarely, if ever, teaches falsehood. The author is, from beginning to end, on the very verge of discovering the basis of what we regard as the true system of philosophy for our epoch. His style is diffuse, but his expression is hearty, and rarely inelegant, and often very beautiful. His general method of handling his subject is worthy of praise, and very remarkable in a German.

Lectures to Ladies, on Anatomy and Physiology. By Mrs. MARY S. GOVE. Boston: Saxton & Pierce. 1842. 16mo. pp. 300. — The only fault we have to find with this book is with the title, that it reads *Lectures to Ladies*, instead of *Lectures to Women*. Woman is a better and a higher term than Lady. Ladies are sometimes very weak and disagreeable. Women are always deserving of honor and respect from

every manly heart. Mrs. Gove has here treated an important subject in a delicate and agreeable manner. She deserves great credit for doing what she can to call the attention of her sex to the importance of physical education. She is, so far as we can judge, in general just in her views, and correct in her information. She has ventured to treat some matters, on which many have thought it most prudent to be silent; but while we have been keeping silence, the evil has been growing; and we know no reason in the world, why we should not struggle to save the community from the deplorable effects of pollution, and especially self-pollution, which extends far, and is practised by those whose moral principles would recoil with horror from what Mrs. Gove calls *social* licentiousness. Masturbation does more than any other cause, perhaps than all other causes combined, to people our lunatic asylums; and sincerely do we thank Mrs. Gove for daring, in our falsely delicate society, to raise her warning voice, which she has done, and in tones which can offend nobody.

Lectures on Agricultural Chemistry and Geology. By J. F. W. JOHNSTON, M.A., F.R.SS. L. & E., &c. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842. 12mo. pp. 255 and 40.—The importance of introducing more and more science into the culture of the earth, of making our farming operations more scientific, is every day becoming more and more widely felt. This is well. But we are anxious to see our own farmers trying experiments, and works for their aid should be written in this country, founded on experiments made upon our own soils, and in our own climate. Works by foreigners, written for a country widely different in the character of its soils, and the temperature of the climate, or in its atmospheric changes, must always be taken with due allowance. These Lectures, however, by Mr. Johnston, of which the volume before us comprises the first part, we should think, might be studied with advantage by all our farmers. This volume would make a good introduction to the one by Dr. Liebig, noticed in a previous number of this journal.

War and Peace: the evils of the first, and a plan for preserving the last. By WILLIAM JAY. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842. 12mo. pp. 101.—A book possibly written by a well-meaning man, for a praiseworthy object; but by a man who, if he believe in his own nostrums, is much better fitted for the moon than for the earth. Nobody questions the evils of war; but there are greater evils. It is better to fight, to kill or be killed on the battle-field, than to live and die a slave. He, who will not fight for freedom, for justice, country, humanity, in words, and in deeds too, should be banished from society; and if, when his country is threatened with a war, and has need of the whole martial support of her citizens, he came forward to prate of the evils of war, and the blessings of peace, why, up with him to the lamp-post. His *philanthropy* makes him a traitor. Wars will not cease till men become good Christians; and till they cease, men cannot be good Christians without now and then doing battle for justice, for country, or for humanity. War is one of the rights of humanity.

Ancient Greece. From the German of ARNOLD H. L. HEEREN. By GEORGE BANCROFT. Second American edition. Boston: Little & Brown. 1842. 8vo. pp. 344.—The character of this book is told, when

we mention the names of its author and translator. The original work is one of great merit, and the translation is all that could be desired. The translation by Mr. Bancroft, we believe, has been republished two or three times in England, and without acknowledgment. It is adopted as a text book in Cambridge University.

Chapters on Churchyards. By CAROLINE SOUTHEY, (Miss BOWLES,) Authoress of *Solitary Hours*, &c. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1842. 12mo. pp. 322.—A very pleasant book on a grave subject, we are told by those who profess to have read it.

An offering of Sympathy to the Afflicted; especially to parents bereaved of their children. Being a collection from manuscripts never before published. With an appendix of extracts from various authors. By FRANCIS PARKMAN. Third edition. Boston: James Munroe & Co. London: John Green. 1842. 16mo. pp. 270.—This is a valuable little work. Man in this world is ever in need of solace. He, who has the greatest power to sympathize with him, to soothe his sorrows, and lighten his afflictions, is his best friend. Dr. Parkman has here prepared a volume, which may indeed be regarded as an offering of sympathy.

Primer of Reading and Drawing. By MARY T. PEABODY. Boston: E. P. Peabody. 1841.—From the examination we have made of this book, we believe it admirably adapted to its purpose, and worthy to have a place in all our primary schools. It is on a plan somewhat novel, but one that will finally commend itself to all who are instructors of children.

Key to the French Language. By J. A. WEISSE. Boston: E. P. Peabody. 1842.—This little book, in the compass of 210 pages, gives a complete grammar of the French language, with a sufficient number of exercises. It has singular merits. It does not contain a superfluous word; and what it does contain, is just the answer of the questions learners ask. We understand its author prepared it with primary reference to his own teaching, and it confirms his title to the reputation of being one of the very best teachers of the language. We understand he has lately come into this vicinity, and this is the certificate he offers. It is certainly most satisfactory. The book has another advantage; it is the cheapest French grammar offered for sale.

Ollendorf's German Grammar. Frankfort-on-the-Maine. 1840. 12mo. pp. 436.—This grammar is the production, also, of a practised and practical teacher. It is the very best manual for the acquisition of a foreign language we have ever known; and we are glad that by a large importation of it, at a moderate price, one of our Boston booksellers, E. P. Peabody, has put it in every person's power to learn German without an instructor. At the same time, the book is a capital one for a school, enabling the teacher to instruct a large class at once, and in the best manner, the ear being brought to bear upon the memory of the words. A solitary student will find himself, also, much aided, by compelling himself to study the lessons aloud. When this is done, the exercises hardly need to be written.